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This thesis attempts to explore the influence that Duncan Sandys' 
experiences of the Second World War had on his policy preferences, and 
policy-making, in relation to British defence policy during his years in 
government. This is a significant period in British nuclear policy which 
began with thermonuclear weaponry being placed ostentatiously at the 
centre of British defence planning in the 1957 Defence White Paper, and 
ended with the British acquiring the latest American nuclear weapon 
technology as a consequence of the Polaris Sales Agreement. It also saw 
intense discussion of the nature and type of nuclear weaponry the British 
government sought to wield in the Cold War, with attempts to build 
indigenous land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and where British 
nuclear policy was discussed in extreme depth in government. The thesis 
explores this area by focusing on Duncan Sandys and examining his 
interaction with prominent aspects of the defence policy-making process. It 
argues that Sandys sought to navigate his way through this period of 
uncertainty by drawing heavily upon his experiences of the Second World 
War, and that this method of policy-making should be seen as a nuclear 
belief system unique to the individual, and therefore critical in 
understanding how British policy-makers approached the Cold War at the 
highest levels of government. 
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Introduction 
 
Unlike many politicians of his generation, Duncan Sandys has not been the subject of 
any detailed study. There have been no biographies, and he did not publish any diaries 
or memoirs.
1
 When not simply referred to in passing as Winston Churchill's son-in-law, 
the main recurring item of personal information offered in relation to his work is that 
which concerns his difficult character - something Harold Macmillan speculated might 
owe itself to 'German blood', and which caused Gerald Templer, the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff during Sandys' first year at the Ministry of Defence, to 
physically attack him and refuse to speak to him for twenty years.
2
 Even Ian Smith, the 
formidable Rhodesian white minority leader with whom Sandys dealt with as Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, found him 'abrupt, even tending to aggressiveness' and 
'completely devoid of those qualities of diplomacy and tact associated with British 
"statesmen"'.
3
 
 
   Where he has been discussed in direct relation to the policy-making process, 
historians have tended to neglect the influence that his experiences during the Second 
World War might have had on his policy preferences, albeit whilst occasionally 
accepting them as a non-specific influence.
4
 Martin S. Navias has written that the 
Second World War left a 'lasting impression' on Sandys: 
 
[T]o the extent that he considered himself well cognizant of the major 
changes taking place in the realm of military technology - especially when it 
came to missile and nuclear weapons and their implications for what was 
                                                          
1
 In a 1996 book on the papers of former Cabinet Ministers it said 'Biographies are being prepared by Dr 
John Barnes of the London School of Economics, and by Duncan Sandys's son-in-law, Piers Dixon'. 
Neither appear to have been completed; Hazelhurst, C., Whitehead, S. and Woodland, C. (eds.), A Guide 
to the Papers of British Cabinet Ministers: 1900-1964 (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), p. 319. 
2
 Macmillan, H. and Catterall, P. (ed.), The Macmillan Diaries: Prime Minister and After, 1957-66 
(London: Macmillan, 2011), p. 128-29; Templer regarded Sandys as 'an interloper with little grasp of 
strategic issues in general or the heritage of the British Army'; Navias, M. S., '"Vested Interests and 
Vanished Dreams": Duncan Sandys, the Chiefs of Staff and the 1957 White Paper' in Smith, P. (ed.), 
Government and the Armed Forces in Britain, 1856-1990 (London: The Hambledon Press, 1996), p. 223. 
3
 Smith, I., The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith (London: Blake, 1997), p. 58. 
4
 C. N. Hill refers to Sandys as the 'strongest political personality' in his history of the British rocket and 
space programme, yet references to his background are limited to his having 'made an early reputation for 
himself during the war in the context of German guided weapons', and makes no mention of how this 
period influenced his outlook; Hill, C. N., A Vertical Empire: The History of the UK Rocket and Space 
Programme, 1950-1971 (London: Imperial College Press, 2001), p. 19. 
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known as "global war" - and well aware of the natural conservativeness of 
the defence departments.
5
 
 
   As a result of this, Navias writes that Sandys arrived at the Ministry of Defence in 
January 1957 'with a record indicating a predilection towards cost-cutting, reliance on 
nuclear deterrence and missiles, and a willingness to override service sensitivities'.
6
 
However, Navias frames Sandys' policy-making in terms of this 'predilection towards 
cost-cutting', rather than examining the extent to which the reductions in expenditure 
and manpower he became associated with were actually an incidental (but useful) by-
product of the policies that he constructed for other reasons. To this end he credits 
Sandys with recognising 'the poverty of Britain's resources' in order to defend him 
against charges of lacking an appreciation or understanding of defence policy.
7
 A. J. R. 
Groom was another who sought to minimise the role of Sandys' intellectual contribution 
towards the policies of 1957, writing that much of 'the lines of policy that were to lead 
to the Sandys Defence White Papers' had evolved from 1951 onwards.
8
 There was 
certainly a large degree of continuity in what Sandys proposed in 1957, but Groom fails 
to cite Sandys as having provided an important voice in the defence debates during 
those years, or mention that his White Papers drew heavily on the proposals he had put 
forward in 1953 as the Minister of Supply during the so-called 'Radical Review'. This 
thesis will argue along a different line, and suggest that when this consistency in 
Sandys' policy preferences is properly taken into account, the economies he pursued can 
be seen as having been a significant aspect of his recommendations, but not as 
something that was allowed to take precedence over what he considered to have been 
sound strategic concerns. 
 
                                                          
5
 Navias, M. S., '"Vested Interests and Vanished Dreams"', p. 219. 
6
 Navias, M. S., Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 1955-1958 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991), p. 140. 
7
 Ibid., pp. 248-49; Richard Moore follows a similar course to Navias in writing that Sandys' preference 
for unmanned weaponry 'reflected in part his involvement in the activities of the wartime Crossbow 
committee' (although he never expands on this and its direct effects on the policy-making process) having 
previously framed the White Paper as the result of Sandys following the 'logic' of instructions to reduce 
the defence budget and 'in particular to bring peacetime conscription to an end'; Moore, R., Nuclear 
Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958-64 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 9-11 and p. 254. 
8
 Groom, A. J. R., British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London: Frances Pinter, 1974), p. 92; 
Desmond Wettern accuses Sandys of attempting to replace conventional forces with 'a still unproven 
nuclear deterrent system', but provides no background information as to what could have sent him down 
this course, and makes no mention of his previous opposition to certain naval programmes as Minister of 
Supply; Wettern, D., The Decline of British Seapower (London: Jane's, 1982), p. 172. 
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   In contrast to this David French has written that Sandys' 'ideas about the right shape of 
defence policy had begun to form in 1953, during his period as Minister of Supply'.
9
 It 
can be demonstrated that the ideas of 1953 remained at the forefront of Sandys' thinking 
in 1957; but, as this thesis will argue, the intellectual roots of the policies he had 
advocated in 1953 can be found in his wartime reports for the committees tasked with 
defending Britain from unmanned German weapons. Furthermore, the influence of these 
experiences on his ideas about defence policy was such that there emerged a 
consistency in Sandys' thinking that, whilst putting him ahead of the curve (and Britain's 
capabilities) during the defence debates of 1953-54, and making him the ideal man to 
re-organise British defence policy after the Suez Crisis, would eventually lead to his 
effective isolation in arguing that Britain base its entire strategic concept on the 
possession of Blue Streak, the increasingly costly and problematic British-built ballistic 
missile system. 
 
Nuclear Belief Systems 
 
   That the Second World War had an influence of British nuclear policies is not a new 
interpretation. Margaret Gowing, author of the official histories, felt that there was a 
'feeling that Britain as a great power must acquire all major new weapons'.
10
 This was a 
position shared by Groom, who concluded that, whilst 'there can be no doubt that a 
Soviet threat was perceived... this strategic argument was itself a function of the 
political question regarding the rôle of nuclear weapons in shoring up Britain's position 
in the world', both as a 'means to deter Moscow and to influence Washington'.
11
 More 
recently, Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge have given particular weight to the 
specific memory of 'standing alone' in 1940 as a factor in British nuclear policy, with 
nuclear weaponry representing both a symbol of Great Power independence as well as a 
protection against Britain finding itself once again in such a perilous situation.
12
 In 
addition to this 'soft' cultural aspect, historians such as Ian Clark and Nicholas J. 
Wheeler, who have sought to re-introduce strategic calculations into the debate, have 
                                                          
9
 French, D., Army, Empire, and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy: 1945-1971 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 159. 
10
 Gowing, M., Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952 - Vol. I (London: 
Macmillan, 1974), p. 184.  
11
 Groom, British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, p. 576; see also: Andrew J. Pierre: 'One of the 
primary motivations for the nuclear force was the desire to gain influence over American policy and 
strategy'; Pierre, A. J., Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Nuclear Force, 
1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 304. 
12
 Schrafstetter, S. and Twigge, S., Avoiding Armageddon. Europe, the United States and the Struggle for 
Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945–1970 (Westport: Praeger, 2004), pp. 213-14. 
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written that 'an essential part of any history of British strategic thought in the nuclear 
age [is] to document the elements of continuity within it'.
13
 This thesis suggests that 
these attempts to understand nuclear policy as a matter of mechanical strategic 
calculation and resource allocation, what Michael Carver calls 'a perpetual balancing 
act; between commitments and resources', leave something to be desired.
14
    
 
   In recent years, the literature on strategic cultures has gradually come to be associated 
with so-called 'belief systems' having had an influence on the policy-making process. In 
strategic studies, John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart have recently argued that '"ideas" 
and "beliefs," deriving from deep cultural roots, have an important, indeed even more 
important, role to play in nuclear decision-making'.
15
 They contend that the 'reflection 
of state values and norms rooted in historical experience' manifested itself as a 'nuclear 
belief system' with six leading concerns. These were: the necessity of nuclear weapons 
as a guarantor of Britain's survival; the fear of 'adversaries or potential adversaries' 
acquiring them; as a contingency in case 'even the closest of allies might not come to 
Britain’s assistance in times of crisis'; to impress and influence the United States; the 
belief that Britain had 'an inalienable right' to be a nuclear weapons state; and as a 
confirmation of Great Power status.
16
 It was these ideas and beliefs of what they 
characterise as a relatively small policy-making elite (in the political, military, and 
scientific spheres) that they suggest shows 'ideational, more than materialist, factors 
have been at the heart of British nuclear policy'.
17
 
 
                                                          
13
 Clark, I. and Wheeler, N. J., The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989), p. 18; see also: Henry S. Rowen and Philip Bobbitt, who have both written about the 
'extension of strategic bombing' and the 'orderly continuation, by more effective means, of the strategic 
bombing campaign'; Rowen, H. S. 'The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine' in Martin, L. (ed.), 
Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age (London: Heinemann, 1979), p. 137; Bobbitt, P., Democracy and 
Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 21; 'The 
emergence of SAC (Strategic Air Command) was rooted in Air Force Experience. The air planners were 
all veterans of the bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan... and believed that the Air Force must 
serve as the nation's new first line of defense'; Rosenberg, D. A. 'The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear 
Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960' in Miller, S. E. (ed.), Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 130; see also: Morgan, P. M., Deterrence Now 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 7. 
14
 Carver, M., Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy Since 1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1992), p. vii; 
see also: Michael Howard: 'War is now seen as being a matter for governments and not for peoples; an 
affair of mutual destruction inflicted at remote distances by technological specialists operating according 
to the arcane calculations of strategic analysts'; Howard, M., The Lessons of History (New York: Vail-
Ballou Press, 1991), p. 47. 
15
 Baylis, J. and Stoddart, K.. 'The British Nuclear Experience: The Role of Ideas and Beliefs' in 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, 23:2 (2012), p. 331. 
16
 Ibid., pp. 343-44. 
17
 Ibid., p. 331.  
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   This conception of a 'nuclear belief system', as Baylis and Stoddart would describe it, 
still has its deficiencies. This is due to its nature as something to be subscribed to 
collectively, whether in a department of state or more generally, which makes its tenets 
too wide-ranging to properly account for its intellectual origins. Just as when Peter J. 
Katzenstein argues that 'security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural 
factors', it becomes comparable to the nature of governmental business, where, 
according to Graham Allison, 'deliberate choices' are overshadowed by 'large 
organisations functioning according to standard patterns of behaviour'.
18
 This presents a 
monolithic type of culture, a kind of organisational memory, whether departmental or 
strategic, that simply exists as a non-specific influencing factor on those who encounter 
it. Martin Ceadel gives a good example of this when he describes 'defencism' as the 
main culture of the Cold War, describing it as a collective belief system where the 
policy-making elite as a whole subscribed to the idea 'that war can be prevented for 
indefinite periods, and that diplomacy as well as military force plays a part in achieving 
this'. The result of this was the prevailing belief that 'The best to be hoped for is... an 
armed truce'.
19
  
 
   The main drawback of the 'nuclear belief system' as a general will is that it restricts 
the space for individual initiative. In his work in the expanding field of British nuclear 
culture, Richard Maguire has gone further into the 'nuclear belief system', claiming that 
'Beyond a general acceptance that the West needed some form of nuclear force to face 
the Soviet threat, there was no single, or even dominant, structure of explanation among 
the politicians, scientists, civil servants and military officers who discussed British 
nuclear weapons'. Nuclear policy-making, according to Maguire, 'drew upon individual 
                                                          
18
 Katzenstein, P. J. 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security' in Katzenstein (ed.), The 
culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Colombia University 
Press, 1996), p. 2; Allison, G. T., Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1971), p. 67.  
19
 Ceadel, M., Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 72; similarly, 
Wolfram Kaiser writes that an 'excessive prestige orientation' afflicted British political elites following 
the Second World War, and that this was particularly noticeable in the Conservative governments of 
1955-64 where 'background influences... were strengthened considerably by Britain's relative decline and 
its perception by the political elite' which 'was still largely a socially cohesive group with a similar 
educational background, and... an inherently conservative mental framework for policy-making'; Kaiser, 
W., 'Against Napoleon and Hitler: Background Influences on British Diplomacy' in Kaiser, W. and 
Staerck, G. (eds.), British Foreign Policy, 1955-64: Contracting Options (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
2000), p. 117 and pp. 127-28; Michael Blackwell has considered the post-war Labour government, 
writing that 'the leaders of the Labour Party... and the Foreign Office mandarins... shared the same world 
view'. Whilst their educational and social differences were sometimes stark, they were ultimately taught 
by the same 'Whig teachers' to revere the British Empire. Thus Blackwell explains 'the broad consensus 
on foreign policy issues that Labour and Conservative governments have traditionally demonstrated'; 
Blackwell, M., Clinging to Grandeur: British Attitudes and Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Second 
World War (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993), p. 163. 
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experience, political and social tradition, understandings of technology, and specific 
Cold War experience'.
20
 In addition to this, it should also be acknowledged that within 
the ranks of policy-makers, not all experiences carried equal weight.
21
 John Simpson 
has written that whilst nuclear decision-making remained firmly in the control of 'the 
Prime Minister of the day and selected members of Cabinet', politicians generally 'found 
themselves limited in their understanding... by their lack of detailed knowledge', which 
left them 'increasingly dependent upon advice from officials'.
22
 In light of this, the 
interaction between experiences and those policy-making processes that sought to 
ensure a more methodical approach is of particular interest. This is especially so when 
analysing the aftermath of the Second World War and the policies devised to maintain 
Britain's supposed responsibilities as one of the victorious parties. Due to the extensive 
mobilisation of British society that the Second World War required, almost everybody 
serving in any policy-making role throughout the 1950s and 1960s had previous war 
experiences to draw upon. This is the main reason why the defence backgrounds of 
politicians as individuals, where they can be discerned, deserves further study. 
 
The Role of the Individual 
 
   Attempting to analyse policy preferences as products of experiences and beliefs is a 
well-worn area of interest, particularly when the results of those experiences and beliefs 
prove to have acted as a restrictive force. For example, a consensus has emerged that 
Harold Macmillan's years as the Member of Parliament for Stockton-on-Tees, from 
1924-29 and then again from 1931-45, were a 'prime conditioning factor in his domestic 
political thinking throughout the rest of his career'.
23
 This approach to understanding the 
                                                          
20
 Maguire, R. '"Never a Credible Weapon": Nuclear Cultures in British Government during the Era of the 
H-Bomb' in The British Journal for the History of Science, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December, 2012), p. 521. 
21
 This could even be due to the particular working methods of an organisation, as Julian Lewis has 
written. He praises the success of the Joint Staff system in being able to provide 'straight answers to 
straight questions' reasonably quickly because of the 'standard format of its procedures'. This compares 
favourably with the Foreign Office at the end of the Second World War where, lacking in such structures, 
policies emerged 'haphazardly according to which individual bestirred himself on a given question at a 
given moment'. He quotes Kim Philby as writing 'It was facile then [1940], as it is now, to speak of a 
Foreign Office view. There are a lot of people in the Foreign Office and quite a few views'; Lewis, J., 
Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942-1947 (London: The 
Sherwood Press, 1988), p. 338. 
22
 Simpson, J., The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom 
(London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 232-34; see also: Clark and Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear 
Strategy; Gowing, Independence and Deterrence; and, for an American perspective, Schilling, W. R. 'The 
Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950' in Hammond, P. Y., Schilling, W. R., and Snyder, G. H., 
Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). 
23
 Horne, A., Macmillan, 1894-1956: Volume I of the Official Biography (London: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 
73-74; see also: Fisher, N., Harold Macmillan (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), p. 25, 366, and 
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economic policies of Macmillan as Prime Minister has also led some historians to 
suggest his experiences 'governed his thinking for longer than was appropriate', 
preventing him from addressing the signs of economic decline that became apparent 
during his period as Prime Minister.
24
 In a similar vein, Jeremi Suri's Henry Kissinger 
and the American Century sought to show Kissinger's policy preferences as having been 
shaped by his experiences of wider cultural shifts. The rise of Nazism, which forced his 
family out of Germany, is said to have taught him that democracies required 'decisive 
leaders' and 'protections against themselves'; and his status as a Jewish immigrant 
allowed him to rise through 'tradition-bound institutions' which valued 'outsiders'. 
Consequently, 'Having witnessed the violent "collapse" of a society filled with morally 
self-righteous figures, Kissinger defined his career as a response', leading him towards 
measures that 'insulated the day-to-day management of foreign policy from public 
interference'.
25
 
 
   In the course of his biography, Suri does not shirk from criticising this approach. 
Because of the supposedly set nature of his thinking, Kissinger, he writes, struggled 
with 'challenges from people he did not understand', and consequently failed to deal 
with 'ideas that ran against his basic assumptions and experiences'.
26
 Barbara Keys has 
built upon this contention, contending that Suri and other biographers of Kissinger tend 
to treat their subject 'above all as an intellectual', and as a 'rational actor' relatively 
unaffected by day-to-day concerns. In opposition to this image, Keys devotes particular 
attention the relationships that Kissinger painstakingly forged with Soviet diplomats, 
arguing that they serve as the best explanation for him remaining 'obsessively wedded to 
bipolarism', when, had he lived up to his much-vaunted realism, he would have 
                                                                                                                                                                          
369; Sampson, A., Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity (London: The Penguin Press, 1967), p. 22; D. R. 
Thorpe: 'His searing experience was the Depression in pre-war Stockton, and this, together with his 
affinity with Keynesian ideas, hung heavily over the way he thought about financial policy'; Thorpe, D. 
R., Supermac: The Life of Harold Macmillan (London: Chatto & Windus, 2010), pp. 616-17. 
24
 Fisher, Harold Macmillan, p. 154; see also: Charmley, J., A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-
1996 (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 156; for his part, Macmillan had repeatedly made statements such as 
'I shall never forget those despairing faces... They wanted work. The British economy was indeed sick, 
almost mortally sick'; Macmillan, H., Winds of Change: 1914-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 285. 
25
 Suri, J., Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 
pp. 8-14 and p. 247; David Jablonsky has made a similar, if somewhat less convincing, attempt at 
understanding Churchill as a war leader. To Jablonsky, Churchill was to become 'the quintessential 
example of a leader in total war', having 'inherited the basic tension of that era (Victorian) between 
emotional, often irrational romanticism and earnest, rational pragmatism. To this were added general 
Victorian beliefs in such shibboleths as the British Empire and the Whig version of history... 
Compounding all that were the personality traits formed by a boy raised in patrician elegance, but cruelly 
neglected by his parents'; Jablonsky, D., Churchill, the Great Game and Total War (London: Frank Cass, 
1991), p. 185. 
26
 Suri, Henry Kissinger..., p. 248. 
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recognised that 'the world was entering a new era of multipolarity'.
27
 Even though 
Kissinger embraced the new state of affairs to the extent that he was still able to 
function in his capacity as both National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, Keys 
writes that 'Kissinger's habit of approaching problems through this bipolar "cage" 
exacerbated instead of resolved them', citing his misreading of the Indo-Pakistan War 
(1971) and 'consistently overestimating Moscow's influence over Hanoi' as examples of 
this.
28
 
 
   This idea of an intellectual 'cage' is of particular interest to this thesis. It is similar in 
some respects to previous studies of the 'operational code', which began with Nathan 
Leites' A Study of Bolshevism, which attempted to 'portray the spirit of the Bolshevik 
elite' by analysing the writings they came to live by.
29
 Leites characterised a leading 
Bolshevik as somebody who 'lives to conduct politics', and argued that by subordinating 
a 'multi-dimensional life' to their politics, Soviet ideology - rather than normal human 
functions - became crucial to understanding their actions.
30
 As with the more general 
notion of a 'nuclear belief system', this was quite a broad approach to discerning the 
motivations of policy-makers, and it was left to later political scientists to expand the 
idea. One notable attempt was Ole R. Holsti's case study of John Foster Dulles, the 
United States Secretary of State (1953-59).
31
 By looking at all of Dulles' statements 
regarding the Soviet Union during his period as Secretary of State, Holsti found that 
Dulles was often forced to manipulate information as to make it sit more comfortably 
within his carefully-constructed worldview and his image of the Soviet Union.
32
 As 
Holsti noted, this could be problematic from a policy-making perspective, and in a later 
study he analysed Dulles' well-documented interpretation of history that, Holsti noted, 
left him 'unburdened by doubts about the righteousness of his policies, the sinfulness of 
                                                          
27
 Keys, B. 'Bernath Lecture - Henry Kissinger: The Emotional Statesman' in Diplomatic History, Vol. 35, 
No. 4 (September, 2011), p. 589 and p. 602. 
28
 Ibid., p. 603. 
29
 Leites, N., A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), p. 15. 
30
 Ibid., p. 16. 
31
 Holsti, O. 'The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study' in The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 1962), pp. 244-52. 
32
 'Contrary information (a general de-crease in Soviet hostility, specific non-hostile acts) were 
reinterpreted in a manner which did not do violence to the original image. In the case of the Soviet 
manpower cuts, these were attributed to necessity (particularly economic weakness), and bad faith (the 
as-sumption that the released men would be put to work on more lethal weapons). In the case of the 
Austrian State Treaty, he ex-plained the Soviet agreement in terms of frustration (the failure of its policy 
in Europe), and weakness (the system was on the point of collapse)'; Ibid., p. 249. 
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his enemies, or the "immorality" of those who would remain neutral in the conflict of 
good versus evil'.
33
 
 
   This thesis is primarily concerned with the effect that 'individual experience' had in 
the policy formation process; but these effects have to be situated within the procedures 
associated with the defence policy of a democratic society, and with the differing levels 
of status within the policy-making process that Sandys carried in various roles. 
Alexander L. George wrote that 'operational code beliefs', whilst serving as a 'set of 
general guidelines', are unable to 'unilaterally determine the individual's choices of 
action' due to the existence of 'other variables'.
34
 The 'other variables' had also been 
considered by Holsti, who found the most rewarding situations for 'detailed 
investigations of decision makers' beliefs' to be those situations characterised by, 
amongst other things, 'Nonroutine situations', the need for ''Long-range policy planning', 
and where 'the situation itself is highly ambiguous'.
35
 Holsti was also able to identify 
situations where an increased responsibility was placed on the individual, having been 
relatively isolated from collective decision making procedures, as providing fertile 
ground for the use of individual beliefs in the policy-making process.
36
 This echoed 
earlier work by Sydney Verba, who discussed how personal preferences are more likely 
to be called upon in more ambiguous situations where established procedures and group 
input were less apparent.
37
  
 
   British defence policy-making throughout the 1950s was characterised by these 
scenarios, as policy was organised and re-organised in a strategic environment subject 
to rapid technological development and seemingly never-ending financial pressures. As 
a result, such ambiguity was ever present.
38
 To this end, Baylis, despite describing the 
                                                          
33
 Holsti, O. 'The "Operational Code" Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' 
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more general 'nuclear belief system', has written that a 'fundamental lack of agreement 
amongst political and military leaders... had important implications for British foreign 
and defence policies'.
39
 However, where Sandys' policy ideas were only taken up in part 
whilst Minister of Supply, he was the first Minister of Defence to be given overall 
control (subject to Cabinet approval) over both the broad direction of British defence 
policy and of decisions relating to equipment, effectively handing him control over 
Britain's strategic posture, and therefore making his personal preferences, and their 
intellectual origins, of paramount importance in any analysis of policy-making in this 
period.  
 
   George said that 'an actor's beliefs' are more likely to be found in 'policy preferences' 
than 'the option he finally chooses', owing to the variables he cites - 'domestic politics, 
organizational considerations, the necessity of compromise, etc.' - making preference, 
rather than final decisions, as 'the dependent variable' in detecting the part played by 
beliefs in any decision.
40
 To George, determining the impact of beliefs on 'decisional 
choices' requires two things. One is tracing in detail the 'steps in the process'. Another is 
the identification of consistency between beliefs and decisions, which is first established 
on 'relevant behavioural data from his prior life history'.
41
 Between his Second World 
War service and his rise to policy-making roles, Sandys provided clear 'relevant 
behavioural data' in the form of public statements and literary interpretations - some of 
questionable accuracy - of his experiences defending Britain from unmanned German 
weaponry. These are utilised in this thesis to provide an idea of what informed Sandys' 
policy preferences.  
 
   This approach to problem solving also encroaches upon the idea of 'political myth', 
which is also relevant to Sandys' policy-making decisions. Henry Tudor defined myth in 
this context as 'an interpretation of what the myth-maker (rightly or wrongly) takes to be 
hard fact'. What is more: 
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It is a device men adopt in order to come to grips with reality; and we can 
tell that a given account is a myth, not by the amount of truth it contains, but 
by the fact that it is believed to be true, above all, by the dramatic form into 
which it is cast.
42
 
 
   Paul Fussell concurred, famously describing memoirs as a 'kind of fiction' dependent 
upon 'continuous implicit attestation of veracity or appeals to documented historical 
facts'.
43
 This was written in relation to memories of the First World War, the negative 
myths that emerged from which have been addressed by Dan Todman, who concluded 
that the 'survival and triumph of a set of negative myths' was largely because they 
'remained useful' in a twentieth century Britain marked by 'changing circumstances'. 
The myths, therefore, 'retained an explanatory power' that ensured their 'survival and 
eventual dominance'.
44
  Jean Peneff has described the 'mythical element in life stories' 
as being the result of a 'mental construct which, starting from the memory of individual 
facts which would otherwise appear incoherent and arbitrary, goes on to arrange and 
interpret them and so turn them into biographical events'. It is claimed that such myth-
making is 'common in all societies', but is 'especially widespread in societies 
undergoing rapid development and change'.
45
 Richard Carr offers a relevant example of 
this in writing that young Conservative politicians who had served in the First World 
War sought political benefits from 'constantly speaking of a generation wiped out, and 
selling themselves to a grieving public as the living embodiment of lost sons, brothers 
and fathers come election time', which had the effect of propagating the stubborn image 
of their war having been a disaster.
46
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   The 'explanatory power' of Sandys' own myth-making is crucial in understanding the 
consistency in his personal belief system, and its importance in allowing him to 
determine its usefulness during periods of difficulty. Equally so, the failure of 
experiences in determining policy in its final form - the negative side, as it were - is 
equally deserving of further analysis. Whilst Sandys may not have had cause to cast his 
experiences into a 'dramatic form', he certainly came to possess an image of his wartime 
experiences that differed from reality in critical respects and which, consequently, 
affected his approach to solving problems in the policy-making process. In this respect, 
the myth he created around his wartime experiences proved useful. This returns to what 
has been said about 'nonroutine' and 'ambiguous' situations providing the most 
appropriate circumstances for the use of personal belief systems in the policy-making 
process. 
 
Thesis Structure 
 
   To illustrate how Sandys came to depend on his experiences of the Second World 
War, this thesis follows the development and utilisation of his policy preferences in 
chronological fashion. The first section looks at Sandys' participation in the Second 
World War, and how he came to interpret the role he played in defending Britain from 
unmanned German weaponry. By following Sandys' actions through official documents 
and related histories, and then comparing these with his later interpretations of events, it 
can be demonstrated how Sandys developed an image of his own contribution to the 
war effort that was occasionally exaggerated by retrospectively assigning a greater 
importance to the unmanned weapon threat at a time when his policy preferences were 
beginning to have an influence on official policy. The second section follows on from 
this by showing how Sandys first applied the perceived lessons of his war experiences 
to the policy-making process, arguing for a radical overhaul of British defence policy in 
1953 and 1954 that would have seen Britain base its security on the descendants of the 
weapons he had first been impressed by during the Second World War.  
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   The third section covers Sandys first few months at the Ministry of Defence in 1957, 
during which time he put together the 1957 White Paper on Defence. When he arrived 
at the Ministry of Defence in January 1957, Sandys was explicitly charged with 
overseeing the kind of thorough re-think he had previously advocated, and given 
increased powers in order to see it through. This concentration of power in the Minister 
of Defence, combined with Britain entering a period of uncertainty and upheaval 
following the Suez Crisis, allowed Sandys to draw heavily upon his personal 
experiences and conceptions of warfare when re-formulating British defence policy, 
provoking outrage from the Armed Forces and defence experts. In this section it is 
clearly demonstrated that Sandys had by this point developed a coherent strategic 
concept that was based upon the idea of unmanned weaponry proving impossible to 
defend against, and by analysing the different drafts of the White Paper produced over 
March and April 1957, Sandys' determination to deviate as little as possible from this 
core idea becomes apparent. In order to stay within designated word limits, this thesis is 
unable to address Sandys' defence review and subsequent policies in full. Instead, focus 
is given to what can be directly linked to his experiences of the Second World War, 
namely how his strategic concept emanated from his ideas about unmanned weaponry 
(to be equipped with thermonuclear weapons). Where otherwise significant issues such 
as conscription, colonial withdrawal, home defence, and naval warfare are discussed it 
is in relation to how Sandys himself linked them to his support for his primary policy 
preferences, such as his suggestion that Hong Kong did not require a colonial garrison 
as China could be deterred with strategic nuclear weapons, or his consistent opposition 
to the Royal Navy's attempts at increasing their role in plans for global warfare. 
 
   The fourth section maintains this focus in describing what might be seen as the 
negative aspects of Sandys' willingness to depend on his war experiences as a policy-
making tool. After triumphantly publishing his White Paper in April, 1957, Sandys 
immediately found it difficult to actually implement the ideas it contained. Mounting 
costs and technological problems combined to see Sandys gradually lose control of the 
situation, finding himself sidelined by those eager to move away from what they 
considered to be a problematic weapons system - the Blue Streak medium range 
ballistic missile - and the policies he (and therefore the government) expected to base 
upon it. This section will address his time at the Ministry of Defence following the 
publication of the 1957 White Paper, and how he attempted to give proper consideration 
to alternative nuclear weapon systems without wishing to provide the government with 
19 
 
an excuse to lessen its commitment to Blue Streak and what he considered to be a 
meaningful definition of nuclear independence. The fifth and final section will be 
devoted exclusively to Sandys and Blue Streak, the British-built ballistic missile system 
he hoped would provide the nation with an independent nuclear capability beyond the 
lifespan of the manned bomber aircraft, and the failure of which he would become 
personally associated with. By following Sandys' involvement with the Blue Streak 
programme across both his period at the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of 
Aviation, where he watched on as it was cancelled as a weapon system, it can be seen 
how Sandys did almost everything in his power to ensure that Blue Streak was a 
success, including resorting to underhand methods, to the extent that he was to end up 
being the only Minister willing to defend the programme before it was cancelled in 
April 1960, bringing to a close to the policies that he had based his defence plans upon.  
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The Intellectual Foundations of Sandys' Belief System 
 
In August 1952, Sandys took it upon himself to question the official government belief 
that the recent spate of UFO sightings were merely a 'product of mass psychology'. He 
accepted that was no evidence of 'flying saucer aircraft' as such, but felt there was 
'ample evidence of some unfamiliar and unexplained phenomenon'. The situation 
seemed familiar to Sandys, who had spent a large part of the Second World War 
tracking the development of unmanned German weapons, as well as attempting to 
coordinate the defensive efforts against them, and he felt the evidence of there being 
some as-yet unexplained object was 'quite as convincing as the half dozen vague and 
wholly inaccurate reports of the V.2 which was all that we had to go on in the Spring of 
1943'. Furthermore, this was, he recalled, evidence that 'all our leading scientists 
declared to be technically impossible'. His recollection of what 'all our leading 
scientists' thought in 1943 was slightly inaccurate, but Sandys was the Minister of 
Supply at this point, responsible for equipping the Armed Forces with the latest 
weapons, and he was inclined to 'have no doubt at all' that a British pilot in Germany 
had witnessed a 'phenomenon similar to that described by numerous observers in the 
United States' rather than settle for the official verdict.
47
 This curious example was part 
of a wider trend of Sandys falling back on his war experiences when forming his policy 
preferences, particularly when attempting to navigate a way through situations where 
adhering to a more established, routine way of thinking was deemed unsuitable, and in 
which individual policy preferences were allowed to thrive. 
 
   In order for this thesis to demonstrate how Sandys consistently returned to his 
personal belief system when heavily involved in the defence policy-making process, it 
is important that the intellectual foundations of this belief system have are first 
established. This section will attempt to do that by exploring Sandys' experiences in the 
Second World War, as well as analysing his later attempts across a range of platforms - 
particularly public statements and his contributions to various histories of the Second 
World War that touched on his responsibilities - at constructing them into a usable 
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belief system from which he could draw upon when later asked to provide solutions to 
long-standing issues in British defence policy. 
 
The Second World War 
 
   On 11 April 1943, a report was circulated amongst the Chiefs of Staff documenting 
German technological developments over the past five years. It claimed that the 
Germans had started to focus on rocket development, rather than pilotless aircraft, 
which came as something of a surprise to the British government.
48
 Within a matter of 
days, Prime Minister Winston Churchill received a minute from the Chiefs of Staff 
through its de facto secretary, and his personal military assistant, Hastings Ismay, that 
recommended an 'investigation directed by one man who could call on such Scientific 
and Intelligence Advisors as may be appropriate', and, should the evidence have 
amounted to anything, take responsibility for devising counter-measures. They urged 
Churchill to act without delay, and suggested that Sandys 'would be very suitable if he 
could be made available'.
49
  
 
   As of February that year, Sandys had been serving as the Parliamentary Secretary to 
the Ministry of Supply - a job which some felt he had acquired through his connections 
to Churchill, rather than on merit.
50
 It does appear to have been the case that Churchill 
was often keen to promote Sandys on account of his personal connection to him, but in 
this instance he was more than qualified for the role.
51
 The Chiefs of Staff would have 
known that before the war he had been a strong critic of the national air defences and 
war preparations, and that he had commanded an experimental anti-aircraft regiment of 
his own in Norway and Wales before injuries suffered in a car crash had removed him 
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from active service.
52
 This regiment, the so-called 'Z Battery', was a system designed to 
attack dive bombers with rockets, and its very existence had faced strong opposition 
from experts in the field.
53
 He was also seen as the type of live influence required to 
work effectively between the intelligence services, government scientists, and the 
Armed Forces. His appointment was a serious one, worthy of the threat that the British 
government felt from these developments, which Adolf Hitler had come to regard as 
potential war-winners.
54
 Plans for large-scale evacuations of the South East, as well as 
the transfer of government departments from London to relative safety, were quickly 
devised; but it was on questions of active defence against the new weapons that robust 
debate began to emerge. 
 
   By 17 May, Sandys had compiled a report for the Chiefs of Staff that was unable to 
offer a 'firm and final opinion' on exactly what the Germans were working on due to the 
lack of 'wholly reliable and conclusive' intelligence. However, owing to the urgency and 
seriousness of the matter, he offered some 'provisional answers' based on what 
information was available to him. He suggested that the Germans were in the process of 
developing a 'heavy rocket capable of bombarding an area with H.E. or gas from very 
long range' and that, whilst this would be 'extremely difficult' for the Germans, as well 
as representing a 'startling advance' on existing rocket technology, he deemed that this 
was 'technically quite possible'. He also said the economics of the project would not 
prove prohibitive in comparison to dropping an equal amount of explosives from 
aircraft, although this early belief was based on expecting a seventy ton rocket carrying 
ten tons of explosives.
55
 The V-2s that eventually landed in Britain carried less than 
10% of the explosives predicted, and weighed a fraction of what was expected; but 
Sandys was quite accurate in his predictions for the likely speed and altitude that they 
would reach, from which he concluded that such a weapon 'could not be intercepted or 
diverted once it had been launched'. Therefore, he argued that the most effective form of 
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defence was to be found in disrupting the supply chain by bombing experimental 
establishments and any factories connected to their manufacture.
56
  
 
   The Chiefs of Staff were suitably impressed by the preliminary report, and Sandys 
was soon circulating more detailed reports as better intelligence became available.
57
 His 
third report, of 28 June, was able to take advantage of a flood of new information from 
agents on the continent, new interrogations of prisoners of war, and aerial 
reconnaissance that Sandys had personally commissioned. He was able to conclude 
from this improved supply of information that the long-range rocket had 'undoubtedly 
reached an advanced stage of development'. The Germans were still thought to be 
having trouble with developing an accurate targeting system, but since Hitler wanted 
them as soon as possible in order to retaliate against Britain for bombing their heavy 
industries in the Ruhr, it was suggested that they could be forced into service before 
these issues were completely solved. The new photographic intelligence also led Sandys 
to revisit his technical predictions, writing that these weapons would probably carry 
anywhere between two and eight tons of explosives. Most importantly, he remained 
adamant that there was still no direct means of defence against them. This was 
especially concerning for the government as the Ministry of Home Security had 
completed a study, based on each rocket boasting ten tons of explosive power, that 
predicted 4200 casualties (600 dead) following each attack on London. If this happened 
every hour of every day for a month, the report had suggested that 'the virtual 
destruction of the metropolis' would ensue.
58
 
 
   Sandys did not completely endorse those figures, but conceded that even half that 
amount of damage would gravely compromise the capital. 'Undoubtedly the most 
effective way to prevent the use of this weapon', he wrote, was to attack the rockets at 
their source. Therefore he had recommended to the Air Ministry that they launch a 
heavy bombing raid against the Peenemünde Army Research Centre with the object of 
'utterly destroying' the buildings and of 'killing as many as possible of the scientists and 
technicians in the living quarters nearby'.
59
 He repeated this recommendation to the 
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Defence Committee on 29 June, informing them that the Air Staff had said it would not 
be possible to launch a 'really heavy' night attack until August.
60
 It was here that the so-
called 'Scientific Controversy' first emerged. Churchill's scientific advisor, Frederick 
Lindemann - better known as Lord Cherwell - gave his opinion that 'the rocket story 
was a well designed cover plan', and that it was 'almost incredible that the Germans 
should have got, without an intermediate step, to something which we could certainly 
not develop under five years'. Cherwell also doubted the prisoner of war reports that 
spoke of new propellants, claimed a single-stage rocket could not travel more than forty 
miles, and described the whole issue as an 'elaborate cover plan to conceal some other 
development'. He said stories about rockets 'had been going the rounds for years', which 
he argued made a fake rocket programme the ideal basis for a hoax.
61
 
 
   When opening the Defence Committee meeting Sandys had anticipated Cherwell's 
line of objection by making a point of ruling out a hoax as 'far-fetched', owing to the 
sheer number of people that would have had to have been primed with false information 
to make it believable. Additionally, whether or not a rocket was being manufactured 
there, Peenemünde was still known to be an important research establishment, so to 
'invite the heaviest bombing' upon it by allowing dummy rocket casings to be 
photographed would have been 'illogical' in his view. Churchill, whilst taking the 
technical points Cherwell had made on board, sided with Sandys. So too did R. V. 
Jones, the scientific intelligence expert from the Air Ministry, who said the evidence for 
the rocket programme existing was conclusive, and that the Germans were not capable 
of such a deception.
62
 It was decided that a heavy attack should be mounted against 
Peenemünde, but Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, said this should wait until 
the Germans had finished whatever it was they were building there. Portal also 
suggested that it was better to wait until sufficient strength could be mobilised to 
completely destroy the facility and kill as many scientists as possible, where as an 
earlier attack might prove indecisive and simply force the Germans into moving 
production to a more secure location. His Army and Navy colleagues agreed, as did 
Churchill, and a 'heavy scale air attack' was approved 'as soon as conditions permit'.
63
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   A message from the British Embassy in Switzerland was also circulated to those 
present, informing them that Germany had been promising its citizens a 'devastating and 
decisive air attack' against Britain in August that would be both 'novel in method and 
irresistible in intensity'. This seems to have influenced Sandys' mood and in his next 
report he spoke of 'an impending rocket attack upon London'.
64
 The technical 
difficulties would, he felt, probably make the rockets 'erratic', and, unless Hitler forced 
them into early service, not likely to be used 'until next year at least'; but once again, he 
argued that the 'only immediate counter measure' was to bomb Peenemünde.
65
 Cherwell 
used the next War Cabinet meeting to reiterate that the likelihood of Germany solving 
the 'formidable' technical difficulties remained 'remote', as well as explaining why it 
was pointless to embark on a new programme of shelter construction. The velocity of 
the rockets would be such, he said, that in the event of a successful attack 'all fragments 
would be projected straight into the ground', reducing their effectiveness.
66
 
 
   In August, Sandys acquired a 'new and reliable source' that said rockets were being 
'manufactured in quantity' at a number of facilities, as well as further evidence of the 
movement of suspicious tubes that he believed could only be connected 'with the latest 
German secret weapon'.
67
 The heavy bombing raid on Peenemünde, the only precision 
night attack attempted by Bomber Command in the latter half of the war, took place on 
17/18 August, and the precise results of the raid are still a matter of dispute.
68
 The 
official history describes the attack as having done 'good service to the Allied cause', 
where as Michael J. Neufeld has said the raid was ineffective, with the main result 
being, as Portal had predicted, to force the programme into underground facilities to the 
benefit of the SS and their inhumane methods.
69
 Walter Dornberger, who oversaw 
Germany's unmanned weapons programmes, later wrote that the raid set work back no 
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more than two months.
70
 Before the raid Sandys had judged that Peenemünde was 
capable of manufacturing at least one rocket a day, but the attack had at least appeared 
to put that particular facility out of action. However, there were still a number of active 
facilities, and special interest was taken in a suspicious-looking bunker in Watten, that 
Sandys thought worthy of bombing attacks.
71
 The United States took on the task of 
attempting the precision bombing this small site in daylight, and it was repeatedly 
bombed until Allied forces captured it in September 1944. 
 
   In his post-Peenemünde report Sandys suggested that it might be a good idea to spread 
rumours in neutral countries that 'the secret weapon upon which Hitler placed so much 
reliance' had been destroyed, with the intention of provoking the Germans into making a 
reply that would furnish him with more knowledge.
72
 The Chiefs of Staff advised 
against letting the enemy know just how much they knew.
73
 They were happy enough 
with the raid, which Portal reckoned had set the programme back six months.
74
 
Cherwell remained sceptical about what had been accomplished, and continued to doubt 
that the Germans even had a rocket programme. Reports of a different weapon were 
beginning to emerge by this point, and as Portal told the Chiefs of Staff Committee, a 
pilotless aircraft had been seen to make a crash landing on 22 August near Peenemünde, 
which made this the immediate priority. Cherwell did not doubt the existence of this 
pilotless aircraft, but said such a weapon would be an inefficient means of bombing 
Britain. Jones said the Germans had the capability to attack Britain with pilotless 
aircraft, and Sandys confirmed he was already investigating them. He did not consider 
them as threatening as long-range rockets, since they would either have similar 
performance to fighter aircraft, 'in which case it would present few difficulties and 
could be shot down by our fighters', or they would match the rockets in performance 
and not really represent a different problem.
75
 
 
   Sandys felt that his attentions would be better utilised by focussing solely on 
countering the German rocket programme and that aircraft of any sort were better off in 
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the hands of the Air Ministry.
76
 In September he arranged an informal separation of his 
committee into investigating the pilotless aircraft (flying bomb) and the long-range 
rocket separately, but by October the arrangement was proving difficult to manage. In 
November this confusion was solved when the Air Staff assumed control over 
everything; but Sandys maintained his place at the table when the issues were discussed 
in the War Cabinet in order that 'the wide contacts which had been established by Mr. 
Duncan Sandys in various Government Departments should be maintained'.
77
 
 
   Within less than a year, the small sub-committee first tasked with investigating 
German unmanned weapons developments had become a vital part of the Air Ministry, 
boasting ties to the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Ministry of Home Security. 
However, Sandys found it difficult to successfully counter the German unmanned 
weapons programmes. Even attacking research facilities was an inefficient use of 
resources. This was admitted by Sandys on 10 August 1944, when he told the War 
Cabinet that 'on the whole, the results achieved by these attacks had not been 
commensurate with the air effort involved'. On the other hand, he claimed that 'attacks 
on the supply system had gained appreciable results in interfering with and restricting 
the enemy’s scale of attack'.78 This was captured in memorandum by Air Vice-Marshal 
Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Air Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 
that closed the year by saying 'No single weapon is likely to provide the complete 
answer', and that 'Attacks on installations are the primary means of defence'.
79
 The 
potential threat of the weapons, combined with the difficulties of defending against 
them, created a danger that could only be overcome by removing them from the 
equation completely, and doing so at all costs. To this end, the Chiefs of Staff were 
requested on 20 January 1944 to prepare a report as to whether gas attacks might be 
utilised against launching sites 'in the event of the attacks on this country based on those 
sites becoming too damaging'. This was accompanied by the absolutist statement from 
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Churchill: 'Moral and political considerations should not be taken into account in 
preparing this report'.
80
 
 
   Throughout the existence of the various Sandys committees, which eventually became 
known as Operation CROSSBOW, and was directly charged with defending Britain 
from unmanned German weapons, there remained no definitive solution to the problems 
encountered. When the V-1 flying bombs began to strike Britain in June 1944, Sandys 
remained fixated on attacking supply sites. He was supported in this view by the Air 
Staff, who were always happy to bring their bombing strength to bear in order to further 
demonstrate its worth.
81
 In truth, whilst local defensive efforts managed to down 
significant numbers of V-1s, it was the advance of the Allied armies through Nazi-
occupied Europe that put a stop to the flying bomb attacks, even though the official 
history claims that 'the "battle of the bomb" was not won by offensive counter-
measures, but by the defences'.
82
 With the Allies beginning to establish a foothold in 
Northern France, and local defences getting to grips with their new challenge, Sandys 
was able to report to the War Cabinet that: 
 
With regard to our defences the present position was that on an average we 
were able to destroy 41% of the bombs launched and it might be that, as 
improvements were made in the equipment of our aircraft and guns and as 
the skill of the pilots and gunners increased, we should be able to bring up 
the average to 50% in the next few weeks. 
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Taking everything into account he thought that we might reduce the weight 
of explosives dropped in London from 50 tons to 30 tons a day; but we 
ought to be prepared to face attacking on this scale for several months.
83
 
 
   Churchill reacted to this unspectacular statement with a suggested counter-measure of 
his own, wondering 'whether we should not publish a list of, say, 100 of the smaller 
towns in Germany, where the defences were likely to be weak, and announce our 
intention of destroying them one by one by bombing attacks'. It was left to the Secretary 
of State for Air, Archibald Sinclair, to politely remind him that half of all Allied air 
power was at that point engaged against the flying bomb 'and that it would be extremely 
difficult to spare additional resources from the Battle of France'. He also suggested that 
'there was a grave risk that attacks of the kind indicated by the Prime Minister would 
lead to reprisals in the form of the shooting of any air crews who fell into German 
hands'.
84
 
 
   The last flying bomb was launched on 5 September, by which point the retreating 
Germans were having to launch them from specially-adapted Heinkel 111s, and British 
defences had destroyed 3463 the missiles out of 6725 observed and about 9000 
launched.
85
 Although defences against flying bomb attacks had improved, there would 
be no answer to the impending V-2 rocket. When the V-2 was unleashed by the 
Germans, its promise was immediately recognised by Sandys. It had no fixed launch 
sites to destroy or capture, it was ten times as fast as most fighter planes, and its 
development potential was straight away deemed to be unlimited. Sandys had been 
vindicated, although Cherwell had been correct about the size of the rockets eventually 
launched. Sandys had originally briefed the War Cabinet about a weapon half as long, 
twice as wide, six times as heavy, and ten times as explosive as what was eventually 
produced.
86
 However, as early as January 1944 Sandys was able to revise his previous 
predictions and report that 'the explosive load was much smaller than had been 
previously expected', and that the technical problems posed by long-range rockets 
meant production would be 'limited'.
87
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   Despite being correct about there being no hundred ton rockets in existence, as well as 
identifying other issues the Germans were to face, Cherwell has gone down in history as 
the man who was proven wrong, famously saying in October 1943, that 'at the end of 
the war, when we know the full story, we shall find that the rocket was a mare's nest'.
88
 
There is evidence to suggest that Cherwell allowed his views on the German rocket 
programme to be influenced by his personal dislike of Sandys. Jones would later recall 
that this may have 'coloured' his perspective, but thought it was more a case of him not 
wishing to see Britain back on the defensive.
89
 One of Cherwell's biographers, however, 
believes that his position was influenced by his 'disdain' for Sandys, evident in the 
private minutes Cherwell addressed to Churchill, and that he held Sandys' 
comparatively limited scientific knowledge in contempt.
90
 Jones, although never 
appearing to have had a personal dislike of Sandys, had some sympathy with this idea, 
writing that he was confused as to why, in recommending Sandys, the Chiefs of Staff 
had overlooked his fellow scientists 'to do a job that we already had in hand, and for 
which our qualifications were much better'.
91
 Jones had believed in the German rocket 
from the beginning, but it is clear that Sandys was not his ideal partner. He accused him 
of taking the credit for spotting a rocket on an aerial photograph after Jones had brought 
it to his attention, and of wildly over-estimating the weight of the rockets.
92
  
 
   Whilst Sandys never published his version of the story as Jones did, his archive 
contains a number of files containing copies of important documents relating to his war 
work that he would distribute to those seeking his version of events. Historians who 
contacted him would receive a copy, as did the producers of the 1965 motion picture 
Operation Crossbow, in which Sandys was portrayed by Richard Johnson as a tireless 
man of action constantly having to battle against Trevor Howard's dismissive and 
superior Cherwell. Amidst the reproduced committee minutes and reports is a brief 
essay titled The Scientific Controversy, which would appear to be one of the few things 
Sandys ever wrote about his war experiences. In this he pits 'all our rocket experts', who 
supposedly subscribed to the theories of technical impossibility and German deception, 
against those who had considered the 'inescapable evidence that the Germans had 
developed a rocket', but, 'Not being rocket experts', did not advance any theories on how 
                                                          
88
 Hinsley, British Intelligence..., p. 398. 
89
 Jones, R. V., Most Secret War (London: Penguin, 2009), p. 335. 
90
 Fort, A., Prof: The Life of Frederick Lindemann (London: Jonathan Cape, 2003), pp. 287-88. 
91
 Jones, Most Secret War, p. 335. 
92
 Ibid., pp. 341-43. 
31 
 
they had done so. There are no names mentioned. It does not say that Jones and others 
believed in the rocket. But the use of the deliberately vague term 'rocket experts' in 
contrast to those who happened to make the same points as Sandys, which would have 
been apparent to anybody reading the selection of documents the file contained, implies 
that it was very much a case of Sandys against the conservative scientific elite. The 
piece gives the 'experts' their due in doubting that any rocket would be as big as the 
believers - Sandys - had originally predicted, but that is explained away as the results of 
bad scientific intelligence relating to the fuel the rockets were expected to use, which 
was only rectified when the United States began its own experiments into new 
propellants.
93
 This unpublished piece of writing neatly captures both the image Sandys 
came to construct of his contribution to the war effort, and the way he would come to 
jealously guard his role in the story.  
 
   The V-2, as it turned out, proved remarkably ineffective relative to its costs. Neufeld 
compared the V-2 to aircraft-led strategic bombing and deemed it 'pathetic', going so far 
as to claim that the efforts made by the Germans to develop the V-2 meant that 'German 
missile development shortened the war, just as its advocates said it would, but in favour 
of the Allies'.
94
 Nevertheless, Churchill informed Parliament of this latest threat on 10 
November 1944, and by 23 November, Sandys had issued a report to the War Cabinet, 
two days after he had showed it to the Chiefs of Staff.
95
 In this Sandys reported the lack 
of 'effective counter-measures' against a weapon that 'attains a velocity of about 3,500 
m.p.h. and rises over 60 miles into the stratosphere'. As well as these attributes, which 
made shooting them down impossible, 'all efforts to interfere with its radio control 
mechanism have as far proved fruitless'.
96
 These qualities instantly impressed Sandys, 
and the critical paragraphs for understanding the positions he would later take in 
government are as follows. Under the heading 'British Rocket Development', he 
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described what had been seen as 'only for fore-runners of other long distance 
bombardment weapons', whose effectiveness 'could be appreciably increased': 
 
36. The advent of the long-range, radio-controlled, jet-propelled projectile 
has opened up vast new possibilities in the conduct of military operations. In 
future the possession of superiority in long distance rocket artillery may 
well count for nearly as much as superiority in naval or air power. 
 
37. The Americans have already embarked upon an ambitious programme 
of development and there are signs that the Russians are also impressed with 
the potentialities of this new technique. If Great Britain is not to risk falling 
behind other nations in this vital sphere, high grade scientific and 
engineering staff together with extensive research facilities will have to be 
provided and maintained as a permanent part of our peace-time military 
organisation.
97
 
 
   In his role as Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply, Sandys was 
partly responsible for the deployment of scientific manpower. This meant that he 
happened to be fully aware of Britain's involvement in the construction of nuclear 
weapons as part of the United States-led Manhattan Project.
98
 Although he could not 
mention this when writing this kind of report, Sandys' predictions may also have kept in 
mind the looming possibilities of these new weapons. However, that does not diminish 
what, with the benefits of hindsight, became obvious: that the progress of unmanned 
weaponry was inexorable. Whilst Sandys was not the only person to quickly recognise 
the potential of unmanned weaponry, we shall see in the subsequent sections how he 
was the first leading policy-maker to promote the idea of placing it at the centre of 
British defence planning.
99
 It was, therefore, a short step for him to then conclude that 
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on top of being able to reduce capital and human costs through manning equipment 
instead of equipping men, to use the famous maxim, the possession of offensive 
unmanned weaponry was a potential short-cut to superpower status, just as 'superiority 
in naval or air power' had been in previous years. 
 
   In addition to this, there was another angle in this discussion. Sandys came to the view 
that  possessing the dominant weapon of the future had a clear political dimension in 
terms of credibility. The Political Warfare Executive had addressed the psychological 
nature of the weapons in a January 1944 report which foreshadowed the value Sandys 
later attached to the independent nuclear deterrent. The key passage of the report reads: 
 
Furthermore, the long term effect of building up a threat [to retaliate] which 
we have no intention of fulfilling would be harmful to us. Our failure to 
retaliate would be attributed by the Germans to our impotence and to 
German power, and might increase the morale-raising effect of the use of 
'CROSSBOW'.
100
 
 
   Two weeks later this was accompanied by suggestions of a domestic political value 
when a report from the Air Staff claimed that the weapons were providing effective 
propaganda for the Germans, who boasted to their people that they were preventing the 
Allies from attempting their long-awaited invasion of Western Europe, just as the 
nuclear deterrent, whether through an independent British variety, or being protected by 
the United States nuclear umbrella, would come to base its existence on stopping the 
superior conventional forces of the Soviet Union from sweeping through the same area 
during the Cold War.
101
 This claim was supported by the definitive United States 
Strategic Bombing Survey, which is worth quoting at length. Under the heading 
'Retaliation Weapons as a Morale Stimulant', it reads: 
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One of the great stimulants to morale applied by the Nazi leaders was the 
promise of retaliation and secret weapons. The purpose, partially realized, 
was to strengthen the people’s will to hold out and convince them of the 
possibility of a final German victory. There is evidence that as the air raids 
grew heavier in 1944, faith in the eventual application of the new weapons 
was the main sustaining hope of many Germans. Until the invasion, the 
desire for retaliation was closely tied up with the air war, while after June 
1944 it was associated with the hope of defeating the enemy attack in the 
West.
102
 
 
   This would later be reflected by Sandys during the years in which British superpower 
claims were based on increasingly unstable foundations. The years during which Sandys 
occupied important roles in the defence policy-making process, 1951-54 and 1957-60, 
were critical years for Britain in this respect. Whether it was through the frustrated 
defence reviews of the early fifties aimed at putting British defence policy on a more 
viable financial footing, or through his own attempts to radically overhaul defence 
policy following the Suez Crisis, Sandys increasingly came to identify unmanned 
nuclear weaponry as the 'main sustaining hope' for a Britain seeking to remain as a 
serious contributor to the defence of the West. The Strategic Bombing Survey 
continued: 
 
When the V-1 was finally launched, its daily use was closely followed, and 
the absence of any mention of it in the communiqué for a day or two 
aroused the greatest anxiety. Furthermore, the air raids caused great fear that 
the factories producing the V-weapons might be hit and their production 
either rendered impossible or so delayed as to render them ineffectual. 
 
Late in 1944 and in 1945 the people seem to have lost all hope of winning 
the war. Their mood was one of complete demoralization bordering on 
panic. The inability of the V-1 and V-2 rockets to halt the air raids or to 
interfere with the Allied advances in the West removed their last hope. The 
question which naturally arises is how and why they kept working. The 
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morale reports do not attempt to answer that question, except for occasional 
suggestions that propaganda was influential.
103
 
 
   This would again be reflected by Sandys in later years. His predilection for seeing the 
independent nuclear deterrent as both a genuine alternative to so-called conventional 
armaments as a foundation for British defence, as well as a political symbol to justify 
his strategic re-alignment, clearly drew on these influences. The independent nuclear 
deterrent, whilst the result of gradual developments in doctrine, became the main 
political issue in defence because of Britain's newly exposed weakness. Britain's 
conventional forces could, in theory, be destroyed; but as long as Britain retained its 
place as a nuclear weapons state, it remained a nation of major importance, and one that 
the Soviet Union had to give proper consideration. That the weapons became the 'main 
sustaining hope' of the Germans would later justify Sandys' admission that Britain could 
not hope to defend itself against nuclear attack, presenting Britain's own nuclear force 
as the only possible response. This was the case in Germany, where the Strategic 
Bombing Survey found that use of rockets 'found a passionate echo and have 
strengthened the population in its belief that the use of the retaliatory weapon is an 
answer to the technical superiority of our enemies'.
104
 
 
In Opposition 
 
   Prior to the Second World War Sandys had opposed appeasement, but he had never 
really done so with any vigour.
105
 He used his maiden speech to criticise the idea of an 
anti-German alliance in Europe that 'could, at the most, hope to maintain an unhealthy 
and precarious state of armed peace'. He thought instead that Britain should have 
allowed Germany to dominate continental Europe in exchange for not pressing the 
'Colonial and naval question', which he considered to be the main British interests.
106
 
Churchill issued a forty minute rebuke to the new Member, concluding that his idea 'has 
only to be stated to be rejected'.
107
 Rather than merely being pro-German, it could be 
suggested that Sandys was not wholly unsympathetic to National Socialism. In the 
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closing stages of the Second World War the left-wing magazine Tribune published what 
they called an 'exposure' of Sandys, who they described as a 'young Tory statesman with 
prospects of a dazzling career', and somebody who had gone further than most in the 
pre-war Conservative Party in voicing 'pro-Nazi sympathies'. In support of this they 
published extracts from articles Sandys had written for a German magazine in July and 
October 1936, which they claimed had never been seen in Britain before. Naturally his 
words were stripped of any context, but it is difficult to see how passages such as the 
following could have been softened by whatever else might have been included in the 
original piece: 
 
The German people observed with growing anxiety how one key position 
after another passed under the control of Jews... But what made the situation 
doubly unbearable for the self-respecting people was the kind of Jew that 
got to the top, and their political and social views. The Jewish war profiteer 
and Jewish Socialist adventurer obtained control over the lifestream of the 
nation.
108
 
 
   The article mentioned that 'pro-Nazi sympathies' were not uncommon in the 
Conservative Party, and Sandys' writings included the kind of anti-communist 
arguments that were often made in support of Germany during the 1930s; but Tribune 
was right to say Sandys appeared to go further than his colleagues on account of his 
referring to the 'obvious blessings which National Socialism brought to Germany', and 
in attempting to dismiss criticism of Nazi Germany as little more than 'disdainful 
remarks - made on the basis of completely wrong information - about the character of 
German labour camps'.
109
 Before entering politics Sandys had briefly worked in Berlin 
on behalf of the Foreign Office, which may go some way towards explaining his 
sympathies for Germany, having given him a certain amount of knowledge relating to 
the domestic situation prior to Hitler coming to power. However, whilst at the Foreign 
Office he had also visited the Soviet Union in 1931. Under the guise of a more general 
tour, he was actually gathering information about Soviet air routes for the Air Ministry, 
and his visit was wide-ranging enough for him to conclude that 'the whole fabric of the 
State in its political, economic and cultural aspects differ fundamentally from those with 
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which we are acquainted elsewhere'.
110
 This would explain his stance from an anti-
communist perspective; but on one occasion he witnessed the transportation of political 
enemies by trains, which he reported had convinced him of the 'utter ruthlessness of 
Soviet methods and of their callous disregard for human suffering'.
111
 This would seem 
like a natural reaction to such a sight; but he must have been aware that propaganda 
emanating from the Soviet Union would have dismissed this in the way that he would 
later dismiss those calling the character of German labour camps into question. This 
would at the very least suggest a certain wilful blindness on his part, although such an 
interpretation may serve to give what could well have been outright apologist 
tendencies the benefit of undeserved doubt.   
 
   His eventual shift towards the Churchill position may well have simply been down to 
the fact that four months later he married Churchill's eldest daughter, Diana. That said, 
he would prove at various moments that he was still capable of distancing himself from 
Churchill when it suited his immediate political concerns.
112
 During the war, however, 
he managed to go beyond what even Churchill considered to have been a reasonable 
strategy for the destruction of German war-making capacity. Jock Colville, the Assistant 
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, recorded Sandys' comments over dinner in 
March 1941. With Charles de Gaulle and Robert Menzies, the Prime Minister of 
Australia, present, Sandys revealed that his preferred strategy was 'to destroy Germany 
by laying the country waste and burning towns and factories'. This was not a 
particularly bold statement to make in 1941, and his hope that 'for years the German 
people might be occupied by reconstruction' was no more outlandish. What made 
Sandys' position extreme was his wish 'to destroy their books and libraries so that an 
illiterate generation might grow up'. The nature of this suggestion was captured by 
Colville when he added that Churchill was 'in no way moved' by Sandys, describing his 
ideas as 'not applicable to modern conditions'.
113
 
 
                                                          
110
 DSND 1/2. 
111
 Ibid. 
112
 Thompson, N., The Anti-Appeasers: Conservative Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930s (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 24 and 198; Parker, R. A. C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy 
and the Coming of the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 187 and 289; Charmley, J., 
Churchill: The End of Glory - A Political Biography (London: Sceptre, 1995), p. 356; for Sandys' 
previous loyalty to Churchill see Olson, L., Troublesome Young Men: The Rebels Who Brought Churchill 
to Power in 1940 and Helped to Save Britain (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), p. 76. 
113
 8 March, 1941; Colville, The Fringes of Power, pp. 312-13. 
38 
 
   It would appear that Sandys' policy preferences were still in their infancy at this point 
in his career, but there are traces of his all-or-nothing attitude in these early positions, as 
well as an ability to disregard information that refused to fit his preconceived notions. 
Following the 1945 Labour landslide, when Sandys remained heavily involved with the 
defeated Conservative Party, Churchill had wanted to put him in charge of the 
Conservative Research Department, but the informal Shadow Cabinet fought to prevent 
it.
114
 Instead he occupied his time away from the House of Commons by leading the 
United European Movement, a precursor to the European Movement, where he was 
responsible for soliciting covert funding from a United States government eager to see 
Western Europe united against Soviet communism.
115
 Sue Onslow has written about the 
Conservative Party and Europe at this time, and she casts Sandys as the decisive 
influence on turning Churchill towards Europe. Letters of introduction from Churchill 
opened most doors on the continent, where he was apparently left mostly to his own 
devices in organising Churchill's level of involvement, and in doing so he was typically 
assertive. On one occasion when Churchill sent him a draft of his speech to comment 
upon, Sandys wrote a new one for him. When Churchill asked for his original speech to 
be returned, Sandys told him he had torn it up, and Churchill was forced to deliver an 
amended Sandys speech.
116
 However, whilst Churchill sought a United Europe which 
the British Empire could provide with an influential link to the United States, Sandys 
had come to the conclusion that granting independence to India had essentially brought 
the British Empire to a close. As a result, he felt that a close alliance with the United 
States would lead to subordination and a lack of influence over Western military policy. 
The answer, therefore, lay in a Europe that had gone through a phase of full economic 
and military integration in order to emerge as a rival to the United States.
117
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   This concept of British standing in the world may have had some relevance for his 
defence policy preferences. If Sandys was wary of British foreign policy becoming 
subordinate to United States interests, to the extent that he considered a European super-
state accompanied by a significant military capability preferable, his defence policy 
preferences can be seen in another light. As will be shown later, whilst Minister of 
Supply he was notably insensitive to the Royal Navy's argument that their aircraft 
carriers bought Britain a worthwhile say in Atlantic naval policy. This argument 
eventually won over Churchill, after Sandys had almost convinced him to drastically 
reduce the role of the Navy, but it would return in opposition to Sandys when the Navy 
turned it against the Air Force and their apparent need for an increasingly expensive 
nuclear delivery system when they themselves admitted that the ultimate defence of 
Britain rested in American hands. Sandys' insistence on the maintenance of an 
independent element of British nuclear deterrence - preferably manufactured 
independently by Britain, but most definitely under unconditional British control - could 
perhaps also be understood through this aspect of his foreign policy preferences, seeing 
as some historians have credited the friction in Anglo-American relations following the 
Suez Crisis with forcing a renewed drive for independence in defence policies.
118
  
 
   Indeed, when Prime Minister Anthony Eden launched the post-Suez review of defence 
policy in December 1956, he made it clear that 'We should not wish to become entirely 
dependent on the United States for supplies of atomic weapons, warheads or fissile 
material', and said alternatives pursued 'either alone or in co-operation with other 
countries' ought to be considered.
119
 If Sandys was genuinely taken by the idea that it 
was important for Britain to avoid further subordination to United States' policy, his 
insistence that Britain pursue those weapons which provided the greatest element of 
operational independence can be viewed in another light. That these weapons were 
British-built ballistic missiles, the construction of which Sandys would later pursue in 
the face of numerous obstacles and set-backs, would also serve to imbue an indigenous 
unmanned weapons programme with the kind of political value which he had noted in 
November 1944, and that the Strategic Bombing Survey had also recorded.  
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   Having missed out on making his name by opposing appeasement, like many of those 
who at that point formed the emerging Conservative leadership, Sandys sought to make 
up for it after 1945 by taking a hard line against the Soviet Union, as well as attempting 
to associate the Labour Party with its excesses.
120
 In a March 1948 speech he explicitly 
linked the Labour Party with the Soviet threat, saying 'you cannot rely upon a Socialist 
party, however well intentioned, to stand up firmly against the Communist menace'.
121
 
This was not an unusual charge, being repeated by Macmillan amongst others, but the 
draft speech Sandys prepared contained a lengthy passage, eventually undelivered, 
predicting Labour's imminent radicalisation along Soviet lines:  
 
As the crisis darkens, the cry will go up increasingly from Labour Party 
ranks for more and redder Socialism... Once the Labour Party comes under 
the leadership of men drawn from its extreme left wing, it will find it quite 
impossible to resist some alliance of fusion with the Communists. That will 
be the beginning in England of the process which on the Continent has 
sapped and destroyed one free country after another.
122
  
 
   This was crossed out of his copy of the speech, having presumably been reconsidered 
as unsuitable for a prospective parliamentary candidate, which he had become in 1947, 
when he was adopted by the Streatham Conservative Association. These concerns were 
nevertheless apparent in his early campaigning, and in his selection meeting he warned 
the committee that 'Our country is faced with an imminent threat of economic collapse'. 
His real view can be seen in his original draft which argued 'Our country is faced with 
two really big dangers - economic collapse and war', and he does seem to have spent 
much of this period being rather pessimistic about the latter.
123
 In an October 1948 
speech he made reference to his war work when discussing the Berlin situation and the 
chances of the Soviet Union acquiring atomic weapons, adding that, even if the 
blockade was lifted, 'the main problems will remain unsolved': 
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In the last war I had a good deal to do with the defence against German V-
weapons. We reckoned that if we had not succeeded in putting off the V-2 
rocket bombardment until the French coast had been overrun by our troops, 
London would probably have been rendered unusable. If the rocket had 
contained an atomic bomb - and at one moment we feared that it might - 
London would, of course, have been annihilated. We who live in the fattest, 
most alluring of all bomb targets in the world have a very special interest in 
seeing that the Western democracies and Soviet Russia are settled and 
atomic energy brought under international control before Russia herself 
acquires this terrible engine of destruction.
124
 
 
   Although he made it clear that he desired a peaceful settlement, Sandys was willing to 
at least entertain the prospect that the Soviet Union might 'in her obstinacy' have started 
the Third World War. And if there was to be a conflict, he said, 'it would be better to 
have it now or in the near future', since trying to run away from the inevitable 'was the 
argument made at Munich in 1938'.
125
 When these words were reported by the local 
newspaper, he was promptly accused of wishing to start this new war. He wrote to 
clarify that 'Only a madman - and certainly no-one who fought in the last war like 
myself' wanted a war, but argued that 'we shall not avoid war by pretending that the 
danger of it does not exist'.
126
 He claimed that it was important for the West to stand 
firm on Berlin 'not because it is the only, or even the most important of our points of 
difference with Russia, but because it is the most immediate, the most clearly defined 
and, for that reason, perhaps the least difficult to tackle'. Success in Berlin, he argued, 
could make the Soviet Union take notice and 'become more co-operative in the 
settlement of other matters'.
127
  
 
   Sandys was returned to the House of Commons in the general election of February 
1950, where the Conservatives regained many of the seats lost in 1945, but not enough 
to topple the Labour government. He maintained his campaign against the Soviet Union 
as elected representative, and in July 1950 he told the Streatham Chamber of Commerce 
that 'There is a state of danger no less than followed Munich in 1938'. Believing that 
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such an 'explosive state of affairs cannot continue indefinitely', he told his audience that 
'we should be lacking in our duty as a nation if we did not put defence before the 
restoration of prosperity', adding 'what is at stake is our very lives and the freedom we 
fought for in the last war'.
128
 By contrast, Churchill, perhaps looking towards an 
eventual return to government, had by this point started to tone down his anti-
communist rhetoric.
129
 
 
   In December Sandys told a crowd in Streatham that he thought there was only a 'year 
or 18 months' left before the Soviet Union acquired enough nuclear weapons to pose a 
'serious operational danger to the Western world'. By this point a clear pattern had 
developed in his public statements regarding the threat of communism, with similar 
warnings being included in many of his speeches. This particular address, however, 
stands out because of his answer to an audience question about the possible use of 
nuclear weapons in the Korean War (25 June 1950 - 27 July 1953). He said he did not 
think nuclear weapons would prove particularly useful in Korea, but added: 
 
It is a very grave responsibility to take if you are responsible for the lives of 
very large numbers of your fellow countrymen and the men of other 
nationalities who are fighting for a certain cause which you believe to be 
right. It is equally a very grave responsibility to allow those men to be killed 
and taken prisoner in the sort of conditions which you have in those 
countries - if you have something in the bag which would prevent it.
130
  
 
   This was a remarkable statement, as was his belief that there was no 'rule of thumb 
under what circumstances the atom bomb may be used'.
131
 This speech was delivered in 
the wake of Harry S. Truman, the President of the United States, telling the press on 30 
November that 'every weapon that we have' was being considered for use in Korea. 
Truman had made it clear that he did not want to see such a 'terrible weapon' used, but 
when questioned by journalists who could not quite believe what he had said, he 
described it as just 'one of our weapons' and appeared to suggest that Douglas 
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MacArthur, the American general in charge of the United Nations' forces in Korea, 
would have the final decision on whether or not to use them.
132
 When these words were 
greeted with a certain amount of surprise, the White House quickly issued a press 
release to clarify that 'only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb' and 
that he had yet to do so, albeit whilst admitting that 'Consideration of the use of any 
weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon'.
133
 When news of this 
filtered through to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Clement Attlee promised to 
'lose no time' in flying to Washington for crisis talks with Truman.
134
 The Chiefs of 
Staff met to discuss the issue, where John Slessor, the Chief of the Air Staff, warned 
against allowing MacArthur to attack the Chinese mainland because it would probably 
have drawn the Soviet Union into the war.
135
 John Lewis Gaddis has called it 'striking' 
that Truman never seriously considered using his most powerful weapon, even when the 
combined United Nations force was on the verge of defeat, given that United States 
strategy at the time depended on a 'high technology-low manpower' policy.
136
 He writes 
that Truman inadvertently launched a 'trial balloon' which made clear the hostility of 
their allies to such a scenario, which, combined with his own aversion to the idea, ruled 
it out.
137
 
 
   The implication of Sandys' words is that, rather than nuclear weapons representing an 
absolute and final threat, he saw it as a practical policy alternative. The use of 'would 
prevent' leaves little to speculation in this sense. It may have been the case that Sandys, 
like a lot of people involved with the development and implementation of strategic 
bombing, might have been less inclined to view nuclear warfare as anything other than a 
logical development of existing practices. This would fit with his earlier belief that the 
issue should have been forced with the Soviet Union whilst the West - rather, the United 
States - remained in a dominant position through its monopoly on nuclear weapons, 
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which was a point made elsewhere.
138
 There does seem to have been a crude division on 
this issue between the military men and the politicians, with even Churchill expressing 
regret when Truman's successor, Dwight. D. Eisenhower, sought to entrench the 
normalisation of nuclear weaponry through what Nina Tannenwald has described as a 
'deliberate and intensive policy to "conventionalize" atomic weapons.
139
 If Sandys 
sincerely believed that the destructive power of nuclear weapons could be utilised in 
circumstances other than deterring, or responding to, a world-ending Soviet nuclear 
attack, then his policy preferences take on a new perspective. Unlike those who valued 
nuclear weapons solely for their deterrent effect, and who could not contemplate 
actually having to deploy them, Sandys concept of nuclear weapons use could have 
informed his policies that sought to maintain Britain's status as a nuclear power, namely 
the need for a greater level of operational independence, and the most effective means 
of securing that independence.
140
 
 
The Historian 
 
   When not confronting communism, Sandys was helping Churchill to write his six-
volume history of the Second World War. This process gives a valuable insight into 
how Sandys had come to interpret his actions during the Second World War, as well as 
what he perceived their consequences to have been. This, in turn, allows for a better 
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understanding of the intellectual basis of Sandys' policy preferences, rooted as they 
were in a sometimes exaggerated version of events. The fifth volume of Churchill's 
memoir-cum-history contains a chapter titled Hitler's 'Secret Weapon', first drafted by 
Sandys in December 1950.
141
 The original draft, as David Reynolds writes, 'mirrored his 
own wartime contribution' by highlighting the threat of unmanned weaponry and 
emphasising the results of the attack on Peenemünde.
142
 The latter claim became a 
contentious issue when Churchill passed the draft to both Cherwell and Jones. In the 
first draft, Sandys wrote that the Peenemünde raid 'may well have played a decisive part 
in the general progress of the war', citing a passage in Eisenhower's memoirs in 
support.
143
 Both Cherwell and Jones objected to this portrayal, with Jones making his 
own amendments which, according to Sandys, did not merit inclusion as they merely 
covered old ground and offered nothing new.
144
 The version eventually published was a 
compromise shorn of Eisenhower's words that described the raid as having played 'an 
important and definite part in the general progress of the war'.
145
 
 
   It is interesting to note that during his period as Minister of Supply, Sandys was still 
involved with Churchill and his literary project. This came to serve as an unofficial 
platform for Sandys' strategic ideas, in particular his opposition to the Royal Navy 
taking on a nuclear strike role with the N.A. 39 (Blackburn Buccaneer). Towards the 
end of 1952 Churchill was working on his sixth and final volume, and Sandys was once 
again called upon to help. This book contained the chapter The Pilotless Bombardment, 
and the old battles between Sandys, Jones, and Cherwell recommenced when, as 
Reynolds puts it, 'Duncan Sandys again tried to highlight his own contribution'.
146
 In the 
original draft, Churchill had included a lengthy passage including lengthy quotes from 
Albert Speer, who had intimate knowledge of the unmanned weapons programme 
having been the German Minister of Armaments and War Production, which argued that 
the programmes were wasteful, and that the Germans would have been better off 
investing in conventional manned aircraft. This was particularly true of the V-2, Speer 
claimed, which was twenty times as expensive as the V-1. The Speer quote Churchill 
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included mentioned that both bombers and fighters would have been a better use of 
German resources, but when Sandys was asked for his thoughts on the draft chapter he 
returned a completely re-written version with the passages based on Speer's words 
removed in their entirety.
147
 Churchill wrote back on 13 January 1953 questioning 
Sandys' amended version and asking rhetorically whether or not Speer was correct.
148
 
Sandys replied on 29 January - at which point he was deep into a review of defence 
policy - with a compromise. Writing on official Ministry of Supply-headed paper, he 
argued that the Speer quote repeated and contradicted itself, and that it 'interrupts the 
sequence of the story'.
149
 When Cherwell received a copy of this proposed compromise 
draft, he wrote to Churchill to say that Sandys' alterations 'would not give a true picture', 
adding 'Indeed I think it might be phrased in a much unkinder form were it not desired 
to let him down gently'.
150
 The compromise section, as eventually published, reads: 
 
Despite the great technical achievements, Speer, the highly competent 
German Minister of Munitions, deplored the effort that had been put into 
making rockets. He asserted that each one took as long to produce as six or 
seven fighters, which would have been far more useful, and that twenty 
flying bombs could have been made for the cost of one rocket.
151
 
 
   The references to German bomber production had been erased. By placing the 
emphasis on fighters, the section no longer promoted the bomber aircraft as a more cost-
efficient delivery system, as Speer had originally done, and as the Navy were then 
attempting to do. The flying bomb was given its due, but they were obsolete by this 
point, and not likely to be raised in policy discussions. The important thing for Sandys 
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was that manned bomber aircraft were not held up as a possible alternative to long-
range rockets as a means of delivering explosive payloads, capable of matching the 
increases in performance that was thought to have made them impossible to defend 
against. Given that the medium V-bombers, on which the British nuclear deterrent was 
expected to rest, were all in advanced testing by this stage, there would have been no 
chance of the Ministry of Supply de-railing those programmes. However, although 
Sandys' Ministry had confirmed the specifications for the desired naval aircraft in 
August, it was not until February that companies began to respond with designs, and the 
programme had barely progressed by the time he was able to mount a thorough attack 
against it. Therefore, short of a rapid change of heart prompted by his responsibilities, it 
would be fair to say he was always against the idea of a naval strike aircraft capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons, and he would have had this in mind as he prepared his 
draft. 
 
   The next historian to call upon Sandys was Basil Collier, author of the official history 
of the German bombing offensive against Britain, The Defence of the United Kingdom, 
who sought out Sandys for information and advice. Having sent him a preliminary draft 
of his text, Sandys put together a detailed list of amendments. His feelings about the 
draft were made quite clear with the opening line of his 'General Comments', which 
read: 'There is an unmistakeable tendency throughout not only to belittle but to sneer at 
my own part in the story'.
152
 He claimed that the text contained 'not a single friendly 
word' about his role, despite having had a 'larger personal responsibility than anyone 
else'. Consequently, Sandys felt, Jones and the Intelligence Staff had seen their roles 
'magnified beyond all recognition'. It was, at least according to Sandys himself, the 
'energetic and timely action' he had advocated on the back of that intelligence that had 
made the difference. This was the general tone of his criticism. Sandys accused Collier 
of implying that Jones would have been a better choice to chair the committees; 
described the claim that he provided 'speculative account[s]' as 'offensive'; and objected 
to Jones being given credit for predicting that the Germans had a long-range rocket in 
development. Collier was, he thought, attempting to 'minimise as much as possible the 
extent of my responsibility and the part I was called upon to play'. He also complained 
about the coverage given to the Peenemünde raid, which amounted to 'three short 
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sentences', feeling that 'The dislocation caused by the killing of 735 personnel of the 
[Weapons Research] Establishment should be stressed'.
153
  
 
   J. R. M. Butler, the general editor of the official histories, sent Sandys a list of the 
changes Collier had made from his suggestions in February 1956, but Sandys was still 
far from happy with this revised version.
154
 He wrote back to say 'this section of the 
book remains, so far as I am concerned, unfair and misleading'.
155
 The copy of the 
amendments he received has hand-written notes in the margins that take issue with 
familiar themes. He felt the need to remind Butler and Collier of his important role in 
relation to the actual implementation of counter-measures, writing 'Intelligence officers 
do not take charge. They advise. They advised me', and asking rhetorically who had 
actually forced through the attack on Peenemünde. When an amended passage referred 
to 1943 as a period of uncertainty that had  'led to so much untimely speculation', 
Sandys scrawled in the margin 'and to the bombing of Peenemunde [Sic]!'
156
 The 
published version, which would presumably have displeased Sandys, said of the raid on 
Peenemünde: 
 
From the standpoint of the present day, it is obvious that the attacks on 
Peenemünde and Watten were well timed and did good service to the Allied 
cause. We have seen, too, that soon afterwards any immediate prospect of 
rocket attacks on the United Kingdom was extinguished by the technical 
shortcomings of the weapon.
157
 
 
   Both Churchill and Collier had merely sought to classify the attack as one of many 
successful bombing raids carried out, but Sandys had clearly come to see it as 
something more. Rather than Sandys seeking political capital by retrospectively 
assigning himself a greater role in the defeat of Germany, it appears that Sandys had 
actually come to believe that his actions had 'played a decisive part' in the defeat of 
Germany. Conclusive proof of this can be found in 1964 when David Irving published 
his history of Operation Crossbow, The Mare's Nest, and Sandys, who had shared 
correspondence with Irving during the writing process, reviewed it for the Evening 
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Standard.
158
 Despite returning to his previous irritations with the official histories, and 
criticising Irving for emphasising the role of intelligence-gathering at the expense of his 
practical counter-measures, he nevertheless praised it as an 'authoritative account of the 
V-weapon offensive'. In his description of the campaign, he returned to the position he 
took writing for Churchill by referring once more to 'the opinion of General 
Eisenhower'. Eisenhower, Sandys said, believed that the raid on Peenemünde 'may well 
have altered the course of the war'. He then went further: 'In fact, he has expressed the 
view that if the German V-weapons had come into operation six months earlier the 
Allied invasion of Europe from England would have had to be "written off"'.
159
 This 
selective quoting distorts what had actually been written, as the full passage from 
Eisenhower's memoirs reads: 
 
It seemed likely that, if the German had succeeded in perfecting and using 
these new weapons six months earlier than he did, our invasion of Europe 
would have proved exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible. I feel sure that 
if they had succeeded in using these weapons over a six-month period, and 
particularly if they had made the Portsmouth-Southampton area one of their 
principal targets, OVERLORD might have been written off.
160
 
 
   Irving had gone more towards Sandys' version in his book, writing that the raid 
delayed the unmanned weapons offensive 'just long enough to prevent it dislocating the 
combined Allied invasion of Normandy ten months later'.
161
 However, where 
Eisenhower had speculated that the invasion 'might have been written off', Sandys had 
made the statement definitive. This thinking, when done in retrospect as in the case of 
Sandys, would appear to have been a classic case of 'Political Myth'.  It is clear that 
Sandys had come to exaggerate the importance of his war service, but there is little to 
suggest that he did so to cynically further his own reputation and career. As has been 
said, the precise results of the raid on Peenemünde can still be debated. What is certain, 
however, is that Sandys' interpretation of Eisenhower's verdict - that the raid on 
Peenemünde, and therefore his contribution to the war effort, was decisive - did not 
correspond with any conceivable reality. By 1964, however,  this mindset made little 
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difference to government policy. The Conservatives had been defeated in the October 
general election, and Sandys would never again hold a Ministerial position.  
 
Conclusion 
 
   Neufeld recounts the story of Dornberger describing the long-range rocket to Hitler as 
'this perhaps decisive weapon' in a December 1939 memorandum. This baseless 
speculation, writes Neufeld, showed Dornberger to have been a 'true believer, and one 
willing to exaggerate for the sake of the cause'.
162
 Sandys' position, whilst not entirely 
baseless, was comparable in this sense. By analysing Sandys' interpretation of his war 
experiences outside of the policy-making process, a clear picture begins to emerge of 
what constituted his individual belief system. He obviously saw the results of the attack 
on Peenemünde as far more important than they really were, which therefore suggests 
that he believed the threat it and its products posed was much more serious than it really 
was. He had accepted that the gigantic rockets of his early projections would not 
materialise well before the first V-2s began to land in Britain, but he had wasted little 
time in coming to believe that the V-2 descendants held unlimited potential, and 
therefore represented the future of warfare. In addition to this, his experiences being 
mainly ones of so-called 'unconventional' weapons had led him to refrain from 
accepting the emerging notion that nuclear weapons were different from the other, 
comparably less-destructive weapons that Britain and the West had long been able to 
call upon. This would prove to be equally as important as his faith in the supremacy of 
unmanned weaponry when he was given a chance to articulate his strategic vision in 
depth as part of the formal policy-making process. 
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The Ministry of Supply and the Radical Review: 1953-54 
 
The primary intention of this thesis is to explore the extent to which Sandys utilised the 
perceived lessons of his Second World War experiences in his activities as Minister of 
Defence. The ultimate intention is to ascertain the degree to which these experiences led 
him to become wedded to the ideas contained in his 1957 White Paper to the extent that 
he continued to champion them long after their impracticalities had been made apparent. 
In order to show the consistency in his approach, having described how Sandys came to 
interpret his experiences and memories of the Second World War, it is also worthwhile 
explaining how he had previously attempted to draw upon those lessons in a context 
that, whilst different in some respects, was still one characterised by the sort of non-
routine and ambiguous situations in which the use of personal belief systems in the 
policy-making process could thrive. This section follows Sandys' work at the Ministry 
of Supply throughout 1953 and 1954, when he was called upon to make a significant 
contribution to the defence policy-making process for the first time.  
 
   When the Conservatives returned to office in October 1951, Churchill made Sandys 
Minister of Supply in order to force through the de-nationalisation of the steel industry, 
although the main responsibility of the Ministry of Supply was to oversee the provision 
of equipment for the Armed Forces.
163
 This decision put Sandys at the heart of the 
defence policy-making process at an important time. The new Conservative 
administration had inherited a re-armament programme hastily put together by the 
previous Labour government in response to the Korean War, but there had been little 
serious consideration as to how Britain could continue to meet its wide-ranging 
commitments without placing an excessive strain on the economy. To this end the 
Chiefs of Staff submitted a report in June 1952, titled Defence Policy and Global 
Strategy, that intended to place economic concerns at the heart of strategic planning.
164
 
C. J. Bartlett has written that during the defence debates of late 1951 and early 1952, 
Sandys equalled the Chiefs of Staff in his 'radical thinking'.
165
 However, when the 1952 
review was deemed insubstantial, Churchill instigated what became known as the 
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'Radical Review', which sought to encourage an even more thorough examination of 
British defence policy. It was during this Radical Review of defence policy and 
expenditure, and its climate of uncertainty and potential upheaval, that Sandys was first 
able to arrange his policy preferences into a coherent strategic vision. This vision would 
not only be carried over into his time as Minister of Defence, as French has noted, but 
demonstrated clearly that the perceived lessons of the Second World War remained at 
the forefront of his thinking.
166
 
 
   Because the Ministry of Supply was not bound by an obligation to any particular 
branch of the Armed Forces, Sandys was almost uniquely able to offer comprehensive 
solutions to the dilemmas Britain faced without having to defer to service sensibilities 
or established ways of thinking. As a result, he could utilise his position to go well 
beyond what his more conservative colleagues and the Chiefs of Staff were willing to 
countenance, advocating long-term measures that were described within the Ministry of 
Defence as 'revolutionary' before being rejected.
167
 With his lengthy memoranda of June 
and November 1953, Sandys challenged the strategic priorities the Chiefs of Staff had 
decided upon, calling their conception of the Cold War into question, whilst also 
arguing for a policy of dependence on unmanned weaponry and thermonuclear weapons 
at a time when little thought had been given to it by other Ministers or the Heads of the 
Armed Forces. 
 
The Radical Review 
 
   Defence Policy and Global Strategy declared itself to be a 'basis for the revision of 
planned forces and defence production programmes', prompted by economic concerns 
and the perceived changes in warfare brought about by the ever-increasing power of the 
United States' atomic weapons stockpile. Baylis has written that the main legacy of the 
1952 review was that, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, 
'economic criteria had become central to the strategic planning process', in contrast to 
previous policy reviews where responsibilities were laid down and the British economy 
was forced to keep up.
168
 However, as he notes, the final paragraph of the report, which 
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was highlighted for emphasis in the original document, said that reductions in spending 
and a reconsideration of overseas commitments 'can be undertaken only by incurring 
real and serious risks'. Risks that, it was argued, were only worth taking 'in the face of 
the threat of economic disaster'.
169
 In this respect, the Chiefs of Staff were clearly 
reluctant in seeking economies even at this early stage, and their report, whilst accepting 
the premise in theory, reflected their belief in the previous system of finding the money 
to carry out British responsibilities. Baylis also writes that the 'novel features' of the 
report should not be 'unduly exaggerated', which is a mistake he feels historians have 
made in the past by crediting it with putting nuclear deterrence at the forefront of British 
strategy, pointing out that reviews undertaken in 1947 and 1950 placed similar emphasis 
on nuclear deterrence, and therefore 1952 was weighted more towards continuity than 
change.
170
 
 
   The report spoke of the 'implacable and unlimited aims of Soviet Russia', amounting 
to nothing short of 'world-domination'. However, the Chiefs of Staff argued that such 
was the scale of American preponderance in both the stockpiling atomic weapons and in 
the means of delivering them, the Soviet Union could not hope to last more than a 'few 
weeks' in any full-scale war. The priority for Britain, therefore, was to maintain an 
effective nuclear deterrent and the will to use it in response to any Soviet aggression. It 
had also become clear to the Chiefs of Staff that 'in the foreseeable future' there would 
be 'no effective defence against atomic air attack', which carried 'the gravest 
implications for the United Kingdom'. This was because Britain was thought to possess 
'the most threatening bomber bases from which atomic attacks on Russia could be 
launched', and these were expected to be primary targets for a Soviet Union still 
incapable of launching a decisive attack against the United States mainland.
171
  
 
   There was still thought to be a market for 'long-term defensive measures against air 
attack', but, given that there was nothing in sight to fully protect the nation, Britain 
could not afford to prioritise defensive measures above its only effective defence - the 
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main deterrent force.
172
 The report had based its conclusions on the idea of an opening 
Soviet bombardment of 'unparalleled intensity', most likely followed by 'intermittent 
struggle' across the globe, during which 'vital sea lanes and ports must be kept open'. 
However, a 'prolonged period of Cold War' was the expected scenario, and the strategic 
priorities for Britain were deemed to be as follows: 
 
(i) Action required to win the Cold War. 
(ii) Playing our part in the deterrents against war. 
(iii) Preparations for war. 
 
   In order to accomplish these tasks, the review stressed the necessity of protecting the 
'North Atlantic lifeline', which meant a strong Navy; the need for an expanded strategic 
bomber programme 'at the expense of aircraft for tactical use' if need be; the 
continuation of nuclear weapons development; and the importance of maintaining 
troops in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East - despite admitting that there were 
relatively easy savings to be made in reducing overseas commitments such as these.
173
 
 
   In September 1952 the Chiefs of Staff submitted another report confirming their belief 
that the proposed cost-saving measures demanded by the government were 
'unacceptable on military grounds', and would have meant 'risks which we cannot 
believe to be justified in the present state of international relations'.
174
 In October, 
having been asked to find further savings, they warned the government that their June 
review was in danger of being made redundant due to the changes in policy that would 
need to be made in order to meet their new targets. They said that either the government 
found the money to make their June recommendations work, or it took steps to 'reduce 
our commitments - and hence our status', which threatened to have a 'catastrophic' effect 
'not only on our military but also on our economic position'.
175
 
 
   With little headway being made, the strategic situation was permanently altered on 1 
November when the United States detonated the first thermonuclear device, promising 
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hitherto undreamt of destructive capabilities. Having compromised on spending for 
1953, Churchill asked Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, to establish a Ministerial 
Committee on Defence Policy to report on future defence policy.
176
 Brook met with 
civil servants from the Treasury, the Foreign Office, and the Ministry of Defence to 
discuss how to proceed, where it was pointed out that asking the Chiefs of Staff for 
guidance would be 'pointless', since their recommendations were based on existing 
commitments.
177
 The Committee was to formulate the Radical Review, and in January 
1953 Brook brought his group of civil servants together, along with the Chiefs of Staff, 
to build on some of the recommendations put forward in 1952. Brook made it clear that 
previous defence reviews were seen by the politicians as mere 'deferments of certain 
measures', which was no longer a suitable approach when the likelihood of a 'hot war' 
was believed to have been reduced, so planning for a 'long period of cold war' was to be 
given priority.
178
 
 
   It is with this in mind that Clark and Wheeler have characterised the Radical Review 
as an exercise intended to 'deny legitimacy to Army, and especially Navy, preparations 
for a long nuclear war'.
179
 However, whilst the Radical Review had sought to bring 
focus to some of the more vague commitments contained in the 1952 review, the 
decision to plan for a short war was not taken until the politicians had taken hold of the 
process after unsatisfactory progress in the first half of 1953.
180
 That progress would be 
unsatisfactory had been apparent from the beginning, when half an hour before the first 
meeting with Brook, the Chiefs of Staff Committee had met to plan their approach to 
negotiations. They agreed to establish the principle that defence spending could only be 
reduced through 'major changes of policy', since 'all possible pruning' had been done.
181
 
William Dickson, the Chief of the Air Staff, was happy to prioritise 'survival during the 
first intensive phase', but Rhoderick McGrigor, the First Sea Lord, disagreed. He felt 
that such priorities did not apply to the Navy as they did to air and ground forces, 
because the Navy was required to 'keep our lifeline to the North American Continent' 
open in order to survive the second phase, which would be 'protracted', and to build 
reserves for 'the final victory'.
182
 McGrigor won the argument, and was able to then 
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inform the Brook Committee that the 1952 review had considered 'economic and 
political factors', as well as the possibility that, despite the reduced risk of 'deliberate hot 
war', the nation still had to be prepared of a drift into war 'by some indiscreet action on 
either side'. With this in mind, he reported that the Chiefs of Staff could not accept any 
further reductions in defence expenditure without 'some drastic change in policy'.
183
 
    
   The staunchly conservative framework for the Committee was set, and when Brook 
submitted his report on 20 May, there was little to differentiate it from what had been 
laid down in 1952. It met the requirements of the Radical Review in that it accepted that 
the priorities decided by the Chiefs of Staff in 1952 were quite vague, and did not 
properly consider the need to 'maintain our influence as a world Power'. Unfortunately 
for the government, Brook used this as a cue to lean more towards open-ended 
interpretations, such as the need to 'maintain forces overseas even if all our cold-war 
commitments came to an end'.
184
 The report saw 'no prospect' of meeting the reductions 
demanded by the Treasury, stating that such reductions would require a new strategic 
policy 'devised to meet the financial circumstances', the implications of which were 
clear from the apocalyptic visions of future naval and aerial strength predicted by the 
report.
185
 
 
The Sandys Doctrine 
 
   With the Brook Committee proving something of a let-down to the government, and 
with the Chiefs of Staff either unable or unwilling to find the savings asked of them, the 
politicians took charge of the Radical Review and scheduled an 18 June meeting with 
only the Service Ministers representing the Armed Forces.
186
 Before the meeting, 
Sandys had circulated an eleven page memorandum in which he explained his strategic 
vision at length across ninety-seven separate points. His preferred approach was to 
'concentrate expenditure on those objects which will give the highest return in terms of 
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effective defence', and of 'concentrating our strength at the vital points'.
187
 This was in 
sharp contrast to the Chiefs of Staff, who merely sought to stretch ever-dwindling 
resources further and further. That approach, Sandys said, could only lead to a 'general 
lowering of the standards of efficiency and preparedness'; so he radically advocated the 
subordination of policy to the economic realities of medium power status.  
 
   The opening paragraphs of his memorandum proposed some measure of colonial 
retreat, where only the 'minimum forces necessary' should be designated for colonial 
responsibilities, but with a strategic reserve based in Britain to be deployed rapidly 'In 
the event of troubles, such as we are now having in Malaya and Kenya'.
188
 The 
protection of Hong Kong by 'offensive operations against the aggressor country', rather 
than local operations was one mooted example a of cost-saving measure, even though 
such a policy would presumably have risked an even more costly general war with 
China, as he would later admit that operations mounted in defence of Hong Kong 'need 
not necessarily be conducted in Hong Kong'.
189
 
 
   It was then that he turned his attention to the strategic priorities of the Chiefs of Staff. 
He disagreed with the idea of prioritising deterrence over having to win a 'hot war', 
writing that they 'form part of a single task and to attempt to separate them is confusing'. 
 
[T]he task of winning the cold war consists primarily in building up 
deterrents against a hot war. Similarly, the only deterrents which are likely 
to be effective are actual preparations for war, such as will convince a 
potential aggressor that he will surely be defeated. Therefore, apart from the 
requirements of Commonwealth commitments, our defence effort must be 
directed towards one single objective, namely, to prepare for the possibility 
of a major war with Russia. This will not only put us in the best position to 
defend ourselves if war should come, but will provide the best hope of 
preventing it.
190
 
 
                                                          
187
 'Review of Defence Expenditure: Memorandum by the Minister of Supply,15 June, 1953'; DNSD 
4/1/1. 
188
 French has said that this idea would prove influential over the coming years, eventually being 
implemented by Sandys as Minister of Defence; see: French, D. 'Duncan Sandys and the Projection of 
British Power after Suez' in Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2013), pp. 41-58. 
189
 'Review of Defence Expenditure: 15 June, 1953'; DNSD 4/1/1; CAB 134/809, D.P.(M) (53) 1st 
Meeting: 18 June, 1953. 
190
 'Review of Defence Expenditure: 15 June, 1953'; DNSD 4/1/1. 
58 
 
   This is evidence of Sandys again normalising nuclear weapons by viewing them as 
part of general strategic considerations, rather than as an additional factor. The thinking 
of the Chiefs of Staff was that a 'hot war' breaking out with the Soviet Union would 
have represented a failure of deterrence, which would then have led in to a distinctive 
new war. For Sandys, who did not neatly separate nuclear and non-nuclear warfare in 
this manner, it would have simply meant that the British supply of nuclear weapons had 
not proven to be as useful as might have been expected. Thus the same war continued, 
only with more potent weapons. His experiences of trying to counter the V-2 threat 
during the Second World War, and his subsequent exaggeration of the importance of 
doing so, could be said to have had an influence on this position. The unconventional 
weapons Germany produced, whilst thought of as potentially devastating, were 
ultimately seen as just another target to be [successfully] neutralised by Britain's own 
long-range revenge weapon, the heavy bombers of Bomber Command. Additionally, 
because no direct means of defence against the V-2 had been found, this sort of indirect 
defence had been deemed the most suitable counter-measure. If the Soviet Union was 
going to decide any future global war with its nuclear arsenal, as Sandys' seemingly 
believed Hitler had intended to do with his unmanned weapons programme, then 
deterrence and defence became one and the same. The former meant devising a policy 
of threatening to destroy the Soviet Union, the latter would have simply meant 
implementing it.     
 
   This belief fitted with the assumption that any war would begin as a nuclear war, so 
Sandys concluded that 'For us in this small island the opening phase will be decisive'. If 
the Soviet Union could bring enough power to bear that British industry was crippled 
and American bomber bases rendered worthless, 'Britain would be for all practical 
purposes be knocked out of the war'. Therefore the 'decisive opening phase' should be 
given priority, and 'we must unhesitatingly accord lower priority' to anything deemed 
not to be of importance in surviving the opening few weeks of global nuclear war. To 
this end, he emphasised the need to focus on the 'Introduction of New Weapons', and 
the influence of his war experiences were clear to see. This section of his memorandum 
contains the following points: 
 
The Russians have the advantage over us in military man-power. Our chief 
strength lies in the superior quality of our equipment. If we were to lose the 
technical lead and initiative which we now possess over the Russians, our 
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situation would indeed be precarious. Moreover, the knowledge that we and 
the Americans are continuously evolving new and more powerful weapons, 
which are liable to upset Soviet military calculations, is bound to make the 
Kremlin hesitate to risk war, and therefore contributes a most important 
factor for peace.
191
 
 
   Along with the call for 'no reduction of effort on basic research... upon which all 
further advances in the science of war depend', this was one of the main points of his 
November 1944 report to the War Cabinet. That report had predicted that 'possession of 
superiority in long distance rocket artillery may well count for nearly as much as 
superiority in naval or air power', and warned that Britain would fall behind if rocket 
programmes were not adequately funded.
192
 On top of this, Sandys said that the 'main 
instrument for strategic counter-attack' would, in due course, be thermonuclear 
weapons, and that any country 'which does not possess a substantial stock of these, 
together with the means of delivering them, cannot be regarded militarily as a first-class 
power'.
193
 Because Sandys saw the delivery of nuclear weapons as a matter of active 
defence policy, he took the need to possess an effective delivery system seriously:  
 
The adoption of guided rockets for anti-aircraft defence must ultimately be 
followed by the development of long-range guided rockets for use in 
offensive bombing roles. Preliminary investigations indicate that it should 
be technically possible, within the next 10 years or so, to produce guided 
rockets, which could travel at altitudes of over 70,000 ft. and at speeds 
several times that of sound, and which would be capable of accurately 
delivering bombs at ranges up to 2,000 miles. There is no doubt that the 
devastating possibilities of the long-range guided rocket, carrying an atomic 
or hydrogen warhead, are such that we cannot afford to allow the Russians 
to produce weapons of this kind ahead of us. Nor must we neglect the study 
of possible methods of defence.
194
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   It would not be unfair to say that at this point in time Sandys was somewhat ahead of 
the curve in his thinking. The 1952 review had said that the counter-bombing of Soviet 
facilities represented 'the most effective single measure' to reduce the atomic threat, 
mainly because Slessor believed whole-heartedly in strategic bombing as Britain's 
primary means of defending itself.
195
 When the Brook Committee was putting its report 
together, it used as its guidance for air defence a Chiefs of Staffs report that estimated 
Britain would receive a 'substantial proportion' of the Soviet atomic stockpile of 
anywhere between 100 and 200 weapons, and that a 'high percentage' would reach their 
targets even if current air defence estimates were maintained.
196
 Incredibly, despite 
owing its existence largely to the American thermonuclear weapons test, the Brooke 
Committee appears to have given no special consideration to the effects that massively 
increased destructive power promised to have on British strategic priorities.  
 
   Even the Guided Weapons Advisory Board, which reported to the Minister of Supply, 
and had studied Sandys' fight against the original V-2 when putting together its 
recommendations, was unable or unwilling to think too far ahead. When the board met 
during the first weeks of the Radical Review process, it was suggested that 'active 
defence might not be possible', but that passive defence might be 'profitable' if any long-
range rocket attack involved only a 'small number, with atomic warheads'.
197
 Sandys, 
referring to 'the next 10 years or so', had clearly taken the long-term aims of the Radical 
Review to heart. In contrast the panel of esteemed scientists and engineers, representing 
both the state and industry, limited their horizons to the short-term, seeing as they did 
not factor into their thinking the possibility that the Soviet Union would invest heavily 
in long-range rockets, despite admitting that they would prove difficult to defend 
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against, or that they would come equipped with thermonuclear warheads. There is no 
clear evidence of Sandys being moved to voice any disagreements he might have had 
with the Guided Weapons Advisory Board, but its reluctance to see beyond what will 
have seemed like such conservative projections to Sandys must have worked to 
reinforce his willingness to override supposed expert opinion where it came into 
conflict with his own policy preferences.  
 
Reaction 
 
   Sandys' vision for Britain differed wildly from what other departments had put 
forward. Anthony Head, the Secretary of State for War, who managed to limit his 
briefing to eleven points over three pages, had also disagreed with the Chiefs of Staff's 
priorities; but his interpretation was more conservative. Head suggested that the main 
deterrent against Soviet aggression was American strength, to which Britain's 
contribution could never prove 'decisive'. His priorities for Britain were that 'we win, or 
at least do not lose, the cold war', and that 'hot war' preparations should actually be 
considered before nuclear capabilities 'which duplicate strength created or about to be 
created in America'.
198
  
 
   Head also made a lot of synchronising policy with the United States, writing that the 
Navy should complement their 'very great preponderance of naval strength', rather than 
attempting to compete with it. The same cooperation with American air power was 
equally necessary to allow Britain to scale back its bomber force which was already too 
large, since 'Modern aircraft are capable of repeated sorties and presumably we shall not 
drop all our atomic weapons in the first few days of a war'. Research and development 
could also be streamlined through greater Anglo-American cooperation, as could the 
functions of the Ministry of Supply, which Head felt were too broad for one Minister to 
'supervise closely' whilst also dealing with the steel industry.
199
 By comparison, Sandys' 
vision of Anglo-American cooperation was based on the need to 'maintain our special 
position as America's major partner', which meant making an impression on them with 
independent strength in order to 'prevent ourselves being rated on a level with France'. 
To this end Britain had to 'play some appreciable part' in any attack on the Soviet 
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Union.
200
 As touched upon in the previous section, this meant maintaining an element of 
nuclear strike capability, as this was the only thing Sandys believed could have ever 
'play[ed] some appreciable part' in joint operations with the United States in any global 
war. 
 
   Where Sandys and Head found some common ground was on the role of the Navy, 
which had been taken to task in Sandys' memorandum. The role of the Navy under his 
proposed policies of thermonuclear stockpiling would have mainly been one of anti-
submarine and mine-sweeping operations. This, coupled with an expectation that the 
United States would protect convoys in the Western Atlantic, where the dangers of 
mining and submarines would likely be reduced, and because they would most likely be 
American ships transporting materials to any theatre of war that survived the opening 
phase, meant that an 'appreciable reduction in expenditure on aircraft-carriers and the 
costly aircraft which operate from them' was possible. Another suggestion was that the 
Admiralty take over the duties of coastal protection as to 'encourage a reduction in 
costly carrier-borne aviation and greater use of shore-based aircraft'.
201
 
 
   The Admiralty rushed out a response on 17 June, the day before the meeting, to 
remind those set to attend what the Navy was for. It claimed that the United States could 
not be relied upon straight away in the North Sea, so it would be up to the Navy to close 
the Baltic and protect Norwegian sea lanes from the 'very powerful' Soviet Naval Air 
Aim. Soviet cruisers, sent to harass British trade, would also need to be countered with 
aircraft carriers as well as British cruisers. The Navy was also important in 'uniting us 
with the distant members of the Commonwealth'. Finally, they played the political card, 
hinting towards an issue that would continually plague Sandys' proposals. They 
speculated whether a 'Government prepared to implement a Continental strategy at the 
price of being a world power could continue to enjoy the support of the nation'.
202
 This 
was matched by an internal Ministry of Defence response to an earlier draft of Sandys' 
memorandum that described his central argument, 'that the task of winning the cold war 
consists primarily of building up deterrents', as 'questionable', citing recent experience 
in Korea as an argument against it. It also said Sandys was 'going too far' on the future 
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of the Navy, and that his Air Force policies would actually increase expenditure 
'considerably'.
203
 
 
   In spite of this immediate hostility to Sandys' ideas, Churchill was receptive. He 
explained that he still hoped to find some form of détente with the Soviet Union, and 
that until he could do so it would be 'fatal' if anybody noticed that Britain was cutting its 
defence expenditure; but he nevertheless found himself in full agreement with Sandys' 
main idea of 'lay[ing] down operational priorities which would make possible a 
reshaping of the Armed Forces'. These priorities were, as explained in his 
memorandum, whatever contributed to surviving 'the first six weeks of the next war'.
204
 
Sandys arguments for planning for the decisive opening phase were accepted by 
Churchill, and the Minister of Defence, Harold Alexander, was sent to inform the 
Chiefs of Staff that they would have to 'urgently' trim another £308 million from their 
proposed programme for 1955-56, which would have meant freezing expenditure at its 
then level.
205
 Clark and Wheeler have called this 'June Directive' the first occasion in the 
age of nuclear weapons where 'Ministers had initiated changes in strategic doctrine 
without prior consultation with their military advisors', and Sandys was the driving 
force behind it.
206
 
 
   The Chiefs of Staff reacted negatively to these new priorities. McGrigor slammed 
what he saw as moving towards a 'defensive "Maginot" attitude' that might 'militate 
strongly against the survival of the United Kingdom', adding two days later that 
reducing naval functions was 'patently unsound', and could only have been decided 
upon by the politicians if they believed that the likelihood of war was receding. 
Therefore, if these cost targets were to be met, McGrigor said that 'reductions should be 
recommended that were capable of immediate replacement in war', which meant 
preserving heavy equipment like ships over armies that could be scratched together 
relatively quickly.
207
 John Harding, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, agreed with 
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the First Sea Lord about the 'unrealism and unsoundness' of the proposal, but urged him 
to go along with the terms of reference put forward by the government. Arguments 
against the results of their economies would, he prophetically suggested, be better 
reserved for a later date. Dickson agreed with this approach, speculating that the 
proposed reductions might not provide any savings anyway.
208
  
 
   The adoption of Sandys' priorities represented a major threat to the Navy, and the 
Admiralty became so irritated by Sandys that they sent the Director of Naval 
Intelligence and the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff to give him a three hour briefing on 
what they thought he did not understand about naval warfare.
209
 However, Sandys' ideas 
merely reflected the debates that surrounded 'broken-backed' warfare, which Eric Grove 
has called a 'weak concept' that the other services would have been happy to abandon, 
and which had previously taken place across the Atlantic.
210
 There the United States 
Navy had reacted to the establishment of an independent air force in 1947, which 
monopolised American atomic weapons strength along similar lines to what Sandys 
proposed for the Royal Air Force, by commissioning five massive flush-deck aircraft 
carriers from which to launch atomic bombing raids. After a bitter, sometimes public, 
battle between the services the programme was cancelled just days after construction 
began on the lead ship, when the government decided that the proposed carriers would 
prove to be an expensive duplication of Strategic Air Command functions.
211
  
 
   With the Armed Forces set against him, Sandys' found an unexpected ally in the 
Paymaster-General: his old rival Cherwell. In a meeting where Alexander made clear 
that further reductions could only be achieved by 'cutting out substantial sections of 
valuable defence organisation', a view supported by the First Lord of the Admiralty and 
the Secretary of State for Air, Cherwell demurred. He raised the idea of taking 'very big 
risks by gambling on the success of new inventions and new techniques'. He had 
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unmanned weapons in mind, as well as designating anti-submarine operations as an Air 
Force responsibility. Such ideas, he thought, would have allowed Britain to remove 
'whole groups of armaments' from its strategic calculations, naturally saving a lot of 
money.
212
 Sandys returned to the need for a 'detailed examination' of British strategic 
priorities, the main one of which was still 'to prevent our total annihilation in the early 
stages of a future war'. This led him to ask two questions: How much warning could 
Britain expect before the opening aerial bombardment; and what part did the United 
States intend to play in the opening phase across the world? Both of these questions put 
the spotlight on the Navy, since a surprise attack was believed to have stood a good 
chance of destroying their ships either in port (which would presumably have seen the 
surrounding city destroyed with them) or on the open waters, and because a firm 
commitment from the United States to engage in world-wide sea warfare would have 
reduced its importance to British survival.
213
  
 
   Alexander and Sandys were invited to produce a list of questions for the Radical 
Review to answer, mostly regarding how the Navy could justify its current budget, with 
an additional question relating to the possible effects that guided weapons might have 
on existing naval and air forces.
214
 After another meeting, Alexander sent everybody 
away before the summer recess to consider what they could put into the field under re-
calculated budget ceilings, and Sandys wrote directly to R. A. Butler, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, suggesting that expenditure could, in fact, be reduced even further than 
everybody seemed to imagine. Although it would prove 'extremely painful' and 
'humiliating to our national pride', Sandys thought it was feasible to reduce spending by 
an extra 50-100 million on the proposed June budget. He offered a 'very tentative' plan 
for allocating resources that suggested the Navy receive a 21% share of defence 
expenditure compared to the Army and Air Force taking 35% each. This, he predicted, 
would see the Admiralty 'no doubt say that this involves the mutilation of the Navy and 
that it is wholly unacceptable', but he nevertheless felt that 21% was 'quite as much and 
probably more than can be justified' if naval warfare was to be seriously downgraded in 
accordance with the policies put forward in his June memorandum.
215
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   During the summer, the Soviet Union exploded what they claimed to be a 
thermonuclear bomb. It was still a relatively small device, and nowhere near as 
powerful as the successful American test of November 1952; but the fact the Soviet 
Union claimed to have mastered the process would have consequences for strategic 
policy-making, particularly since this Soviet weapon was compact enough to potentially 
be delivered by aerial bombardment, unlike the vast installation the United States had 
used to verify its technology.
216
 Nevertheless, when the Radical Review was revived 
after the summer recess, the policy debates surrounding it stuck to the same lines. 
 
The Second Phase 
 
   When the Radical Review resumed in October, the Defence Research Policy 
Committee stirred the conflict between Sandys and the Navy with a report analysing the 
likely effects of restricting the research and development budgets for the Ministry of 
Supply and the Admiralty. It was predicted that unless savings could be found 
elsewhere, the Navy would struggle to introduce 'any new item'. In addition to this, it 
would negatively impact existing programmes on anti-submarine warfare, anti-mining 
operations, and torpedo countermeasures. In other words, everything the Navy was 
expected to do in the sort of role Sandys had in mind for it. For the Ministry of Supply, 
which was facing a 14% reduction in its research and development funding, reductions 
were going 'to hurt and to hurt very badly'. The report listed a number of programmes 
which would have to be cancelled in order to meet the planned reductions, including the 
N.A. 39, as well as a number of bomber projects.
217
 McGrigor, who said that the 
Admiralty, unlike the Ministry of Supply, 'had to take a realistic' view of research and 
development, thought that ending the N.A. 39 programme would prove 'highly 
dangerous' for the Navy. Denied of an 'efficient Strike aircraft', it would be no match for 
the Soviet Union at sea.
218
 Dickson was similarly concerned about the effect of research 
and development cutbacks on his bombers, suggesting that 'less serious' reductions 
might be found in 'front line forces'. McGrigor had urged his colleagues to unite against 
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cutbacks in June, and now the Air Force and the Navy had started to find some common 
ground against the Army; but their projects were still under threat.
219
 
 
   Before Sandys was given the chance to defend Ministry of Supply allocations, 
McGrigor called the Chiefs of Staff together to discuss exactly where things were 
heading. They knew that the Radical Review was not progressing in accordance with 
their strategic priorities, but they had accepted the need to go through with it as a 
'mechanical exercise'. Now that the government had 'seriously departed' from their 1952 
recommendations, as well as those of the Brook Committee, the Chiefs of Staff had to 
consider whether policy was being determined 'in accordance with their views'. Were it 
not, their reservations would have to be formally registered, and it was felt that it might 
also have been necessary 'to arrive at a clear understanding of the constitutional position 
of the Chiefs of Staff in this matter', which meant reminding the politicians that the 
Chiefs of Staff were there to advise on all military matters and that their advice was not 
to be dismissed lightly. John Baker, the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, agreed to some 
extent, but said they could not establish their own firm position until the politicians had 
assembled a more coherent policy. Harold Redman, the Vice Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, was firmly with McGrigor. He said the War Office had only ever seen the 
Radical Review as a mechanical exercise, and that the Chiefs of Staff should 'emphasise 
their reservations', albeit when the time was right. Neville Brownjohn of the Ministry of 
Defence added his support, and an agreement was reached to make it clear that, despite 
their association with the Brook Committee report on which the Radical Review was 
originally based, they would not collectively endorse it. It was also agreed that they 
would re-affirm their commitment to the 1952 report, and make it known that they felt 
'most uneasy' about the latest developments - particularly Sandys' main contribution, 
'the special consideration now being given to hot war preparedness under the specific 
heading of survival'.
220
 
 
   Sandys was given the chance to defend his policy preferences when the politicians 
met with the Armed Forces in November. When James Thomas, the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, informed the meeting that the Navy could not accept the 'very serious Naval 
consequences' that a budget ceiling of £1650 million would mean, Sandys tore into the 
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Navy.
221
 After claiming that failure to enforce a budget ceiling would have led to costly 
cancellations in the future, he said he could not accept the Ministry of Supply being 
denied financing according to 'any rational system of strategic priorities'. If any extra 
money were to be made available, he said, it should have been spent 'on Medium 
Bombers and certainly not on the Fleet'. He then questioned the allocations, saying that 
more should be diverted towards research and development in order to make his 
proposals a reality.
222
 Thomas defended a strong Navy with the same arguments Sandys 
had used in favour of a strong nuclear deterrent force, referring to a memorandum he 
had written that argued the importance of Britain contributing towards any 
overwhelmingly American Striking Fleet in order to have a 'voice in the employment of 
these forces'. Equally important was the belief that, without aircraft carriers, 'In the eyes 
of the rest of the world we would cease to be a major naval power'.
223
 In spite of this 
appeal to emotion, Sandys was nevertheless able to convince Alexander that 'further 
consideration' of naval spending was required, before trying his luck and attacking their 
cruisers before the meeting was brought to a close.
224
  
 
   By this point Alexander was beginning to waver, coming round to the idea that any 
defence policy determined by Treasury limits would be 'far from satisfactory', as well as 
backing the Navy on the retention of aircraft carriers.
225
 In an attempt to maintain the 
momentum of the Radical Review, the various departments were once again asked to 
submit detailed proposals for future defence policy. Perhaps sensing a softening in the 
Ministry of Defence position, inter-service rivalries began to make their influence 
known. The Admiralty submitted a lengthy defence of aircraft carriers, referring to their 
'essential and not uneconomical' role as an important part of the deterrent, as well as 
appealing for a fleet 'worthy of a nation whose greatness is founded upon and whose 
survival depends on sea-borne trade'.
226
 The Air Ministry, on the other hand, asked 
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whether it was a good idea 'to lock up £40 million of capital in a fleet carrier that can be 
sunk with one bomb?' Especially when 'The Russians' decision on whether to risk a war 
will depend on the air and land situations and not whether they think they can starve us 
out by sinking shipping'.
227
 
 
   The memorandum supplied by Sandys was once again a comprehensive document, 
this time going much further than his June contribution, and making his belief in the 
inexorable dominance of unmanned weaponry much more clear. This may have been 
because, as it reminded its readers, his previous recommendations for prioritising the 
opening phase had been accepted by Churchill; therefore he could now build upon his 
previous work. He may also have decided, having experienced the negative reactions 
from the Service Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff, that it was worth forcing the issue. In 
the event, his policy ideas were never adopted; but it is worth quoting his opening 
summary at length, because it would be revived in 1957 as the entire basis of his 
solution to providing Britain with a long-term defence policy based on economic 
stability. Having accepted the Treasury spending limits, and reiterated his desire to 
prioritise the 'decisive opening phase', he wrote that 'all other dangers are secondary' 
compared to aerial attack. On top of this, long-range rockets and atomic weapons meant 
that the 'prospects of providing any effective protection against air attack are continually 
diminishing'. Even with improved fighter and guided-weapon defences, he said, a 
proportion of enemy bombers would still find a way through, allowing them to 'inflict 
upon us fearful casualties and devastation'.
228
 
 
   These were all well-established points, and would not have altered existing priorities; 
but he added a caveat. Even if Britain could eventually mount a respectable defence 
against manned bombers, he suggested that by the time this was established the Soviet 
Union would probably have developed long-range rockets that could deliver atomic 
warheads into London from firing points in East Germany. The other departments had 
not even factored long-range rockets into their thinking, but here Sandys had sought to 
look beyond the narrow timescale preferred by the government and Chiefs of Staff. 
What is more, he was willing to take those thoughts to their natural conclusions, writing 
that 'we have no means of defence whatsoever' against long-range rocket attack', the 
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practical effect of which meant that 'we cannot any longer protect our people in the 
event of war'. Therefore, he argued, 'we must concentrate our efforts on preventing it. In 
planning our forces, we must henceforth put the emphasis not so much on defences as 
upon deterrents'.
229
 
 
   This echoed the famous words of Bernard Brodie, who, having determined that there 
was no 'direct immunity to atomic bomb attack' in 1946, wrote 'Thus far the chief 
purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief 
purpose must be to avert them'. Brodie had looked ahead to a point where 'technological 
realities make reduction of vulnerability largely synonymous with a preservation of 
striking power', and here Sandys applied this idea to the policy-making process, making 
it the crux of his argument.
230
 The implication of this point also had the effect of taking 
his June priorities further still. If the rise of unmanned weaponry would make it 
impossible to protect Britain, then the 'decisive opening phase' was truly decisive. Thus 
the assumed secondary phase of 'broken-backed' warfare was not only frivolous but 
practically impossible. With this in mind, Sandys pressed for a complete reallocation of 
spending. He wrote: 
 
We must therefore press ahead with the creation of a powerful bomber 
force, and the manufacture of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons. We shall 
not have enough British-made atomic bombs to conduct even the most 
limited operations for at least five years. As an interim measure, we should 
ask the Americans to provide us with a small number of bombs out of their 
enormous stockpile. 
 
At the same time, we must develop long-range weapons of our own, either 
ballistic rockets of the V.2. type or flying guided missiles.
231
 
 
   He wrote that these programmes could be paid for with reductions in Army and Navy 
allocations, since a properly-equipped Army of more than eight divisions was probably 
going to be unaffordable in the long-term anyway, whilst the  Navy was expected to 
play a reduced role under his policies, albeit one that would include coastal defence 
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responsibilities. The opening statement finished by urging that the government plan for 
'peace rather than defence', which meant 'build[ing] up offensive air power and atomic 
weapon production'. He explained how each branch of the Armed Forces could work 
within its new budget ceiling, but warned against cutting Ministry of Supply funding for 
'projects which are important to the Services, civil aviation, and export trade'.
232
 He 
elaborated on the likely effects of a Soviet attack from the air, which now 'might knock 
Britain out in the first fortnight, if not in the first few days', and how guided missiles 
would prove to be the best defence against Soviet bombers. This was then qualified with 
a section on long-range rockets which suggested that:  
 
It is known that the Russians have for some years been developing long-
range ballistic rockets. They have been employing numerous German 
scientists and technicians, many of whom had previously worked at 
Peenemunde and other German experimental establishments. 
 
It is known that the Russians have perfected the German war-time V.2. 
rocket and may have put it into quantity production. This could carry a 
warhead of about one ton and would have a maximum range of about 220 
miles.
233
 
 
   This brought Sandys back to the Second World War, and his fears of total destruction 
through rocket attack. Writing that the Soviets were known to be working on a rocket 
with a 35-ton thrust motor that could deliver a nuclear warhead into London from East 
Germany by 1956, as well as a device boasting a 100-ton thrust motor that promised an 
even longer range and a greater payload, his words recalled his papers from almost a 
decade ago. He attempted to hammer the point home by reflecting on his experiences in 
the Second World War, the memory of which would have been clear to Churchill and 
the Chiefs of Staff, and offered a concise recollection of his struggle against unmanned 
German weapons: 
 
Against attack by long-range ballistic rockets we have as yet no means of 
defence whatsoever. Once they have been launched we know of no method 
of diverting or destroying them. They can probably be fired from mobile 
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launching gear transported by rail or road. The firing points, therefore, 
would offer unprofitable targets for counter-bombing. In the last war we 
were able to bomb experimental establishments and factories in Germany 
where the V 2 was being developed and manufactured, with the result that 
the rocket attack was delayed until the intended launching area in Northern 
France had been overrun by our troops. But, since we are at peace with 
Russia, no similar action to forestall attack is now open to us.
234
 
 
   Thus Sandys' wartime memories, which had themselves been altered by his reflection 
on them over time, officially became the basis of his policy proposals. The Nazi 
scientists were still the enemy, working for another totalitarian power and preparing the 
onslaught they could not complete ten years earlier. In addition to this, Sandys made the 
important point that prioritising deterrence over defence was particularly vital for 
Britain due to the Western democracies' unwillingness to contemplate preventative war. 
Because Britain could not keep its defences 'in a state of war-time readiness year in and 
year out', the Soviet Union held the initiative in being able to launch a surprise attack 
when it most suited them. Therefore, even with improved fighter defences, the 
protection of British cities was becoming less and less likely: 'The conclusion to be 
drawn is surely clear. If we no longer have the means of protecting ourselves in war, we 
must increasingly concentrate our energies and resources upon preventing it'.
235
  
 
   He went on to defend the prospective medium bomber fleet on deterrence grounds. He 
noted the utility of bombers as the 'most flexible of all weapons in our armoury', not 
least for their ability to sink large naval vessels; but it was as part of the nuclear 
deterrent that they were most valuable. This required, he said, that the British nuclear 
weapons programme 'be stepped up to the utmost extent', since air forces not equipped 
with them were 'inefficient and wasteful'. British medium bombers were, however, seen 
as a short-lived threat to the Soviet Union. At that time the Soviets had put little effort 
into defensive guided weapons, which meant the V-bombers would have stood a fair 
chance of breaching their defences. But Sandys did not expect this to last. He believed 
that if the Soviets developed defensive guided weapons, or even supersonic interceptors, 
then the V-bombers would prove hopeless if sent to attack targets deep into enemy 
territory. He predicted that this would be the case by 1960 at the earliest, and suggested 
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that this left Britain with two choices. One was to lengthen the lives of the V-bombers 
by equipping them with self-propelled bombs. The other was to develop 'ballistic 
rockets of the V.2 type'. The former was ruled out as a temporary solution, easily 
countered with improved defences, especially those based in satellite nations between 
Britain and its targets in the Soviet Union. To support his argument Sandys once again 
called upon his projections of November 1944: 
 
In the field of guided missiles, we have up to present concentrated attention 
mainly upon defensive weapons. While maintaining this effort, we should 
now in addition give equal attention to the development of missiles for use 
in offensive rôles. This is an extremely urgent matter. We are already a long 
way behind both the Russians and the Americans in the development of 
long-distance bombardment weapons. If we neglect this any longer, we may 
well, in ten years' time when piloted bombers are becoming obsolescent, 
find ourselves without any means whatsoever of conducting counter-
offensive air operations.
236
 
 
   This was quite an incredible statement. Sandys was proposing in 1953 that Britain 
should have been taking practical steps towards basing its ability to wage nuclear war 
entirely on unmanned weaponry. There had previously been some consideration given 
to offensive guided weapons, but this was going far beyond what anybody else in a 
prominent policy-making role had suggested. The 1947 review, with the Second World 
War still an obvious influence on proceedings, had predicted that the Soviets would be 
in a position to use atomic weapons as early as 1956, and that with German assistance 
they would by this point have developed 'rockets, [and] pilotless aircraft'.
237
 Similarly, 
the 1950 review had recommended that planning 'includes provision for the day when 
the manned bomber is no longer usable'.
238
 By 1952, however, guided weapons were 
seen merely as potentially valuable weapons for air defence, with the Chiefs of Staff 
equating a desire to avoid 'prohibitive loss to the attacker' with 'the right types of 
aircraft... and other scientific aids'.
239
 In October 1953 the Chiefs of Staff had agreed 'in 
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principle' to protect the funding allocated for the development of unmanned weaponry; 
but there had been no suggestion of Britain basing its striking power on them, and there 
is little to indicate that the idea formed any substantial part of Establishment thinking.
240
  
 
   These were the policy recommendations that the Ministry of Defence had deemed 
'revolutionary', and which would still prove controversial several years later as Sandys 
attempted to implement them as Minister of Defence. Recognising that Sandys was 
putting these ideas forward in 1953 is vitally important in any attempt at making sense 
of Sandys' period at the Ministry of Defence, as well as the nature of the defence 
debates in Britain during this decade and where the central tenets of Sandys' personal 
belief system were situated within it. As the subsequent section will demonstrate, 
Sandys' contributions to the policy-making process during the defence review of 1957 
can only be properly understood when taking his recommendations as Minister of 
Supply into account, thereby acting to reinforce the idea of him possessing a consistent 
set of policy preferences that led to the formation of a coherent strategic concept based 
upon his belief that there could be no effective defence against unmanned weaponry.  
 
Reaction 
 
   Whilst official thinking appeared to have gone backwards, Sandys had consistently 
looked towards the long-term. Unfortunately for him, the entire nature of British 
defence policy was not going to be drastically altered on the back of Ministry of Supply 
initiatives, and the committee kept its discussion to more manageable questions. Head 
accused Sandys of having paid too little attention to overseas commitments in order to 
put all of his efforts into deterrent weapons and the task of surviving the opening phase. 
Sandys said his strategic reserve would fill the gaps, but was unable to dispute the 
accuracy of his wider charge.
241
 
 
   The memoranda were discussed on 27 November, by which time the Chiefs of Staff 
had once again let it be known that their position on the 1952 review was the correct 
basis for defence planning. They also singled out Sandys for his 'valuable and far-
reaching proposals', but witheringly noted that 'these proposals differ in some respects 
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from accepted strategic policy'.
242
 Churchill and McGrigor debated the new priorities, 
with the former taking his cue from Sandys and arguing that land-based bombers could 
attack submarine bases and lay mines much more effectively than the Navy could. 
Sandys drew attention to the 'considerable rocket development' taking place in the 
Soviet Union as a way of emphasising the need to fund a genuine deterrent, which he 
said aircraft carriers were not.
243
 Churchill was clearly leaning more towards Sandys' 
position on aircraft carriers at this point, but he remained sentimental about the Navy, 
and, recalling his own experiences of the Second World War, hesitated to make a 
decision without another review of naval aviation.
244
 
 
   This bought the Chiefs of Staff some valuable time, and in retrospect it can be seen 
that this delay sapped all momentum from the Radical Review, largely serving to defeat 
its original purpose. McGrigor had previously sought to unify his colleagues against 
budget reductions, and in December he came to a private understanding with Dickson 
about the future of naval aviation. Whereas Slessor was on record as having little regard 
for aircraft carriers, Dickson came round to the Admiralty view that they were essential 
aspects of the deterrent, and appeared genuine in doing so.
245
 In one sense this served to 
validate what the Ministry of Supply had been doing in the meantime, as, according to 
Grove, Sandys had been deliberately holding up the progress of the N.A. 39, 
presumably in accordance with his belief that equipment programmes became 
increasingly difficult to cancel once development had got underway.
246
 On the other 
hand, his campaign against it would ultimately prove unsuccessful, so he had in fact 
created some of the delays the N.A. 39 suffered from.  
 
   When the Radical Review re-started in January 1954, Alexander had by this point 
firmly distanced himself from his earlier enthusiasm for Sandys' position. Rather than 
focus on strategic matters, which would have carried less weight with Churchill who 
was still committed to prioritising the opening phase, he stressed the expected 'political 
consequences' of Sandys' ideas instead. These were thought to include a loss of service 
morale, controversy at home owing to 'the country's traditional affection and support for 
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the Royal Navy', and the loss of influence on United States naval planning. Alexander 
thought Britain should retain a heavy aircraft carrier as a contingency, and have it carry 
out lighter duties, but not take on a strike role.
247
 The Admiralty sensed this shift and 
began to question his plan to 'retain heavy Carriers, but not allow us to use them', 
making it clear once more that 'any cuts imposed should not reduce the Fleet Air Arm'. 
They sought to confirm the position that Alexander had started to move towards, 
claiming that in return for a relatively minor saving, Alexander would oversee the loss 
of British influence over American policy, jeopardise British involvement in NATO, 
sacrifice strategic flexibility, and baffle international opinion. They also reversed his 
argument and applied it to the Air Force. After all, why rely on the United States at sea, 
but not depend wholly on its strategic bombing force for deterrence?
248
  
 
   The critical decision, as far as the Radical Review and Sandys' time at the Ministry of 
Supply were concerned, was taken at a February meeting which Sandys was unable to 
attend due to illness. McGrigor made a passionate defence of the need to be able to 
destroy an enemy fleet, as the Navy 'had traditionally done from the days of Sir Francis 
Drake at Cadiz', which meant the N.A. 39 had to go ahead. Thomas backed him up with 
'political arguments', such as the loss of influence on American policy. Churchill, 
despite repeating his belief that land-based aircraft would eventually carry out 
'everything which naval strike aircraft claimed to do', was all-but won over. He deferred 
a decision on the N.A. 39 and agreed to keep two heavy carriers in commission; but 
seeing as these carriers would have obviously required aircraft at some point, the 
decision on the N. A. 39 was essentially made.
249
 
 
   Churchill had been swayed by the arguments relating to American policy, as well as 
direct lobbying by the Admiralty. Grove also suggests that whilst Churchill was 
'anticarrier and antinavy' by the end of the process, albeit due to his concept of naval 
warfare being one of 'dreadnoughts rather than carriers', everybody - himself included - 
knew he that was no longer capable of 'ramming through an unpopular program of 
carrier cuts on his own authority'.
250
 One man who might have been capable of aiding 
                                                          
247
 'Naval Air: Note by the Minister of Defence, 26 January, 1954'; CAB 134/809, D.P.(M) (54) 1. 
248
 'Naval Air: Note by the First Lord of the Admiralty, 27 January, 1954'; CAB 134/809, D.P.(M) (54) 2; 
that idea had been tentatively raised back in July, when Dickson attempted to defend a bomber force 
larger than what had been recommended in the 1952 review; Clark and Wheeler, The British Origins of..., 
p. 189; Grove, Vanguard to Trident, pp. 105-6. 
249
 CAB 134/809, D.P.(M) (54) 2nd Meeting: 26 February, 1953. 
250
 Grove, Vanguard to Trident, pp. 114-15. 
77 
 
him in ramming through an unpopular programme was Sandys, but it is widely accepted 
that it was only Sandys falling ill at this decisive moment that prevented him winning 
the argument and seeing the Navy reduced in size and status.
251
 With Sandys on the 
sidelines at this critical point, the Admiralty began to win its arguments, standing firm 
and mounting counter-attacks against the prevailing Air Force-dominant narrative. 
Sandys made something of a last stand in March, advising Butler to 'err on the side of 
cutting defence expenditure too much than too little', and reminding him that long-term 
savings could only be accomplished through a 'reassessment of the relative importance 
of the roles of the three services'.
252
 In spite of this, McGrigor was successful enough in 
his defence of naval functions to have a section included in the 1954 Defence White 
Paper that read: '[I]f no decisive result were reached in this opening phase, hostilities 
would decline in intensity, though perhaps less so at sea than elsewhere, and a period of 
"broken-backed" warfare would follow'.
253
 
 
   Whilst still attaching significant weight to Sandys' absence, Baylis has also described 
the postponing of a decision on the N.A. 39 as having reflected the uncertainty of 
Ministers who were hesitant to follow the 'June Directive' through to its logical 
conclusions. This he writes was largely due to a collective 'lack of expertise in strategic 
matters' that made them 'reluctant to impose their ideas on the Chiefs of Staff'.
254
 
However, just one month after the 1954 White Paper had made its way through the 
House of Commons, the government re-opened the Radical Review when Churchill 
assembled a committee to discuss the manufacture of a British thermonuclear weapon. 
The Chiefs of Staff were unwilling to comment formally until they had finalised their 
report on the issue, but Sandys, perhaps sensing an opportunity to regain the momentum 
he had built up over the previous winter, struck first. In a May meeting between the 
Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff, he called for quick decisions on the basis that 'major 
items of equipment' could take up to three years to introduce, and returned to his calls 
for a reassessment of priorities. If thermonuclear weapons multiplied the destructive 
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power of the air offensive, then the logic of his June and November recommendations 
became even more apparent, and he was unequivocal in his support for a British 
thermonuclear weapon: 
 
Our ability to put up an effective defence against air attack was decreasing 
and we ought, therefore, to concentrate on measures calculated to prevent 
war rather than on measures of defence, which were rapidly becoming 
obsolete. We must have the power to retaliate. In particular, we should 
secure supplies of hydrogen bombs, from the United States or from our own 
production; and we must have enough bomber aircraft to carry the hydrogen 
bombs at our disposal. The next stage of development would be the ballistic 
rocket, against which there was no foreseeable form of defence.
255
 
 
   He then informed those present that his American counterparts had been in contact 
with the Ministry of Supply to suggest a measure of collaboration between the two 
countries on the construction of these long-range rockets. This collaboration was to 
proceed on the basis of Britain concentrating on a medium-range weapon and leaving 
the United States to develop an inter-continental weapon.
256
 Sandys had held 
preliminary discussions on this issue with Charles Wilson, the United States Secretary 
of Defence (1953-57) the previous December, and now set out for Washington for 
further talks. Before leaving he wrote to Wilson setting out his wishes for the 
standardisation of smaller guided weapons, economic concessions in terms of dollar 
payments, and for measures aimed at avoiding a 'duplication of effort'.
257
 
 
   Whilst Sandys was away, the Chiefs of Staff published their updated advice. They 
reported that the world situation had been 'completely altered' by thermonuclear 
weapons that had 'no theoretical limit' to their power, concluding that 'More than ever 
the aim of United Kingdom policy must be to prevent war'.
258
 This would have pleased 
Sandys, as would the belated recognition that the 'ballistic rocket threat' would 
eventually render any conceivable system of air defence obsolete. The report also did 
little to downplay the threat posed by thermonuclear weapons, and even admitted that 
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Britain may 'receive such damage from nuclear bombardment in the opening days of a 
war that it cannot continue to function as a main support area'. When it stated that 
British strategic policy should be to 'possess the means of waging war with the most up-
to-date nuclear weapons', in tandem with a policy of containing communism, it would 
have appeared that the Chiefs of Staff had taken Sandys' recommendations almost 
wholly on board.
259
  
 
   On the other hand, the report did not go into any real depth about the functions of each 
service under this revised policy. It was suggested that the protection of sea 
communications and mine-sweeping operations would be accorded a lower priority, and 
instructed the Admiralty to undertake another review of its functions; but its suggestion 
that preventing war was wrapped-up with 'our position as a world Power' implied that a 
strong navy would remain essential, since many of the arguments used by the naval 
lobby had stressed the connection between British status and a powerful surface fleet. 
By the same token, their position on air defence was not carried through to its logical 
ends, and they maintained that Britain required an 'efficient fighting force, [that] 
satisfies public opinion and demonstrates to the Russians that an attack against this 
country would require a substantial effort on their part', as if even a handful of 
thermonuclear weapons, whether delivered by manned or unmanned weapons systems, 
would not have constituted a 'substantial effort'.
260
 
 
   In the United States, Sandys was impressed by tours of experimental guided weapon 
establishments, and a joint communiqué was issued promising further cooperation. 
When he arrived back in Britain he told the press that he was 'hopeful' that the talks 
could prove helpful in developing 'these vitally important new weapons', but no formal 
agreement had yet been reached.
261
 However, he immediately reported to Churchill that, 
whilst in Washington, he had been taken to meet Eisenhower. This meeting was not 
reported by the press, so had presumably remained secret, but he claimed that 
Eisenhower had told him that 'in the event or threat of war, the United States intended to 
allocate a certain number of atomic bombs to Britain', and that their plans were 
proceeding on that basis. Sandys said he had pointed out to Eisenhower that re-fitting 
British planes to carry American weapons would be difficult at short notice, and 
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requested detailed information on their 'external dimensions and fittings', which was 
something Churchill had previously asked for. Eisenhower agreed that this information 
would be necessary, but said that to provide it he would need to find a way around the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act), which prohibited the United States from 
sharing its nuclear technologies.
262
 Regardless of the practical difficulties that the 
McMahon Act might have presented, Sandys believed this to have been the first time 
the President, or anybody in a senior policy-making role, had given a definite promise 
to supply Britain with atomic weapons in wartime, and in the next Defence Committee 
meeting, after Sandys had recommended a formal agreement on the basis that Britain 
would stand to benefit far more from it than the United States would, the Secretary of 
State for Air confirmed that he too had been contacted by his counterparts expressing a 
willingness to share the information Britain needed to use their weapons.
263
 
 
   The Cabinet Defence Committee gave the thermonuclear bomb project the go-ahead 
on 16 June, after a recommendation from the Chiefs of Staff, and the Cabinet followed 
with their support a month later; but this on-going process had led to the possibility of a 
renewed attempt at reducing spending when the Chiefs of Staff were asked to consider 
the effects of thermonuclear weapons on British policy.
264
 The prospect of British 
thermonuclear weaponry put a renewed emphasis on strategic bombing, which brought 
supposedly settled matters back into the spotlight. The Navy was quick to suggest that 
increasingly destructive warheads meant that the Air Force required less bombers to 
meet its targets - something which Sandys had pre-emptively warned against.
265
 He 
threw the Ministry of Supply behind the V-bomber programme on the basis that, despite 
working on an agreement for closer cooperation with the United States, it remained 
'essential that we should have under our own control in war the means of attacking 
effectively those targets which we considered of prime importance'.
266
 The Navy still 
made these arguments as well, and although willing to make concessions on 
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minesweeping and manpower under the new strategic outlook, it insisted on keeping its 
carriers.
267
 
 
   Two of Sandys' last acts as Minister of Supply brought his interests together. Firstly, 
the Chiefs of Staff circulated a report on air defence that recommended slight reductions 
in fighter strength; suggested that the Soviets would not be able to attack with 'surface-
to-surface ballistic missile[s] with an H-head' until at least 1960; and said anti-aircraft 
guns were now all-but pointless except in protecting low-level attacks against the early-
warning system, although the report did concede that public opinion might necessitate 
the retention of a token force.
268
 In the meeting that debated the report, Sandys said that 
'Ministers should consider the likely trend further ahead', since there was no telling what 
solutions could be found to even the ballistic missile problem. He felt the Soviet Union 
would possess a viable missile threat before 1960, which meant greater emphasis 
needed to be placed on the development of similar weapons in Britain.
269
 His second act 
brought the carrier issue back into his sights. In the latest attempt to solve the question, 
another committee was set up, this time under Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Relations. Cunliffe-Lister had been the Secretary of State for Air 
during the re-armament programme that took place before the Second World War, and 
he was joined by Sandys and Nigel Birch, previously of the Air Ministry.
270
 The Navy 
made its case against what it considered to be a deliberately biased panel, but it was no 
surprise when this group reported in November that continuing to finance naval aviation 
'appears to impose a burden disproportionate to the results', and they proposed scaling 
back the Navy.
271
 
 
   Unfortunately for Sandys, in October he was moved to the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government, and his replacement at the Ministry of Supply, Selwyn Lloyd, was 
more appreciative of the defence McGrigor was once again forced to make of his 
aircraft carriers - something which Grove refers to as 'perhaps his finest hour'.
272
 The 
same re-shuffle had seen Alexander replaced by Macmillan, who did not think that 
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expending massive amounts of political capital for relatively small savings was 
worthwhile, so was unwilling to drastically alter the role of the Navy as Sandys might 
have done.
273
 The 1955 Defence White Paper he would eventually deliver therefore 
went on to describe the aims of British policy as 'impressing on a potential enemy that a 
sudden attack even with nuclear weapons would not be conclusive', and allocated 
resources, albeit 'on a lower priority', for 'continuing operations after the initial phase, 
particularly at sea'.
274
 The Navy had won. The doctrine of 'broken-backed' warfare had 
survived the Radical Review, and the Navy was looking forward to its nuclear strike 
role. 
 
Conclusion 
 
   In December, Churchill sent a note to members of the Cabinet that he had prepared for 
Britain's representatives at the NATO council, which opened by referring to 'Defence by 
Deterrents' as the 'only sane policy' for Britain.
275
 Churchill discussed the possibility of 
the United States launching a 'forestalling' attack on the Soviet Union, which he felt was 
unlikely, and of the Soviet Union attempting something similar. This outcome, as well 
as being 'more grievous', was 'less improbable'. Consequently, Churchill believed that 
the West had to ensure its nuclear superiority was 'expanded, improved, and varied' in 
order to make it clear that any surprise attack would be met with 'immediate 
retaliation'.
276
 This he was certain 'would make the Deterrent effective except in the case 
of lunatics, or dictators or plotters in the kind of position of Hitler in his final phase'.
277
  
 
   He had refused to follow Sandys' recommendations fully during the Radical Review, 
and used this note to credit 'conventional forces' as playing a 'vital part in our security'; 
but here Churchill was effectively circulating Sandys' central arguments of June and 
November 1953.
278
 Sandys had never written the Army and the Navy out of British 
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defence policy, but he had unashamedly put his faith in deterrence through nuclear 
striking power as the 'only sane policy' well before Churchill was willing to admit as 
much so bluntly, and also far in advance of the Chiefs of Staff reaching much the same 
conclusions. Whether Sandys' policy preferences would have been practical at the time 
is difficult to judge, but it is clear that he had formulated something approaching a 
coherent strategic vision that was radically different to that of the Chiefs of Staff. 
Equally clear is the influence of his Second World War experiences on this vision, with 
his memoranda at times resembling copies of his wartime reports on the German 
unmanned weapons threat. 
 
   Throughout the Radical Review process, Sandys had not shown any reluctance to 
defend his ideas against supposed expert opinion, nor had he shied away from taking his 
observations to their logical conclusions. Perhaps strengthened by his experience in the 
Second World War, Sandys was unafraid of challenging what he saw as the cosy 
consensus of the professional military and scientific elites. After Sandys departed the 
defence policy-making process, the lack of this self-belief in his successors allowed the 
defence debates between the services and the Treasury to return to familiar territory. On 
top of this, a succession of Defence Ministers followed Macmillan, who only lasted six 
months himself before being promoted to Foreign Secretary. None of them lasted a full 
year. The effect of this was to eliminate any chance of radical approaches to long-term 
decision making. In April 1955 Lloyd replaced Macmillan and attempted to oversee a 
Long Term Defence Programme, but he was gone by Christmas, promoted to Foreign 
Secretary to replace Macmillan who headed to the Treasury. Without the stability 
brought to defence policy-making process by Churchill and Alexander, which the 
Radical Review had for a while promised to benefit from, successive Ministers of 
Defence were unable to really get to grips with reforming British defence policy. It was 
only after the shock of the Suez Crisis that a serious attempt to rethink defence was 
made when Macmillan, who had passed through the Ministry of Defence and realised 
its weaknesses, tasked Sandys with finally setting defence policy on a sustainable 
footing and gave him considerably increased powers to do so. 
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The 1957 Defence White Paper 
 
In October 1959, following Sandys' departure from the Ministry of Defence, the Central 
Office of Information sent him a revised version of the brief biographies they 
maintained for each member of the government, inviting him to edit it as he thought 
necessary. The document described his time at the Ministry of Defence as being 
characterised by 'planning the reorganisation of Britain's defence forces in the light of 
developments in modern warfare and the need to relieve the strain on the nation's 
economy'. Sandys did not object to this section, but when it said he was 'largely 
responsible' for the White Paper of April 1957, he made sure to correct the record, 
removing the word 'largely' from the text.
279
  
 
   Given that, as will be explained in the following sections, Sandys was removed from 
the Ministry of Defence because his policies were proving difficult to implement, and 
also because he had alienated all but a few of those involved in the defence policy-
making process, this minor incident reveals a remarkable unwillingness on Sandys' part 
to distance himself from what many perceived to be his failures, even though he had 
previously been willing to do so when it had suited him. During his short stay at the 
Ministry of Defence, Macmillan had blamed Sandys for the problems affecting the 
Supermarine Swift, a jet interceptor whose service life would ultimately prove short, 
accusing him of concealing development issues from colleagues, and complaining that 
it was left to him to 'whitewash the Churchill, Alexander, Duncan Sandys regime'.
280
 
Why, then, was Sandys willing to associate himself with his alleged failures this time? 
Especially failures that, unlike the Swift - which only related to one failed project of 
many - were much more public and potentially damaging to his career? 
 
   Richard Powell, who served as the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence 
during Sandys' time there, would later recall that, although drafting of the White Paper 
was a 'joint effort' between the two of them, Sandys was 'the undoubted leader all the 
way through'. As somebody who had been at the Ministry of Defence since 1946 (save 
for a two year spell at the Admiralty between 1948 and 1950), Powell was well placed 
to admit that Sandys never 'contributed all that much which was original to the content 
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of the White Paper'.
281
 However, when asked how things might have been different had 
somebody other than Sandys been in charge of the policy-making process, Powell said 
that the 'references to ballistic missiles and to missile defences instead of fighters and 
bombers' were things that Sandys 'certainly put in himself', and that, had anybody else 
been in charge, 'I do not think the thing would have been carried through in the form it 
was and would not have emerged as it did'.
282
 
 
   It is between these two points that the existing historical appraisals of the 1957 White 
Paper leave something to be desired. Historians have largely accepted that Sandys 
offered little in the way of original thinking, choosing instead to emphasise continuity, 
albeit whilst giving Sandys credit for bringing several existing trends together and 
managing to override objections in doing so.
283
 Alongside this, however, the importance 
of Sandys' policy preferences has been neglected, with historians stressing a willingness 
to make large-scale reductions in spending and manpower as his primary contribution. 
Groom concluded that 'above all', the decisions in the White Paper 'were motivated by 
notions of economy and prestige', whilst Navias writes that Sandys' 'prime intention' 
was 'securing savings through manpower reductions', and that he did not set out to 
balance these reductions with a consistent balance between conventional and nuclear 
forces.
284
 It is true that Sandys was focussed on securing marked reductions in 
manpower and expenditure; but this was only achievable because of the alternative 
policies that Sandys forced through.  
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   The deficiencies of this approach can be seen in Baylis citing a July 1957 article by 
Slessor in support of his contention that the White Paper 'reflected the culmination of 
past endeavours'.
285
 This neglects an important contextual point. The Slessor article in 
question claimed that the White Paper introduced 'no basic revolution in policy, but 
merely rationalizes and (probably for the first time) explains in admirably intelligent 
form tendencies which have long been obvious'.
286
 This does point towards a degree of 
continuity, as Baylis rightly observes. But this statement has to be qualified by the fact 
that Slessor had been every bit as devoted to the decisive superiority of nuclear striking 
power as Sandys, and had been talking up unmanned weaponry and denigrating aircraft 
carriers since the late 1940s.
287
 What Slessor had considered to be 'tendencies which 
have long been obvious' did not necessarily correspond with the accepted wisdom 
prevalent within the Ministry of Defence or on the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Indeed, 
Slessor used this article to criticise the White Paper in terms reminiscent of Sandys' 
1953 recommendations, writing that its failure to follow the logic of its main arguments 
in favour of prioritising the decisive opening phase meant that 'we are not taking 
advantage of the economies which would flow from the acceptance of the short war 
assumption'.
288
 
 
   Although Sandys' powers at the Ministry of Defence were strengthened by a directive 
from Macmillan, giving him more control over the policy-making process than any of 
his predecessors, this did not mean that he was able to unilaterally impose significant 
alterations on the Armed Forces. However, by paying particular attention to what had 
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previously been Sandys' main areas of concern during the Radical Review, it can be 
shown how in spite of 'other variables' attempting to force him off course, Sandys 
consistently adhered to his well-developed belief that Britain should prioritise the 
opening phase of any future global war, and that all strategic calculations had to bear in 
mind what he considered to be the inexorable progress of unmanned weaponry. This 
section, by looking at Sandys' first few months at the Ministry of Defence up until the 
publication and defence of the White Paper, seeks to demonstrate how Sandys' brought 
the policy preferences he had developed from his experiences of the Second World War 
into a policy-making process over which he exerted a significant degree of control, and 
how this enabled him to lay the foundations for his later attempts at making his 1953 
recommendations a reality. 
 
The Political and Strategic Context 
 
   It has already been mentioned how, in the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis, 
Eden had expressed his wish that Britain should attempt to become less dependent on 
the United States for its nuclear strike capability, but this was just one aspect of his 
post-Suez defence review. In his note on 'Long Term Defence Policy' in December 
1956, Eden also made clear his desire to see British defence policy reorganised 'on the 
principle of smaller Forces equipped with fully up-to-date weapons'.
289
 The Minister of 
Defence at this point was Head, who as Secretary of State for War had provided 
conservative counters to Sandys' Radical Review ideas, (Walter Monckton, his 
predecessor, had resigned over his opposition to Eden's Suez policy), and he was 
instructed to begin working with the Service Ministers on another review of policy. This 
instantaneous reaction to the failures of Suez, a devastating psychological blow to 
British superpower pretentions, was the latest in a succession of appeals for spending 
reductions and greater efficiency. However, following a period of post-war 
consolidation, the British public had by this point come to expect that an economically 
sustainable defence settlement would be reached. This was particularly so as new 
technologies were increasingly being touted as capable of reducing the burdens defence 
spending placed on the British economy.
290
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   The Chiefs of Staff had actually commissioned a minor review of policy just weeks 
before the Suez Crisis began. This had attempted to address all aspects 'short of Global 
War', but was scrapped in the wake of Suez in favour of an updated report that 
acknowledged 'some tasks which have previously been regarded as commitments 
cannot now be met'.
291
 It is difficult to gauge from the official documents how the 
Chiefs of Staff felt about another review. Where Dermot Boyle, the Chief of the Air 
Staff, said it was 'inevitable' that Britain would no longer be able to meet what the 
Chiefs of Staff perceived to be its strategic requirements if another round of spending 
reductions was implemented, it is hard to say whether this constituted an attempt to 
embrace new realities or to fix his position against them.
292
 Unlike Slessor, who was 
completely devoted to strategic bombing, Boyle had more ambiguous allegiances to, 
and conceptions of, air power. Whilst he had spent much of the Second World War in 
heavy bombing roles, prior to becoming Chief of the Air Staff he had been Commander-
in-Chief of Fighter Command. Where the bombing aircraft upon which the British 
nuclear deterrent depended might have been expected to survive any post-Suez review 
of defence policy, any measure of colonial retreat that it might have advocated would 
have put British fighter strength at risk. If Boyle had only adopted his position with 
some reluctance, then Louis Mountbatten, the First Sea Lord, demonstrated a greater 
hostility to significant changes being made in choosing to stress the role of the Chiefs of 
Staff in keeping politicians on track.
293
 
 
   When Eden unexpectedly resigned on 9 January 1957 owing to ill health, he was 
succeeded by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Macmillan. Macmillan had effectively 
killed off the Radical Review when he had occupied the Ministry of Defence, being 
unwilling to expend political capital taking bold decisions whilst Churchill was in no 
real state to fully support him. He was by no means a reactionary in defence matters, 
however, recalling that he had arrived at Number 10 wanting to see defence policy 
finally 'take full account of the impact of nuclear weapons', as the Radical Review had 
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originally intended.
294
 In addition to this, Macmillan had come to see military 
experience as vital when attempting to formulate policy in related areas, and even in 
making somebody a 'complete man'.
295
 This belief was a result of his experiences in the 
Grenadier Guards during the First World War, where he earned a reputation for bravery 
and was seriously wounded during the Battle of the Somme.
296
 His memoirs also 
reflected this, containing sharp criticisms of previous Conservative Prime Ministers 
who, through their lack of experience in military matters, were deemed by Macmillan to 
have had no real understanding of the defence policy-making process.
297
 
 
   Macmillan had started out at the Ministry of Supply during the Second World War, 
but he had soon risen to represent the British government in the Mediterranean Theatre, 
where he had worked closely with Alexander. So closely, in fact, that Alan Brooke, the 
wartime Chief of the Imperial General Staff, came to suspect that Macmillan was 
'donning the coat of Supreme Commander' himself.
298
 Macmillan maintained an interest 
in defence issues, and often took to his diary to bemoan the policies of the government 
in which he served. In May 1952, whilst the Minister of Housing and Local 
Government, he wrote that military spending had to be redirected away from 'useless 
weapons (like anti-aircraft guns)', and towards 'the new and unconventional weapons by 
which alone (if war came) we could hope to resist the Russian masses'.
299
 In November 
1954, having only just been promoted to the Ministry of Defence, he recorded his 
thoughts on what he considered to be the main problem facing British defence policy: 
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I fear that the public will be rather alarmed to discover that we really cannot 
fight any war except a nuclear war. It is quite impossible to arm our forces 
with two sorts of weapons - conventional and unconventional... This means 
that if the Russians attacked (which is very unlikely) with conventional 
weapons only, in the first instance, we should be forced into the position of 
starting the nuclear war... From a purely military point of view, there is no 
way out. We should be utterly crushed in a conventional war.
300
 
 
   Following a brief period at the Ministry of Defence, and an equally brief period as 
Foreign Secretary, Macmillan had served as Chancellor of the Exchequer since 
December 1955. It was in the Treasury that he had really come to appreciate the need 
for spending reductions. This was particularly the case where the Air Force was 
concerned, and in July 1956, he wrote: 'The RAF seem unwilling to make any great 
changes. I still want to abolish Fighter Command (as such) on the grounds that UK 
cannot be defended even from Bombers. When the Russians have guided missiles, it 
cannot be defended at all'.
301
 
 
   In spite of these sentiments corresponding with Sandys' previous policy preferences, 
Macmillan had initially wanted Head to continue as Minister of Defence and oversee 
the review; but Head was an Army man, a graduate of the Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst and a former Brigadier, and, as he told Macmillan's official biographer: 
 
I couldn't do it, that it would be a betrayal of the forces… so I had to resign. 
Perhaps it was just a neat way of getting rid of me, knowing that I couldn't 
accept the cuts… I thought the forces would be pleased that I stood up for 
them, but they weren't; they got Sandys instead, whom they couldn't bear!
302
 
 
   Macmillan realised he needed somebody willing to confront entrenched opposition, 
and within weeks of appointing Sandys he was able to write in his diary that 'Duncan 
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Sandys is both able and obstinate - great qualities'.
303
 When Macmillan had been 
Minister of Defence he had been superior in standing to the other ministries with a say 
in defence policy, but unable to dictate to them, so he appreciated that the existing 
system of defence policy-making made genuine reform difficult.
304
 To resolve this, he 
issued a directive on 18 January giving the Ministry of Defence sweeping new powers. 
Under these new rules, the Minister of Defence made the final decision, subject to 
Cabinet approval, on 'all questions on the size, shape, organisation and disposition of 
the forces, as well as their equipment and supply, their pay and conditions of service'. 
On top this, all complaints from Service Ministers and the Ministry of Supply had to go 
through the Ministry of Defence, rather than attempt to appeal directly to the Prime 
Minister (as the Navy had done during the Radical Review), the Defence Committee, or 
the Cabinet; and the Minister of Defence also gained the power to call upon the Chiefs 
of Staff and subordinate ministers whenever he wished. The Chairman of the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, Dickson, was also made Chief of Staff to the Minister.
305
 
    
   Macmillan might have been re-ordering his government, but the policy-making 
process had continued along the lines originally set out by Eden, and on 11 January the 
Joint Planning Staff issued their examination of what the Service Ministries had thus far 
proposed. Whilst each department had worked in relative isolation in defence of their 
own interests, the Joint Planning Staff was able to make the implications of their plans 
clear. The report touched on familiar issues of prestige relating to colonial matters and 
NATO deployments, but it did manage to address some of the new realities Britain 
faced. For example, it was suggested that 'reduced fighter forces' would rule out the 
defence of Britain 'as a whole', forcing the government to choose whether to protect 
bomber bases or defend 'certain centres of population and industry'. Similarly, the 
'world-wide' value of the Navy would reckoned to be put at risk by an insistence on 
maintaining balanced forces in home waters and in the Mediterranean. On the other 
hand, the report struck a cautious note by accusing the Air Force of being 'coloured by 
their assessment of the overriding need to continue to produce a significant British 
contribution to the nuclear deterrent', the burden of which was said to have necessitated 
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reductions in overseas deployments, which had therefore become dependent on their 
being reinforced 'quickly by air or by aircraft carrier' in times of crisis.
306
 The Chiefs of 
Staff decided to develop this report into a formal memorandum for Sandys' benefit.
307
 
 
   The Joint Planning Staff presented the Chiefs of Staff with an updated and more 
detailed version of their report on 24 January, and it began favourably in relation to 
what Sandys would eventually advocate. It was suggested that there was 'no effective 
defence' against nuclear bombardment, and that any element of counter-threat 'should 
not be left solely in the hands of the United States'. In addition to this, the Joint Planning 
Staff made efforts to 'stress that NATO and the deterrent are complimentary', since it 
was believed that NATO kept the United States interested in Western Europe. To this 
end the defence of Britain was said to depend upon 'the Allied Strategic Bomber Force 
and on the continued cohesion of NATO'. Whilst the Joint Planning Staff made clear 
their belief that Britain should seek to possess its own nuclear capability, as not to leave 
the 'ultimate defence' of Britain and British interests to American goodwill, this appeal 
towards maintaining a strong British presence in NATO was potentially open-ended 
enough to be utilised by all three services in defence of their different interests.
308
 This 
would explain why, when asked for their immediate reactions to the report, the Army 
and Navy were most keen to emphasise this aspect, with Mountbatten taking particular 
objection to what he thought was an implication that Britain should only contribute the 
bare minimum to ensure continued NATO cohesion.
309
 There was comparatively little 
discussion about new deployments in the report, which meant there was little to object 
to specifically beyond Boyle warning that reductions to Fighter Command constituted a 
'serious, calculated risk'.
310
 The overarching disagreement came from the Joint Planning 
Staff adhering to Head's 21 December 1956 directive that the Service Ministers plan on 
the basis of capping manpower at roughly 450,000. They had cautiously said that this 
would be just enough to support a 'sound strategy' in defence of British interests, but the 
Chiefs of Staff wished to distance themselves from a figure that they considered 
inadequate.
311
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   The Chiefs of Staff presented their own report on 5 February, warning Ministers that 
'there are no military or strategic grounds which justify considerable reductions', and 
making it clear that it was only 'in H.M. Government's view' that the economic situation 
served to justify 'the risks involved'.
312
 To make their report work as a mechanical 
exercise, whilst also making their opposition clear, the Chiefs of Staff stressed that their 
recommendations represented the absolute minimum required for the defence of British 
interest 'On military grounds' only. So whilst the report contained developments on 
what the Joint Planning Staff had put forward in relation to each service - the Air Force, 
for example, was still expected to provide sufficient air defence coverage to 'convince 
the Russians that they could not destroy a worthwhile proportion of the bases for the 
strategic offensive before the United Kingdom could retaliate' - special consideration 
was given to the potential political effects of what the government had in mind. These 
were policies that the Chiefs of Staff felt would 'involve this country in considerable 
risk, particularly in regard... to our alliances', and the overwhelming conclusion of the 
report was that the political position of the United Kingdom, both as a Great Power and 
as a leading member of several defensive alliances, was wholly dependent on its ability 
to project military power around the world. This report placed the Chiefs of Staff in 
direct opposition to the government once again, which led them to remind Ministers that 
'It is our duty to say this'.
313
 
 
The Drafting Process 
 
   Sandys' active participation in the policy-making process was delayed by a pre-
existing commitment for the Minister of Defence to visit the United States and come to 
some arrangement over Thor missiles and possible relaxation of the McMahon Act. 
This made him the first British Minister to visit his American counterparts since Suez, 
and before he left Lloyd had told him not to appear either too eager to get back on their 
good side, or too resentful about their perceived lack of support during the Suez 
Crisis.
314
 It is difficult to say whether he achieved this balance, but Macmillan would 
later applaud the 'very firm line' Sandys had taken in Washington, apparently letting 
them know just how 'widespread and deep' anti-American sentiment was in Britain at 
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the time.
315
 It was only after this that he was able to begin his reforming task, which he 
began by presenting what he referred to as a 'broad approach' to future defence policy to 
the House of Commons, and where he assured Members of Parliament that his 'first 
responsibility is for defence', and that he would not 'slash about indiscriminately' in 
pursuit of economies.
316
 
 
   The policy-making process officially began the following week when Powell 
informed his colleagues in the Service Ministries that Sandys intended to end 
conscription and reduce manpower to 380,000.
317
 This was followed by a special 
weekend gathering at Chequers where Sandys sought Cabinet approval for his outline of 
future defence plans.
318
 His 'starting point' had been the 'Government's declared 
intention to end National Service as soon as practicable', and in order to accomplish this 
drastic shift in defence policy he once again drew heavily on his previous policy 
preferences, offering a vision of British defence policy where 'the minimum forces 
necessary' were allocated towards defending British interests overseas, and priority was 
given to 'play[ing] our part in preventing world war'. This latter aspect was to be 
accomplished 'by creating a British element of nuclear deterrent power', and by 
contributing only 'sufficient' air, land, and sea forces to maintain the solidarity of NATO 
'upon which our whole security depends'. Sandys admitted that defending British 
interests with 380,000 regulars would have involved an element of 'difficulty', but 
thought it would be possible provided these 'much reduced forces' were equipped with 
modern armaments. However, he was also forced to admit that reductions on this scale 
would 'appreciably affect' British power projection capabilities, which would in turn 
'inevitably reduce our influence' in alliance decision-making and more general world 
affairs.
319
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   To demonstrate how he intended to make all of this work, Sandys had provided those 
present with what he called a 'tentative plan' for a new distribution of force. This once 
again reflected his Radical Review recommendations by including in its projections a 
'considerably reduced fleet' and a large amount of colonial withdrawal after which 'only 
local forces' would remain in several garrisons. Given that his plans were dependent on 
nuclear striking power, the Air Force was given more attention. He was content that the 
force of medium bombers, the precise number of which was still to be decided, would 
form the backbone of the British deterrent for the foreseeable future, but added a note of 
inevitability by saying that this was only until they could be replaced 'in due course' by 
ballistic rockets. British-built nuclear weapons were also listed as a definite 
requirement, although Sandys was happy to accept warheads under United States 
control until a worthwhile stockpile of British devices had been established. As part of 
this overall deterrent package Fighter Command was condemned to have its overall 
strength reduced from 480 to 280 planes, which were also to be replaced 'in due course' 
by unmanned weapons, once its focus was redirected towards the 'limited task of 
protecting our bomber bases only'.
320
 
 
   This was all very much in line with his 1953 recommendations, and this 'new' 
approach to defence was confirmed as a suitable basis for British defence policy at a 27 
February Defence Committee meeting. Macmillan gave Sandys his full blessing, 
believing that even the most severe reductions in manpower 'would be offset by 
equipping the forces with nuclear weapons'. Equally in tune with Sandys' ideas, 
Macmillan stressed that a 'capacity to make both atomic and hydrogen weapons and the 
means of delivering them' would also need to be developed if Britain was to remain a 
nuclear power. Continuing membership of the nuclear club was a key issue for 
Macmillan, and he added that it was important for Britain to 'have within our control 
sufficient weapons to provide a deterrent influence independent of the United States', 
even though he was prepared to admit that he could not conceive of a scenario in which 
Britain would have used tactical or strategic nuclear weapons unilaterally. It would have 
seemed at this moment that Sandys had proven the perfect choice for what Macmillan 
had in store for British defence policy, but a possible point of divergence emerged at 
this early stage when Macmillan spoke about the means of delivering British nuclear 
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weapons. He had definitely factored the implications of unmanned weapons 
development into his thinking, but he did not consider a British-built missile to be a 
priority. With Washington willing to offer Thor missiles to Britain under partial United 
States control, Macmillan felt that there was no real need 'to produce ourselves a 
medium-range ballistic rocket'. It was immediate pointed out by somebody present that 
a failure to manufacture a British missile would put the Western deterrent entirely in 
American hands.
321
 It is not clear from the Cabinet papers who raised this objection, but 
it was apparently someone who felt that manned bomber aircraft were more than likely 
to be superseded by unmanned weaponry, and that any supposedly independent British 
deterrent had to be under the sole control of the British government, so quite possibly 
Sandys himself. 
 
   Having received the approval of both the Cabinet and the Defence Committee, Sandys 
could now begin to work his plans into a detailed framework to be presented to the 
Chiefs of Staff and Service Ministers. It was originally hoped that the policy-making 
process would be over reasonably quickly, with Macmillan looking to approve a final 
draft by 19 March before he set off for Bermuda, where he hoped to properly repair 
Anglo-American relations with his wartime friend Eisenhower. However, there was still 
no sign of a draft a week into March, which an internal Admiralty note claimed was due 
to Sandys 'taking a very great interest in every line'.
322
 Powell recalled that the White 
Paper went through 26 printed proofs 'and an equal number of typed ones' before its 
eventual publication on 4 April. Many of these do not appear to have survived in either 
the official departmental files or in Sandys' personal archive; but by analysing what 
does survive (Sandys' public statements before and after the White Paper had been 
written, as well as the surviving documents including the first rough draft, the proofs 
that went before the Cabinet, and the finished product) Sandys' policy preferences can 
be shown to have been an identifiable constant throughout.  
 
   The first working draft emerged on 12 March, with the Ministry of Defence 
requesting feedback within two days in order for a more polished draft to be ready for 
18 March, the final Cabinet meeting before Macmillan departed for Bermuda. This 
initial draft bore little resemblance to the finished article, but Sandys' policy preferences 
were clearly apparent in this still very brief outline of defence policy. It is impossible to 
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say whether Sandys had deliberately used this draft to make sweeping points in order to 
establish his negotiating position, or whether it simply represented his thoughts in their 
most natural form, befitting of his newly-increased importance in the policy-making 
process. But the sections relating to the main pillars of Sandys' belief system - that the 
opening phase ought to be given priority, and that unmanned weaponry would 
eventually dominate strategic calculations - remained intellectually consistent across the 
numerous drafts produced despite opposition from the Chiefs of Staff and Service 
Ministers forcing minor textual alterations. 
 
New Strategic Priorities 
 
   When Sandys spoke in the House of Commons on 13 February, he claimed that his 
position was dictated by the 'realities of today'. First and foremost amongst these 
realities in Sandys' opinion was the present situation where the power of attack had 
established its dominance over the ability of a nation to defend itself. To hammer this 
point home, Sandys informed the House of Commons that the type of bombs dropped 
on Japan in 1945 were now 'primarily suitable for tactical use by troops in the field'.
323
 
Therefore, having taken into account the 'present superiority of the means of attack over 
the means of defence', as well as the 'catastrophic consequences' of thermonuclear war, 
Sandys had come to the conclusion that the only sensible policy for Britain was to 
'concentrate our military effort upon prevention rather than defence'.
324
 By making this 
the central point of his defence review, Sandys was returning to his initially well-
received 1953 suggestion that defence expenditure be concentrated 'on those objects 
which will give the highest return in terms of effective defence'. Although this had been 
embraced by the government at the time as a suitable foundation for future policy, it 
soon became lost to inter-service rivalries and frustrated economies. Now Sandys and 
the newly-strengthened Ministry of Defence, with control over 'all questions on the size, 
shape, organisation and disposition of the forces', had greater prospects of making this a 
reality. 
 
   To Sandys, prevention still meant maintaining an effective level of striking power, 
and he gave credit to the 'brilliant scientific research' instigated by the Labour 
government that had equipped Britain with its atomic weapons before revealing that 'the 
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first British megaton bomb' was almost complete, and speaking about how he expected 
the Macmillan government to embrace its possibilities.
325
 In addition to this, he 
explained how 'the possession of nuclear air power is not necessarily by itself a fully 
effective deterrent', paying tribute to the role of NATO, SEATO (South East Asia 
Treaty Organisation) and the Baghdad Pact as vital components of the overall deterrent 
force, albeit whilst pointing out that Britain could no longer contribute 'more than our 
fair share' towards their requirements.
326
 Having done this, he offered a summation of 
his overall strategic concept that simply reiterated his 1953 policy preferences: 
 
When we have settled what contribution Britain should make to the 
deterrent, we have to ask ourselves whether we should, in addition, provide 
other forces which do not directly contribute to the deterrent but which 
would be desirable for waging major war should the deterrent fail. 
 
We must, as far as possible, resist the temptation to dissipate our limited 
resources on forces which in themselves have no deterrent value; for to that 
extent we should be reducing the contribution we can make to the 
prevention of war.
327
 
 
   In stating that the deterrent could 'fail', Sandys was once again disputing the strategic 
priorities of the Chiefs of Staff, as he had in 1953, when he had shunned the idea of 
separating deterrence as a means of winning the Cold War from making preparations to 
utilise nuclear force in winning a 'hot war'. Just like in 1953, the nature of these 
priorities immediately asked questions of the Navy, the future of which Sandys said 
'depends upon our view of the likely course of a full-scale nuclear war'. In deciding the 
likely course of a 'full-scale nuclear war', Sandys said that policy-makers would have to 
answer the following questions.  
 
How soon after the outbreak of such a war do we think we might expect that 
shipping across the Atlantic could be resumed? After the initial nuclear 
attack, would the harbours of Britain and Western Europe still be usable? 
Have we to assume that when the first all-out atomic phase was over, there 
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would follow a second phase - sometimes described as broken-back war - in 
which operations at sea would play a prominent part?
328
 
 
   He had claimed in 1953 that everything 'form[ed] part of a single task', which he had 
referred to as winning the Cold War through 'actual preparations for war'; that is to say, 
mobilising the greatest amount of potential striking power, which meant equipping 
Britain with an effective nuclear delivery system. The most recent Chiefs of Staff report 
of 5 February had not offered any recommendations relating to strategic priorities as 
Defence Policy and Global Strategy had, but the principles originally laid down in 1952 
had been reaffirmed by Monckton the previous February.
329
  
 
   Sandys had brought 'broken-backed' warfare into question and effectively dismissed 
its value within the space of a few lines, and his policy preferences were developed in 
his first draft White Paper which formalised his 1953 strategic conception by reducing 
the functions of the Armed Forces to 'two principal roles'. The first was 'to play their 
part with the forces of allied forces in preventing world war and in resisting Communist 
aggression and infiltration', and the second was 'to defend, and preserve order in, British 
colonies and protected territories'. The first role was naturally listed as 'the more 
exacting of these tasks', but due to the fact it was expected to be played out as part of 
different systems of alliance, Sandys said that Britain did not necessarily require 'forces 
which are self-sufficient and balanced in all respects'.
330
 Taken into consideration 
alongside what had already been written about Sandys' policy preferences, and the near-
identical phrasing incorporated in his 1953 memorandums, the implications of this point 
are clear, and Sandys made no reference to 'broken-backed' warfare as one of the key 
roles of the Armed Forces.
331
 It is alluded to later in the draft, but in terms reminiscent 
of his 1953 memorandums, with the role of naval forces in any global war described as 
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'uncertain' following the bombardment of Britain by 'aircraft or rockets'. This  was 
expected to have destroyed most of Britain's ability to wage war effectively 'within a 
few days'. Britain 'keeping open her Atlantic life-line' was listed as a possible 
consideration, but Sandys suggested that this was a matter best resolved within NATO 
planning structures.
332
 If Sandys' previous recommendations are anything to go by, this 
would have meant shifting that particular burden onto American vessels. 
 
   The immediate feedback was almost wholly sceptical. Surprisingly, the Admiralty 
accepted the role Sandys had in mind for the Navy, although they said it would prove 
difficult to fulfil following the sort of reductions in manpower and spending he had put 
forward. With little for the Admiralty to complain about militarily, criticism was 
focussed on similar political lines as had been highlighted by the Chiefs of Staff. The 
First Lord warned Sandys that were he to make an announcement that Britain intended 
to eventually cut its Armed Forces by half, he would 'cause the disintegration of the 
North Atlantic Alliance'. This would have the practical effect of de-railing the entire 
White Paper, since the draft had described NATO as a vital component of the deterrent, 
as well as expecting the alliance system to make up for any lack of balance in British 
strength. The draft was consequently 'too defensive' for the Admiralty, and they said 
that they would find it hard to support the idea that 'military and scientific developments 
justified these enormous reductions'.
333
 The Air Ministry, which at this point stood to 
emerge from the Sandys review relatively unscathed, echoed much of what the 
Admiralty had said. They too stressed the political implications of the draft, writing that 
Britain would cease to be a 'leading power' following reductions that were 'startling in 
all aspects'. 'Default on N.A.T.O.' would inevitably follow such proposals, and the 
spectre of European military leadership falling into German hands was raised for added 
effect. They even predicted that Sandys' proposals would fail in their declared aim of 
improving the economic outlook, as their failure to 'convince militarily' would 'be 
judged as a panic measure forced on H.M.G. by [a] serious and deteriorating economic 
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outlook'. This would in turn defeat the entire object of the defence review by reducing 
confidence in the British economy, thereby serving to undermine it.
334
 
 
   When the Chiefs of Staff met to consider their reaction to the first draft, the Air Force 
and the Army wished to distance themselves from Sandys' manpower targets, with the 
Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, William Oliver, voicing his opinion that 
Sandys had offered them something 'based entirely on economic considerations and not 
related to military capability'. Mountbatten was equally worried, repeating what had 
previously been suggested about the end of NATO, and adding that Sandys' ideas 
becoming a reality would provide 'immense encouragement to the forces of 
Communism and to those of Arab nationalism', effectively undermining everything 
Britain stood for abroad.
335
 The meeting agreed to send their reservations directly to 
Sandys, the result of which was a 15 March minute explaining that the Chiefs of Staff 
were 'profoundly concerned at some of the effects which the White Paper in its present 
form may have'. This covered service morale, concerns that 'our Allies will be gravely 
disturbed', and what appeared to be a lack of clarity relating to the strategic priorities 
Sandys had put forward.
336
 
 
   The feedback Sandys had asked for was intended to inform the first formal draft, the 
third proof, which was to be taken before the Cabinet for general approval having been 
circulated on 15 March. Sandys took little of this criticism on board, submitting a 
document that was largely the same as his working draft.
337
 The 'broad lines' of this 
latest draft were approved by the Cabinet on 18 March, although it was noted that its 
presentation 'would need careful consideration'. Macmillan was concerned that 
emphasising the root-and-branch nature of the review might alarm British allies, and 
that it would also have domestic implications by 'reflect[ing] unfavourably on the record 
of Conservative Governments since 1952'. To this end he requested that the opening 
statement stress a degree of continuity by pointing out that 'the objective of our defence 
policy remained, as it always had been, the maintenance of compact and efficient 
fighting Services, but that the methods by which we should best attain this objective 
required radical reappraisal in the light of current strategic considerations'.
338
 In addition 
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to this, it was requested that Sandys' emphasise that any reduction in manpower would 
be 'counter-balanced by an increase in atomic strength', and Macmillan proposed a 
thorough re-write of sections which he thought 'may give the impression that the Navy 
is being handled with special severity'.
339
 
 
   In discussing what Sandys had put forward, members of the Cabinet suggested that 
this 'fundamental revolution' in defence policy 'might have far-reaching effects on our 
influence in world affairs'; that it would lessen Britain's ability to maintain their position 
in far-flung interests such as Hong Kong; that it would have an 'unfortunate' effect on 
NATO; and that 'any suggestion that the proposed reduction in our naval forces would 
warrant the transfer of certain NATO naval Commands to other countries' should be 
cleared up.
340
 The Admiralty was less critical about the third proof, since they had 
already accepted much of what Sandys' intended in terms of strategy, and their 
recommendations were limited to requesting that the 'Western Alliance' be referred to as 
a definite part of the overall deterrent, accompanied by a token complaint about 
manpower reductions.
341
 These criticisms were considered by Sandys, as were the more 
specific points raised by the Service Ministries, and Sandys own copy of the third proof 
contained in his archives has numerous alterations hinting at a certain amount of 
compromise.
342
 However, where Sandys made alterations in an attempt to move towards 
a greater level of consensus, other sections of his personal third proof were changed to 
restore balance, suggesting that Sandys was conscious of a need to keep the 
fundamentals of his policy preferences intact at this early stage. 
 
   The Chiefs of Staff were still far from happy with the direction of Sandys' proposals, 
so Dickson was sent to explain Sandys' views by claiming that the Ministry of Defence 
was 'anxious to reach an understanding' with the Chiefs of Staff. Dickson informed his 
colleagues that he had explained their constitutional role to Sandys, and their 
motivations for criticising his recommendations, before informing them how and why 
Sandys disagreed with their advice. Sandys was said to have divided British defence 
requirements into two parts. The first addressed the defence of 'purely British interests', 
and the second related to the contribution Britain was expected to make towards its 
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defensive alliances; all of which Sandys was convinced could be accomplished with 
380,000 regulars. Dickson said he had not pressed the issue with Sandys, but advised 
the Chiefs of Staff to prepare for him asking them why this would not be possible.
343
 
The nature of this message was captured in an Admiralty briefing for Mountbatten 
which said 'The Minister's tactics appear to be much as predicted', and questioned 
'whether it is wise to accept battle on ground of the Minister's own choosing'.
344
 
 
   Dickson met with the Chiefs of Staff again the following day to inform them that 
Sandys wished to meet them and explain things himself, suggesting that they come up 
with some way of splitting the difference between their respective manpower 
requirements. Mountbatten could see no way of compromising on this. He said he 
would be willing to work with the Ministry of Defence to make an Armed Forces of 
380,000 work, as this was his constitutional role, but insisted that there was 'no 
implication that a reduction to this figure had been justified on military grounds by the 
Chiefs of Staff'. Ronald Ivelaw-Chapman, the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, agreed with 
Mountbatten. He was worried that if the White Paper included any references to what 
'the Government' believed, this would imply that the Chiefs of Staff were in agreement 
with Sandys. Templer also supported this, as well as questioning the 'soundness' of 
Sandys' strategic priorities.
345
 
 
   Before the Chiefs of Staff had the opportunity to put their points to Sandys directly, 
another draft was circulated. This fifth proof had included the justification of previous 
Conservative programmes Macmillan had asked for, but other points which Sandys had 
been pulled up on had not changed at all in substance. Some of them had even been 
worded to present an even firmer picture of Sandys' policy preferences. There was 
evidence that Sandys had accepted some criticism as the fifth proof now laid down 
'three main tasks' for the Armed Forces. To 'play their part with the forces of Allied 
countries in deterring and resisting aggression' was still at the top of the running order, 
and this was still followed by a commitment to defend British interests from localised 
attack. The third task of the Armed Forces was then listed as taking part 'in limited 
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operations to uphold the rule of law'.
346
 This reads like a concession to the points raised 
in Cabinet about civil defence, the inclusion of which meant no deviation from the 
wider philosophy Sandys' wished to implement. That said, its inclusion could still have 
been useful as an inconsequential gesture designed to imply that Sandys' was capable of 
looking beyond the potentially decisive opening phase, even if he did not envision a 
need to keep supply lines to the United States open following such an event. 
 
   The day after the fifth proof had made its way around Whitehall, Sandys met the 
Chiefs of Staff to clear up what he called their 'understandable misgivings'. He 
explained to them that in his view the reduced Armed Forces would still be sufficient to 
defend British colonies, 'take part in limited overseas operations... in support of  the 
Baghdad and SEATO alliances', and to make a 'fair contribution' to NATO. Britain, he 
said, was currently contributing more than its fair share to NATO, and it was time that 
other member states took on some of the burdens that Britain had carried since the 
alliance was formed. What made Sandys confident that Britain could do was his belief 
that increasing or decreasing British commitments to NATO would not be the 
'determining factor' in whether the Soviet Union started a global war or not.
347
 Sandys 
then gave the Chiefs of Staff further insight into his strategic concept:  
 
Although he realised that from the purely military aspect NATO forces 
would not be regarded as enough for safety, in his own view they were 
sufficient to deter Soviet Russia from starting a nuclear war since she could 
attain her ends in other ways at much less risk to herself, e.g. by subversion 
in the Middle East and South East Asia. However, a greater probable danger 
was the potential commercial threat from Russia since, with her form of 
Government she could easily undertake a trade war.
348
 
 
   Navias has described Sandys' ideas here as 'somewhat confused', writing that he 
'appeared to equate Soviet goals in the Middle East and the Far East with those in 
Europe', as well as blurring the 'careful distinctions between cold, limited and global 
war' that the Chiefs of Staff had always based their recommendations upon. This he 
cites as proof that 'what undoubtedly drove Sandys was not so much an explicit strategic 
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formula as much as the issue of financial savings', which was also reflected in his 
concerns about the Soviet Union resorting to economic warfare.
349
 
 
   It is difficult to say how well Sandys was able to put his case across to the Chiefs of 
Staff, or whether he was even willing to engage with them properly; but this is an 
almost perfect summation of the criticism his ideas had attracted during the Radical 
Review. He had previously advocated confronting the Chinese over Hong Kong with 
the threat of general war, and this would appear to have also become his preferred 
policy for resisting the Soviet Union's attempts to expand beyond its borders. This 
explains his supposed inability to correctly understand the strategic priorities the Chiefs 
of Staff had decided upon. Sandys believed that what kept the Soviet Union within its 
borders was not localised blocking manoeuvres, but the threat of full-blown nuclear 
war. Whether these policies were sensible is not the concern of this thesis, but they can 
clearly be shown to have been carried over to the Ministry of Defence from Sandys' 
time at the Ministry of Supply. This is representative of 'an explicit strategic formula', 
regardless of whether it was misguided or not. There can be no doubt that Sandys had to 
make difficult decisions regarding the cost and shape of the Armed Forces, as he had 
during the Radical Review when he was willing to make more drastic cuts in spending 
than even the Treasury deemed suitable; but it must be recognised that Sandys had 
arrived at the Ministry of Defence with something approaching a coherent strategic 
vision suitable for a cost-conscious second class power, and that he was consistent in his 
adherence to it.
350
 
 
   In a concession to the Chiefs of Staff, Sandys offered to re-write the section 
explaining how the government thought their ends could be achieved with smaller 
forces, but they were still concerned that referring to 'the Government' would implicate 
them in supporting any reductions on strategic grounds. Sandys claimed he had no 
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intention of this being the case, and the meeting agreed that the White Paper 'should 
make it clear that the reductions in the forces were not based on any strategic advice 
given by the Chiefs of Staff'. Following this, a number of amendments were decided 
upon, the most important being that the possession of 'nuclear air power' should be 
referred to as 'not by itself a complete deterrent', as opposed to Sandys' original wording 
of 'not by itself a wholly reliable deterrent'. The original wording was more in line with 
his belief that deterrence could fail, but was nevertheless something which the Air Force 
should handle.
351
 
 
   Before Sandys could implement these changes, the fifth proof had to go before the 
Cabinet. Here the objections were familiar. The Foreign Secretary wished to see the 
importance of NATO mentioned in the opening paragraphs 'to avoid any impression of 
an abrupt departure from earlier defence policy', and it was pointed out that the Chiefs 
of Staff had met before the Cabinet to once again raise their primary objections. They 
still thought Sandys' preferred personnel levels were far too low, considering the threat 
of communism was felt to have 'in no way diminished'. Combined with this, the 
reluctance of other NATO and alliance states to reinforce their own numbers meant that 
the 'total forces available for the defence of the free world would be reduced'. The 
Chiefs of Staff wanted the White Paper to make clear that the reduction to 375,000 was 
'dictated primarily by economic needs', and to have it made clear that they did not 
endorse the reductions on military grounds.
352
 Navias suggests that tensions were 
beginning to make themselves obvious at this point, as Macmillan said he would 
personally draft the relevant paragraphs himself in order to soothe the Chiefs of Staff 
and to frame the reductions 'by referring to our traditional reliance on regular forces, 
and our declared intention to revert to this practice as soon as possible'.
353
 
 
   The sixth proof was circulated on 28 March, with a cover note claiming that it 
contained substantial changes to numerous paragraphs, although Sandys' overall 
strategic concept remained untouched.
354
 When the eighth proof was released on 1 
April, a new introduction made reference to British policy being 'determined by her 
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obligation to make her contribution to NATO and other regional alliances as to 
discharge her own special responsibilities in many parts of the world'. However, the 
eighth proof also showed that Sandys' had actually gone back on several important 
points to strengthen his original concept. The reference to 'limited operations to uphold 
the rule of law' as a key strategic priority had been removed, merged with the second 
point about protecting British interests, and still behind the primary task of 'deterring 
and resisting aggression' in partnership with allies.
355
 By this point all concerned appear 
to have accepted that the White Paper was in its final form, and the Admiralty began 
briefing its officers about what to expect from it.
356
 There was still time for the Chiefs 
of Staff to expose Sandys for planning to go back on his agreement to distance them and 
their strategic concerns from the finished product, the points raised in the 2 April 
Cabinet discussion, particularly the request to 'give rather more emphasis to the 
essential role of civil defence', were not going to knock Sandys off course.
357
 
 
The Unmanned Weapons Threat 
 
   It appeared that Sandys' new strategic priorities had been accepted, but there was 
some last minute qualification requested as to what exactly Sandys meant when he used 
the term 'deterrent'. The Director of Plans at the Admiralty objected to naval power 
being said to 'not for the most part contribute directly to the deterrent', and the wording 
was subsequently agreed to say that the role of the Navy in global war 'cannot be 
precisely forecast'.
358
 In the same vein, the Air Ministry sought to make certain that the 
White Paper committed Britain to maintaining a contribution to the Western deterrent 
that was both independent and operationally effective, with a hand-written note in the 
departmental files saying that possession of an independent nuclear capability was the 
basis of the 'whole paper'.
359
   
 
   Although a precise definition of what the British deterrent was expected to consist of 
was noticeably absent from Sandys' drafts, there can be little doubt as to what he 
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expected to form the main body of British nuclear capability. Having opened his 
February speech in the House of Commons with the uncontroversial point that the 'basic 
responsibility of any Government is to protect the lives and independence of its people', 
Sandys brought his attention to the 'phenomenal advances in the development of 
weapons of mass destruction' that had occurred since the Second World War.
360
 Taking 
a conciliatory tone, he said that 'Members on both sides of the House will agree that we 
should not be serving the best interests of the country by seeking to make defence a 
party political issue'; although it was apparently worth reminding everybody that Labour 
had failed to develop a supersonic research aircraft, which Sandys described as the 
'primary reason' that the United States had established a lead in military aviation. 
Equally unworthy of party political attention was 'the failure of the Labour Government 
during their six years of office to initiate any research into guided missiles of the long-
range ballistic type'. The lack of effective research into unmanned weapons, Sandys 
said, was the main reason 'that we are now a long way behind both the Americans and 
the Russians in that vital work'.
361
 
    
   Returning to his recommendations of 1953, Sandys told the House of Commons that 
'However efficient our defences, it is inconceivable that they could provide 100 per cent 
immunity against air attack'. This was because 'half a dozen nuclear bombers' could 
'cause incalculable death and devastation over enormous areas' with a single raid. And 
this was only relevant to manned bomber aircraft. These were 'difficult enough to bring 
down', but threat of unmanned weaponry was altogether more serious.
362
 
 
After the war, the Russians took over the German rocket establishments and 
compelled German scientists to work for them. There is every reason to 
believe that the Russians have been developing a much enlarged version of 
the German V.2 rocket, but with the enormous difference that it would now 
carry a nuclear warhead. The range of these rockets is probably sufficient to 
reach Britain from launching points within Soviet-controlled territory. These 
projectiles would rise to a height of over 100 miles into the stratosphere and 
travel at speeds of over 5,000 miles an hour.
363
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   Whilst entertaining the prospect that a defensive solution could eventually be found to 
weapons of this calibre, Sandys said it would be 'absurd' to pretend such a system would 
be available in the immediate future. When he brought his speech towards air defence, 
Sandys suggesting that savings might be found in accordance with this strategy by 
accepting that 'the whole of the British Isles' could not be defended, and therefore 
confining the role of air defence 'to that of protecting our power of retaliation, upon 
which the prospects of peace so largely depend'.
364
 As Sandys began to expand on how 
this idea to reallocate fighter defences might provide a better return on its investment, 
Emrys Hughes, the Labour representative for South Ayrshire, asked 'What about 
rockets?'
365
 Hughes was a pacifist, and he had been asking questions relating to the 
futility of defence planning against nuclear warfare for almost a decade, so Sandys 
moved onto this section of his speech.
366
 He said that when the Soviet Union gained the 
ability to bombard Britain with unmanned weaponry, 'we shall have to consider whether 
it is worth while retaining fighter aircraft at all'; but for the time being, 'it would be 
irresponsible to neglect such means as are available to protect our deterrent power'.
367
 
Looking towards the longer term, however, he made his thoughts clear: 
 
[I]t is quite clear - and I agree about this - that ultimately the threat to this 
Island will come not from manned bombers, but from nuclear ballistic 
projectiles. It is similarly clear that in the future the effectiveness of our 
deterrent power will also depend upon the possession by us of these 
weapons.
368
 
 
   He said that this idea 'must greatly influence our future programme of research and 
production', pressing the need for longer-term planning. It needed to be determined 
whether Britain 'should develop more advanced types of fighters and bombers', or 
whether policy should be determined by looking at projects and asking whether 'by the 
time these more advanced types can be introduced into service, they will have been 
superseded by rocket weapons, both for the defensive and offensive roles'. When he said 
that this decision 'is largely a question of one's estimate and assessment of the timetable 
on both sides', he then made it plain where he stood in his next breath by saying 'In any 
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case, it is evident that we must give the highest priority to the development of these new 
weapons and their introduction at the earliest moment'.
369
 
 
   The first draft Sandys had circulated built on this early statement by basing its 
argument on the need for British defence policy to be 'radically revised' due to 
technological development and the emergence of thermonuclear weapons. It read: 
 
[T]he evolution of rocket weapons has been forging ahead. It is now only a 
matter of a few years before there will be missiles steered by electronic 
brains capable of delivering megaton warheads over a range of 5,000 miles 
or more. 
 
These sensational scientific advances in methods of waging war have 
fundamentally altered the whole basis of world strategy, and make it 
necessary for all previous defence planning to be revised.
370
 
 
   Although this must have seemed radical, Sandys would have had good reason to 
believe that these predictions were sound. He had used his memorandum of November 
1953 to advocate that defence policy be based on the assumption that Britain could not 
be defended from unmanned weapons. More specifically, he had claimed that the Soviet 
Union would be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon into London from East 
Germany by 1956, and that an even more fearsome weapon would not be far behind. In 
May 1956 the Soviet Union had proven Sandys correct when it deployed the R-5 series 
of missile. The R-5 had been in development since 1951, had entered testing in 1954, 
and had a range of over 700 miles. This meant they would have been capable of hitting 
London from sites in East Germany, and of doing so whilst carrying nuclear warheads, 
vindicating Sandys completely and serving to strengthen his convictions.
371
 That said, 
the Air Ministry suggested he change the wording lest the White Paper 'give the 
misleading impression' that Britain could manufacture comparable weapons in a similar 
timeframe.
372
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   The draft went on, explaining how these developments had made it 'most unlikely' 
that Britain could wage a major war without its allies, primarily the United States, and 
that 'full account must be taken of this important fact'. Other fundamental considerations 
were reducing the burden defence spending placed on the economy, and the need for a 
greater appreciation of long-term planning. This latter concern was primarily influenced 
by the need to keep pace with rapid technological development. This development in his 
thinking would seem to be supported by the section on the nuclear deterrent. Repeating 
familiar statements about how 'only a dozen' Soviet bomber aircraft 'might well blot out 
a large part of the population' if they were to penetrate British air defences, therefore 
making fighter aircraft increasingly ineffective, Sandys began the passage on why 
Britain had to 'prevent war rather than prepare for it' by claiming 'defence has become 
impossible'.  
 
   The copy of the draft that found its way into the Admiralty has this line highlighted, 
whilst the Air Ministry simply crossed it out of their copy.
373
 However it was the Home 
Office that took particular objection to this, and Butler responded by telling Sandys that 
'catastrophic destruction and unprecedented casualties... does not mean that defence is 
impossible', and suggesting that any policy of reliance on nuclear deterrence required an 
element of civil defence planning in order to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that 
Britain still possessed 'the will to resist'.
374
 The Home Office had actually written to the 
Ministry of Defence whilst Sandys was working on his first draft after Powell asked 
them for their thoughts on civil defence. Their response was to submit a note that 
referred to civil defence preparations as an 'essential part of the policy of reliance on the 
deterrent', and claimed that in spite of the 'catastrophic conditions that would inevitably 
result from the use of thermo-nuclear weapons', adequate civil defence measures 'even 
in these crowded islands might be a decisive factor in the struggle'.
375
 
  
   The third proof, as it had in relation to the strategic priorities Sandys had 
recommended, did not make substantial alterations to any of these early statements, and 
continued to ignore the Home Office. The reference to defence becoming 'impossible' 
had been removed, but the inability of fighter aircraft to offer 'the country as a whole 
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any effective protection' remained, as did Sandys' belief that 'the central aim of military 
policy must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it'.
376
 The passage on 'missiles 
steered by electronic brains' that 'have fundamentally altered the whole basis of world 
strategy' was reproduced in near identical form, with only an appeal 'for all previous 
defence planning to be revised' removed.
377
  
 
   The reactions from the Admiralty and the Air Ministry were mixed, but the Treasury 
were so alarmed that they asked Macmillan to extend the White Paper's original 
timetable, as well as sending Sandys a comprehensive list of proposed amendments. 
These mostly concerned themselves with matters of finance, for instance reminding 
Sandys that the Chancellor was yet to commit himself to funding a British-built missile, 
but it was also pointed out that the third proof provided 'nothing to enable organised 
society to survive'. On this the Treasury agreed with the Home Office that Sandys' 
preferences undermined the policy of deterrence, adding that plans to reduce the food 
stockpile served to demonstrate that 'the policy of survival is not the one we are 
pursuing'.
378
 These concerns were reflected in the Cabinet, where it was said that the 
sections covering civil defence needed further attention, 'particularly in the light of the 
statement that the great cities could not at present be protected against nuclear attack'.
379
 
 
   Whilst Sandys noted some of their criticisms on his personal copy, these sections once 
again showed him to have made notes that bolstered his original ideas. His copy of the 
third proof has 'have fundamentally altered' changed to 'are fundamentally altering', 
which makes the statement less definitive. However, Sandys also made a note in the 
opening paragraph to make it clear that reform was required on 'economic, scientific 
and international grounds', removing any mention of 'military grounds'. This serves to 
imply that technological development, rather than established notions of what Britain 
was expected to defend, was now a more pressing influence on the policy-making 
process.
380
 Similarly, Sandys crossed out 'fighters cannot give... any effective protection 
to cities against aerial attack', after the Air Ministry had asked that this be changed to 
'complete protection'. Sandys' note in the margin of his copy suggests adding 'there is at 
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present no means of protecting' instead.
381
 Whilst this change might have reassured 
Fighter Command by suggesting that the next generation of fighter aircraft might have 
been more capable, it actually serves to doubt that even an unmanned weapons-based 
anti-aircraft defence system could provide comprehensive coverage. This is supported 
by an alteration on the next page, where 'air defence must be provided for the nuclear 
deterrent' is replaced by 'the country as a whole cannot be protected against nuclear 
attack'. That this also follows the words 'so largely' being inserted into 'peace depends 
upon the effectiveness of the deterrent' further confirms Sandys' intentions. If the 
addition of 'so largely' was meant to reduce the importance of the nuclear strike 
capability in relation to the rest of the Armed Forces, making it clear that air defence 
would concentrate around bomber bases and rocket sites restored its privileged status.
382
 
 
   Technological development was further promoted to a primary consideration in the 
fifth proof, which went into the actual policy sections by stating there was now a 
'necessity to re-examine defence policy on economic grounds [that] coincides with the 
need to do so on scientific grounds'. The references to 'missiles steered by electronic 
brains' was gone, but this was made up for with an expanded passage on what 
technological development meant for British defence policy: 
 
It has been clear for some time that these sensational scientific advances 
must fundamentally alter the whole basis of military planning. However, it 
is only now that the future picture is becoming sufficiently clear to enable a 
comprehensive reshaping of policy to be undertaken with any degree of 
confidence.
383
 
 
   The less definitive 'are fundamentally altering' had not been used, and the fifth proof's 
re-written passage on the nuclear deterrent is a perfect example of Sandys working the 
criticism he had received into the revised text whilst at the same time changing other 
parts of the wording to strengthen his original point. This section had incorporated his 
colleagues' preference for any statements regarding the lack of effective defence to 
relate to the 'present', but it did so in the following way: 'It must be frankly recognised 
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that there is at present no means of protecting the people of Britain against the 
catastrophic consequences of an attack with nuclear weapons'. This, along with the 
reproduced line about a mere dozen manned aircraft being able to 'blot out' most of the 
people in major cities, was referred to as a 'grim fact' in order to retain the definitive 
nature of his original draft. The idea of a defensive solution being devised in the future 
was further undermined by Sandys when he added an entirely new paragraph on 
disarmament. This made it clear that 'In the long run' it was only through 
'comprehensive disarmament' that 'nations can be saved from mutual destruction and 
mutual ruination'. By suggesting that as long as nuclear weapons existed Britain could 
not be protected, this paragraph completely negates any optimism that might have been 
introduced by entertaining a possibility that it was only impossible to defend yourself 
against nuclear weapons 'at present'.
384
 
 
   The section on defending the deterrent received similar treatment. The alterations 
Sandys had made to his copy of the third proof were carried over into the updated draft, 
and peace was now said to 'largely' depend upon deterrence. This would have satisfied 
those who wished to stress the role of conventional forces in deterring Soviet 
aggression. The fifth proof also saw 'great cities' changed to 'the country as a whole', as 
not to imply that all major settlements would be effectively written off in any global 
war. However, this is again undermined by the insertion of a new paragraph that makes 
clear the threat of unmanned weapons. The third proof had said 'There are grounds for 
hoping that it may ultimately prove possible to provide missile defences against even 
attack by ballistic rockets', and followed this by claiming that Britain was engaged in 
joint research with the United States in doing so.
385
 In the fifth proof this was replaced 
by the following: 'It must be expected that, in a few years' time, the threat of raids by 
manned bombers will be superseded by the threat of bombardment by ballistic rockets. 
It is hoped that it may ultimately prove possible to devise missile defences against even 
this form of attack'. Not only does this re-written statement put a speculative timeframe 
on the unmanned weapons threat becoming a reality, but 'grounds for hoping' becoming 
'hoped' removes the notion of an informed basis for any optimism, serving to make a 
functional defence against them much less likely in the minds of the reader.
386
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   The sixth proof was altered in much the same way, with the main difference being that 
the threat of manned Soviet bomber aircraft would now be 'augmented by', rather than 
'superseded by', unmanned weapons. Everything else remained intact.
387
 The eighth 
proof equally so, which moved somebody to suggest in the Cabinet meeting in which it 
was discussed that 'it might be unwise at this stage to state categorically that there 
would never be a requirement for supersonic bombers or for further developments in 
fighter aircraft, since there could be no certainty that guided weapons and ballistic 
rockets would meet all future needs'.
388
 
 
The White Paper 
 
   Defence: Outline of Future Policy was published on 4 April, and the definitive version 
remained true to Sandys' original vision, albeit slightly tempered in certain respects. The 
spectre of thermonuclear weapons and 'rocket weapons of all kinds' was raised in the 
opening paragraphs, and British strategic priorities had finally realised the directive of 
June 1953. In the sections detailing Britain's approach to the nuclear deterrent, Sandys 
had managed to go even further in the finished article than in his numerous drafts, with 
the defining passage from the White Paper reading as follows: 
 
It must be frankly recognised that there is at present no means of providing 
adequate protection for the people of this country against the consequences 
of an attack with nuclear weapons. Though, in the event of war, the fighter 
aircraft of the Royal Air Force would unquestionably be able to take a heavy 
toll of enemy bombers, a proportion would inevitably get through. Even if it 
were only a dozen, they could with megaton bombs inflict widespread 
devastation.
389
 
 
   The fifth proof had used 'the people of this country', but this was revised to 'the whole 
country' in subsequent proofs. By reverting back to the idea of people being 
undefended, the nuclear weapons threat became more general, moving away from just 
concentrated settlements, and becoming something that could reach everybody 
everywhere, which could have been a reference to nuclear fallout.  From this point on, 
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the White Paper actually rowed back slightly on some of Sandys' earlier versions, and 
Grove lists a number of points on which the Admiralty had appeared to have gotten the 
better of Sandys; the main victory being the retention of a carrier force.
390
 There was 
also, presumably under Treasury pressure, no firm commitment to the manufacture of a 
British ballistic missile; although it did say Britain 'must possess an appreciable element 
of nuclear deterrent power of her own', and that there would be no further effort to 
develop a supersonic manned bomber. In addition to this, the inability to defend the 
whole country as a reason to defend bomber bases was dropped; air power remained 
'not by itself a complete deterrent', with the Free World also needing to be 'firmly 
defended on the ground'. The Navy was even given credit as an 'effective means of 
bringing power rapidly to bear in peacetime emergencies or limited hostilities', even if 
its role in global war was still reckoned to be 'somewhat uncertain'.
391
 
 
   The White Paper even left the door open to 'broken-backed' warfare, saying 'there is 
the possibility that the nuclear battle might not prove immediately decisive'.
392
 When all 
of this is considered against Sandys' previous drafts, the finished product appears to be 
something of a compromise piece. However, it has to be kept in mind that this was, as 
its name suggested, still only an outline of future policy. Precisely how each branch of 
the Armed Forces would meet its new obligations was, at this point, still to be 
determined. In this sense Sandys had succeeded in his primary objectives. He had 
reconfigured Britain's strategic priorities in accordance with his 1953 recommendations, 
just as he had finally had it recognised at an official level that Britain could not defend 
itself effectively in a global war. He had not been able to explicitly base British striking 
power on unmanned weaponry in this April document, but he had at least introduced an 
awareness of its power into the defence debate, and there was still room for him to 
move policy towards embracing it as whole-heartedly as he had suggested during the 
Radical Review. 
 
   Whilst Sandys had seen his radicalism restrained by the friction of the policy-making 
process, the press reacted to the White Paper as a watershed moment in British defence 
policy. The conservative press was broadly supportive, with the Daily Express hailing 
an 'astonishing revolution in military planning - the sudden rise to supremacy of the 
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scientist over the Service chief', and the Daily Mail stating its belief that the White 
Paper 'will be numbered among the great State papers of our time'.
393
 Equally, the left-
wing press was disturbed by its conclusions, with the Daily Mirror demanding that the 
government 'realise that the people of this country will not be content to live forever in a 
twilight world, haunted by the shadow of the H-bomb', and calling for an international 
disarmament summit.
394
 More specific and balanced points were to be point in the 
Manchester Guardian, where its aviation correspondent, 'A Student of the Air', 
criticised the White Paper's emphasis on unmanned weaponry, reminding readers that 
'The Germans spent more than £100 million on developing the V2, and the modern 
ballistic missile is more complicated and therefore more expensive'.
395
 The Spectator 
played down the revolution talk, but praised Sandys by saying that 'unlike his 
predecessors, he recognises the obvious when he sees it', as well as making a direct 
reference to the Second World War:  
 
Since the war successive Ministers have been faced with the dilemma that 
the country's conventional armament has been largely useless... And the 
lesson of the guided missile was left out of account. The lesson should have 
been learned on the day the first V2 landed in England - that henceforth the 
fighter and the bomber were obsolescent. What Mr. Duncan Sandys has 
done is to see that these facts, for the first time, are collectively admitted. 
His White Paper is a model of good sense, as far as it goes. But it can 
reasonably be criticised on the grounds that it does not yet go far enough.
396
 
 
   Macmillan was happy that the White Paper had received 'on the whole, a very good 
press', and happier still that its stated reliance on nuclear weapons 'throws the Socialists 
into still greater confusion'.
397
 However, he also noted that the 'political side' of the 
opposition to the White Paper could pose a threat if the 'sentimental appeal' of more 
traditional policies could be 'cynically exploited'.
398
  The politics of the White Paper 
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were put to the test in the 16 April House of Commons defence debate. Sandys 
proposed that his 'broad reappraisal of future defence policy' be voted through, and 
saying that it was 'founded on the recognition of two basic facts': 
 
The first is that, in present circumstances, it is impossible effectively to 
defend this country against an attack with hydrogen bombs... The second 
basic fact on which this policy is based is the fact that, whether we like it or 
not, we cannot go on devoting such a large part of our resources - and, in 
particular, of manpower - to defence. Since it must now be accepted that 
adequate protection against all-out nuclear attack is impossible, we believe 
that the British people will agree that the available resources of the nation 
should be concentrated not upon preparations to wage war so much, as upon 
trying to prevent that catastrophe from ever happening.
399
 
 
   Although these were Sandys' own words, spoken in a highly-politicised context, they 
still point to his strategic policy preferences having carried significant weight in 
formulating a cost-effective defence policy for Britain. This stands in contrast to them 
being seen as a secondary concern utilised in order to patch together a seemingly viable 
policy from the wreckage of his blinkered pursuit of spending reductions. He went on to 
say that civil defence would 'remain an essential part of the defence plan', but qualified 
this by saying there could be 'no real safety in the world until there is disarmament', as 
he had used the idea of disarmament in the fifth proof to undercut any optimism 
surrounding a potential solution to the coming threat of unmanned weapons.
400
 This was 
coupled with an appeal to 'recognise the grim fact that the only means which the free 
world possesses to protect itself against Communist aggression and domination is the 
power to threaten retaliation with nuclear weapons', and the stated policy of the 
government for Britain to 'possess some element of nuclear deterrent power of her 
own'.
401
 
 
   When Sandys suggested that both sides of the House agreed on this point, he was 
interrupted, giving him a chance to highlight what the Conservatives considered to be 
division in opposition ranks over support for nuclear weapons. He brought up previous 
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occasions where the Labour Party had supported the possession of an independent 
nuclear capability, which then allowed him to elaborate on his own policy preferences 
and in doing so develop on what he had managed to publish in the White Paper. He 
pointed out that many considered the presence of American bomber aircraft in Britain to 
represent an adequate deterrent force, adding that so long as this was the case 'it might 
conceivably be thought safe - I am not saying that it would - to leave to the United 
States the sole responsibility for providing the nuclear deterrent': 
 
But, when they have developed the 5,000 mile inter-continental ballistic 
rocket, can we really be sure that every American Administration will go on 
looking at things in quite the same way? We think that it is just as well to 
make certain that an appreciable element of nuclear power shall in all 
circumstances remain on this side of the Atlantic, so that no one shall be 
tempted to think that a major attack could be made against Western Europe 
without the risk of nuclear retaliation.
402
 
 
   Following some further goading of Labour, using their public statements to suggest 
that they agreed with him even if they did not realise it (the relevant file in Sandys' 
archive suggests that a significant amount of the preparation for this speech concerned 
itself with past Labour Party policy statements), Sandys got on to the idea that the 
nuclear deterrent consisted 'not only the bomb, but also the means of delivering it', and 
that this required that the medium bomber fleet eventually be 'supplemented' by 
unmanned weapons.
403
 This echoed the White Paper, which had also used 
'supplemented' in the relevant passage, in comparison to earlier drafts which had 
predicted manned bomber aircraft being replaced by unmanned weapons. However, in 
the section of his speech which covered the future of the Air Force his words became 
much more definitive, saying that 'We are unquestionably moving towards a time when 
fighter aircraft will be increasingly replaced by guided missiles and V-bombers by 
ballistic rockets'. He said that this would not happen 'overnight', and that 'there will still 
remain a very wide variety of roles for which manned aircraft will continue to be 
needed', but these read like qualifying statements.
404
 Sandys clearly did believe that 
manned bomber aircraft would simply be replaced, rather than supplemented, by 
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unmanned weapons, and his previous reference to United States' policy coming to be 
determined by their possession of these weapons supported this.  
 
   The Labour Party had submitted an amendment expressing regret at what they saw as 
an 'undue dependence on the ultimate deterrent', and Sandys questioned the logic of this 
proposal.
405
 Accepting that this was a 'very understandable anxiety', he nevertheless 
ruled it out as arising 'from a tendency to generalise about the nature of war', which 
inadvertently brought his speech back to his strategic priorities: 
 
One must distinguish between major global war, involving a head-on clash 
between the great Powers, and minor conflicts which can be localised and 
which do not bring the great Powers into direct collision. Limited and 
localised acts of aggression, for example, by a satellite Communist State 
could, no doubt, be resisted with conventional arms, or, at worst, with 
tactical atomic weapons, the use of which could be confined to the battle 
area.
406
 
 
   'Quite impossible' was shouted out, before Sandys finished the point by comparing 
this with a full-scale Soviet offensive into Western Europe, which he said would almost 
certainly have escalated into nuclear war because it was 'inconceivable that either the 
Soviet Union or the free world would allow itself to be defeated, with all that that would 
mean, without throwing everything it had into the battle, including nuclear weapons'.
407
 
Richard Crossman, the Labour representative for Coventry East, using Germany as his 
example of a 'satellite Communist State', asked whether Sandys really believed that 
tactical nuclear weapons could be used in his described example without descending 
into all-out nuclear war.
408
 Macmillan wrote in his diary that this 'mix-up about strategic 
and tactical nuclear weapons' marred Sandys' otherwise 'admirable' performance in the 
defence debate, but the answer Sandys gave showed there was no muddled thinking on 
his part.
409
 He accepted that Germany was not a good example, since 'There are such 
enormous forces there and the great Powers are involved', but he did not rule it out 
completely: 
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I am saying that it is quite conceivable that, in certain circumstances, it 
might be possible to resist an act of aggression, for example, it might have 
been possible in Korea - I do not know, but it is a possibility - by the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons without necessarily bringing the whole world down 
in conflagration.
410
 
 
   When it was suggested from the opposition benches that 'we really cannot shoot these 
things around without having the whole of world opinion and world antagonism against 
us', Sandys said he was not hoping to shoot anything around, only 'trying to show that 
there are different degrees of war', and that the use of tactical nuclear weapons 'might 
not necessarily lead to the use of the wholesale weapons of mass destruction on great 
cities'.
411
 Whilst Macmillan might not have wished to see the debate become stuck on 
this point, this was consistent with Sandys' previous positions on nuclear weapons. How 
realistic it was that tactical nuclear weapons would not have led to the introduction of 
their strategic counterparts is impossible to say, but if Sandys held the belief that 
nuclear weapons were still a practical policy alternative, as he had when asked about the 
Korean War in December 1950, then this statement would be logically consistent with 
what he had previously said. If he did not believe that there was a clear distinction 
between nuclear and non-nuclear - 'conventional' - weapons, then he would have had no 
reason to suppose that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would have represented the 
crossing of a threshold, at which point the spiral into strategic nuclear war between East 
and West must inevitably follow.  
 
   Crossman asked whether Sandys had been moved to reduce British forces in Europe 
'on the assumption that a limited war can be fought with atomic tactical weapons'. 
Sandys jokingly replied 'All I would say is that we should certainly achieve something 
if we did that', before making sure to confirm that this was not the case.
412
 When asked 
to explain his previous remarks once more, Sandys said he would go over it again, and 
his reasoning is worth quoting at length: 
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First, I was talking about the various degrees of war. There is the all-out 
global war, the head-on clash and collision between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. I do not believe, and I do not think anybody else can 
seriously believe, that that could take place without the use of nuclear 
weapons. Then there is the possibility of acts of aggression - not where the 
two giants are both involved in a clash with one another - as, for example, in 
Korea. That was dealt with in Korea by conventional weapons. 
I cannot say that, if, in some years' time, a similar situation arises, atomic 
tactical weapons might not be used by one side or another. Obviously, the 
bigger the weapon one uses, the greater the risks one takes of bringing the 
world to the verge of catastrophe. All I am saying is that the possibility is 
not to be excluded that those weapons might be used without necessarily 
bringing down the whole cataclysm upon the world.
413
 
  Groom has interpreted Sandys' answers as the government declaring its belief that 
'nuclear weapons would not automatically be used in the defence of Europe and that 
their use would not necessarily escalate'.
414
 If Sandys' previous statements are taken into 
account, this was not what he meant. He was not seeking to normalise nuclear weapons 
in order to introduce an idea of graduated deterrence, the idea that tactical nuclear 
weapons could be openly exchanged by the Great Powers in military theatres without 
leading to the whole-scale massacre of opposing populations. Nor was he trying to 
suggest that the government might have second thoughts about using them against a 
Soviet invasion of Western Europe. These statements simply confirm that Sandys 
almost certainly had little or no regard for any distinction between nuclear and non-
nuclear weapons from the perspective of their being legitimate policy options, and that 
he therefore believed that Britain would have been wise to retain its capacity to develop 
and deploy tactical nuclear weapons. He clearly respected the power of nuclear 
weaponry, agreeing that 'the bigger the weapon' the more likely it was to provoke a 
reaction; but there is no sign of him treating their size as a special consideration, or of 
seeing nuclear weapons as a revered other level of defence. This in turn feeds into his 
preferred strategic priorities. If deterrent Soviet aggression was actually a matter of 
preparing to annihilate the Soviet Union, then there was no logical reason to believe that 
different weapons were only suitable for different phases on warfare.   
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   This point was returned to later in the debate when Richard Stokes, representing 
Ipswich for the opposition, interpreted Sandys' comments in the same way that Groom 
later would, saying that it was a 'complete error of judgment to think that we can get 
away with what is called the graduated deterrent', because it was 'ridiculous to suggest 
that a losing side... will not go on to something bigger'.
415
 Stokes had been a vocal critic 
of the strategic bombing campaign during the Second World War, but felt that in light 
of the punishments meted out to the defeated leaders after that war, escalation would 
certainly follow if another global war began to unfold and tactical nuclear weapons 
were introduced at an earlier stage. Sandys replied once again that he was not talking 
about graduated deterrence, but stating that 'in certain circumstances' tactical nuclear 
weapons could be used 'without necessarily bringing about a wholesale cataclysm'. 
Stokes, much like those who had written into the Streatham News in 1950 to deride 
Sandys as a warmonger, called this 'an abomination' and asked 'Does the right hon. 
Gentleman really suggest that we might have used one of these tactical nuclear weapons 
at Suez?'
416
 
 
Conclusion 
 
   It is difficult to see how Sandys did not bring definite strategic policy preferences to 
the policy-making process that created the 1957 White Paper. He was asked to reduce 
the burdens that conscription and confused procurement placed on the economy, and he 
clearly set about doing so. But Head had also been asked to do this, quitting when he 
did not think it was possible to reconcile these new realities with a coherent strategic 
concept. Sandys did think it was possible, and this was because he had worked out how 
it could be done in 1953. Whilst there has been comparatively little written about the 
Radical Review and Sandys' role in previous attempts to rein in defence spending, once 
we compare the proposals Sandys had put forward during the Radical Review and what 
he attempted to force into the White Paper, it becomes clear that Sandys possessed a 
discernible set of sincerely held policy preferences, even if Slessor's criticism that the 
White Paper failed to follow its own logic was valid in reference to its final form.  
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   To point to the White Paper policy-making process as evidence that Sandys was 
lacking in his appreciation of the need for an overall strategic concept also demonstrates 
a tendency to misunderstand the purpose of the White Paper. To this end its official 
name is suggestive, and Sandys said himself that its purpose was to provide a new basis 
for British strategy, rather than to serve as a comprehensive planning document. It is not 
for this thesis to say whether Sandys' ideas and a more thorough commitment to 'the 
short war assumption' would have proven more successful in their original form. Nor is 
it particularly important that Sandys was unable to have things all his own way. What 
matters is that the central strategic concepts upon which the White Paper was based, 
whether or not most people considered them 'tendencies which have long been obvious', 
had certainly long been obvious to Sandys. The downgrading in importance of those 
forces not regarded as central to deterring Soviet expansion; the frank acceptance that 
Britain could not defend itself against thermonuclear attack; the - admittedly diluted - 
expectations that unmanned weaponry would replace manned bombers and fighters. 
These were the 'obvious' trends which Sandys had first advocated at a time when they 
were deemed 'revolutionary' by the Ministry of Defence, and which he had maintained 
and developed in connection with the economic, political, and technological changes 
that had occurred in the intervening years. If Sandys is to be criticised in this regard 
then criticism should be based on his actions at the Ministry of Defence between the 
publication and defence of the White Paper and his departure in October 1959, when, as 
Macmillan wrote in his memoirs, 'The complexity and expense of modern weapons, 
together with the heavy risks involved with novel and untried devices, were to prove, 
during the years that followed, a perpetual source of difficulty and disappointment'.
417
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The Struggle over the Nuclear Delivery System - 1957-1960 
 
This thesis has so far established that Sandys' experiences of the Second World War had 
left an indelible impression on him in relation to the potential of unmanned weaponry. 
This informed his strategic concepts by causing him to see unmanned weaponry as 
something that could not be defended against. The next logical move on this trajectory 
was to ensure that the British arsenal had its own ballistic missile. By 1957 there was 
already an option on the table in this area, Blue Streak. Although the White Paper had 
made no firm commitment to Blue Streak, it is clear that Sandys intended for it to enter 
service. There were problems with this route, however, as rising costs placed increasing 
pressure on the missile's development after 1958. This financial pressure, together with 
the rapid progress made by the United States in sea-launched missiles, like Polaris, and 
air-to-surface weapons, such as Skybolt, forced the Service Ministers to begin 
considering alternatives, and support for Blue Streak gradually waned. Sandys remained 
largely unmoved by the growing opposition to Blue Streak, and eventually a point was 
reached where Sandys' apparent refusal to give proper consideration to the merits of 
Polaris, the submarine-launched ballistic missile system favoured by the Admiralty, 
caused a high-ranking admiral to complain that Sandys 'will do all in his power to 
prevent any alternative to BLUE STREAK from being even considered'.
418
 Because this 
- sometimes exaggerated - belief in the power of unmanned weaponry was the 
intellectual basis for his strategic concepts, the possession of a truly effective nuclear 
force based on unmanned weaponry became intrinsically linked to Sandys' attempts at 
re-organising British strategic priorities. Consequently, the looming failure of Britain's 
independent unmanned weapons programme played a large part in Sandys' removal 
from the Ministry of Defence after the 1959 election, as the hard reality of British fiscal 
weakness and technical backwardness made his strategic concept redundant. 
 
   The government announced the cancellation of Blue Streak (as a weapon system. It 
would carry on in an altered form in the civil programme as Black Knight) in April 
1960, six months after Sandys had left the Ministry of Defence. Following this decision, 
it was eventually decided to base Britain's nuclear deterrent on the American-made 
Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile. Skybolt promised both relative cheapness in 
terms of Britain's contribution and would extend the service life of the expensively-
assembled medium bomber force. An agreement was reached between Macmillan and 
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Eisenhower in which Britain would alter the V-bombers to carry the missiles, which 
they would receive without the American warheads that would have undermined their 
operational independence.
419
 In the event, the Skybolt project was cancelled in 
December 1962 after poor performance in testing throughout the year, combined with 
the rapid ascent of both Polaris and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in 
America. President John F. Kennedy had offered to share development costs with 
Britain, but Macmillan was wary of making such an open-ended commitment to a 
programme he thought it would be difficult for Britain to influence, and he declined. 
The cancellation caused a furore in Britain, and almost left Britain with no deterrent 
capability to succeed its manned bombers. Macmillan was able, however, to secure 
Polaris at a summit in the Bahamas with an emotional appeal to Kennedy that recalled 
everything Britain and the United States had endured together - what the Head of the 
Diplomatic Service later described as the Prime Minister's 'veteran of the Somme' act.
420
  
 
   In order to fully understand the positions Sandys took in defence of Blue Streak 
between 1957 and 1960, his attitudes towards alternative weapon systems have to be 
considered, as does the changing nature of the political and strategic context in which he 
operated. The two alternative weapon systems that occupied most of his time at the 
Ministry of Defence were Thor, an American-made intermediate-range ballistic missile, 
which was initially offered to Britain in July 1956 with certain conditions of access; and 
Polaris, which the Admiralty backed with an intensive lobbying campaign covertly 
supported by their counterparts in the United States Navy.
421
 Because Skybolt did not 
enter serious development until early 1959, it received comparatively little attention 
from the Ministry of Defence during Sandys' period as Minister. Consequently, whilst 
this section seeks to detail Sandys' interactions with those aspects of the policy-making 
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process that related directly to alternatives to Blue Streak as the basis for Britain's 
nuclear capability at both the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Aviation, it is 
forced to concentrate largely on Sandys' attempts to undermine Polaris and Thor as 
possible threats to the completion of the Blue Streak programme, leaving Skybolt and 
its relationship to Blue Streak for the next section. 
 
The Political and Strategic Context: Disarmament and Anglo-American Relations 
 
   Following the publication of the White Paper in April 1957, attention turned to the 
impending series of nuclear tests in the Central Pacific, which were expected to prove 
that Britain was capable of manufacturing thermonuclear weapons of its own. Eden had 
announced the tests the previous June, telling the House of Commons that Britain 
intended to 'carry out a limited number of nuclear test explosions in the megaton range... 
during the first half of 1957', leaving Macmillan with a difficult schedule.
422
 The first 
test (15 May) was supposed to demonstrate Britain's capacity to create a megaton 
device, making this a politically significant event as it was considered that any 
worthwhile thermonuclear device ought to provide that sort of yield.
423
 Unfortunately 
for the government, the design fell short of its intended yield, and Macmillan could only 
claim that 'this explosion makes a notable advance in the development of our deterrent 
power' whilst being forced to remain cagey regarding 'any detailed information about 
the precise yield, type and design of the weapon exploded' on spurious national security 
grounds.
424
 The political value of a functioning megaton device was made clear the 
following day when Macmillan told a meeting of Conservative women that after the 
tests 'we shall be in the same position as the United States or Soviet Russia', and used 
these developments to defend the White Paper. Having had his usual fun at the expense 
of the Labour Party, Macmillan told his audience that he would 'never agree' to nuclear 
disarmament without a similar reduction in non-nuclear weapons, since such a move 
would not end the prospect of any new global war as disarmament advocates claimed, 
but 'merely make it virtually certain that if it came we should lose it'.
425
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   The government remained tight-lipped after the next test (31 May), but it was clear 
from the headline in The Times that 'Britain's second hydrogen bomb' was bigger than 
the first.
426
 This device was sufficiently close to its megaton target for the government 
to feel validated. In reality, this was a very large, and very expensive, non-
thermonuclear device that was unsuitable for use as a weapon; a fact which remained 
secret until the end of the Cold War.
427
 Still, valuable lessons had been learned from the 
tests, and the principles of the White Paper remained within Britain's projected 
capabilities. These were re-affirmed at a 31 July Defence Committee meeting where 
Macmillan appeared to have moved away from his previously ambiguous attitudes 
towards real independence, and now laid down priorities that had more in common with 
Sandys' early drafts of the White Paper than the finished article. Here Macmillan stated 
that 'our objective should be to remain a nuclear Power and that for this purpose we 
should have within our control sufficient nuclear weapons and their means of delivery 
to constitute an independent deterrent'.
428
 
 
   It cannot be said with any certainty what prompted this small but significant shift from 
Macmillan, but he was most likely sparked into action by the proposals put forward in 
June by Harold Stassen, Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Disarmament. These 
proposals, which Macmillan doubted had even been approved by the State Department, 
called for an eventual end to nuclear testing, and also for an end to the production of 
fissile material for military purposes.
429
 The inability to test new weapons would have 
been bad enough, but banning the production of fissile material could have fatally 
undermined Britain's nuclear ambitions, and Macmillan reacted by wondering 'Is this 
America's reply to our becoming a nuclear power - to sell us down the river before we 
have a stockpile sufficient for our needs?'
430
 The Foreign Secretary said that Britain 
would be 'seriously handicapped' by the proposals unless American 'know-how' could 
make up for what Britain would lose, adding that an early moratorium on the production 
of fissile material 'would completely disrupt our nuclear defence programme, largely 
deprive us of the deterrent and upset the whole basis on which our present defence 
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planning is based'. Yet, in spite of these realisations, Lloyd was more concerned about 
Britain appearing to sink this latest round of disarmament talks single-handedly, and 
therefore advocated full co-operation with the United States so as not to jeopardise the 
prospect of them providing the knowledge and fissile material that these proposals 
would have denied the British programme.
431
 To this end he told the Cabinet that the 
Stassen Proposals were 'broadly acceptable'. This, however, put him at odds with 
Sandys.
432
 
 
   For Sandys, only 'comprehensive disarmament' was in Britain's interests. His 
conceptual framework led him to conclude that, as 'the security of the Western world 
rests almost wholly upon the nuclear deterrent' then to weaken this shield was folly. 
With the West robbed of this technological advantage, he said the Soviet Union's 
superiority in manpower and non-nuclear weapons gave it the clear advantage in its 
supposed aim of conquering Western Europe and beyond. Sandys did, however, expect 
that both the United States and the Soviet Union would be aware of this, and thought 
that any agreement that went beyond the cessation of testing and an end to the further 
production of fissile material for military purposes was unlikely. Their nuclear 
stockpiles would not, he thought, be reduced. This outcome represented the worst-case 
scenario for Sandys, which he thought 'would virtually knock Britain out as a nuclear 
power'. Despite this, Sandys was conscious that it would prove 'extremely awkward' if 
Britain was perceived to have been responsible for 'wrecking the first hopeful step 
towards world disarmament', so he suggested that Britain support the proposals on the 
following conditions: 
 
1) That steps towards conventional disarmament be 'firmly laid down' in any 
agreement, and that the timing of these steps be linked to the reduction in nuclear 
armaments. 
2) That this should be 'taken far enough' as to ensure that in the post-nuclear 
environment the Soviet Union 'would not be left in a position to dominate Europe 
with conventional arms'. 
3) That this be 'effectively inspected and controlled'. 
4) That if this could not be achieved 'within a short space of years', the United 
States agreed to provide Britain with enough information 'to perfect our own 
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nuclear weapons', and the fissile material needed for a stockpile of nuclear 
weapons 'primarily for defensive purposes'.
433
 
 
   It is worth mentioning Sandys' attitude towards disarmament before moving on to his 
approach to the nuclear delivery system because, as well as being the catalyst for 
hardening Macmillan's earlier ambiguity in relation to British-built weapons, it 
ultimately confirms Sandys' views regarding the distinction between nuclear and non-
nuclear weapons, which lead into his views on nuclear independence. In hindsight, it 
might initially appear as though Sandys had submitted deliberately unrealistic 
recommendations, since it is difficult for the modern reader to imagine that the Soviet 
Union would have allowed its non-nuclear military strength to be 'effectively inspected 
and controlled' by being placed under some arbitrary ceiling determined in accordance 
with what foreign bodies thought was enough to take over Western Europe. However, it 
is worth remembering that Sandys had spearheaded the post-war drive towards a United 
Europe, and that he would later involve himself with the World Security Trust, a 
movement dedicated to establishing World Government.
434
 This was no trivial interest. 
Sandys visited many countries on behalf of the World Security Trust, meeting many 
senior political figures.
435
 It is also worth remembering that this sort of inspection 
regime was ultimately established in the 1990s as the Soviet Union unravelled, under 
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) inspection system, albeit at a time when there 
was no central authority with the will or ability to challenge American nuclear 
dominance.  
 
   Sandys was not somebody who considered national sovereignty to be sacrosanct, or 
that notions to that effect would prove insurmountable.
436
 For Sandys, nuclear 
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disarmament would have simply weakened Britain to an unacceptable degree. This view 
grew from his belief that nuclear weapons were not a separate 'evil' to be dismantled on 
their own, but simply another weapon, the utility of which had important implications 
for his definition of an independent nuclear capability. This is why he told the Cabinet 
that any ban on the manufacture of fissile material 'would undermine our defence 
policy', one of the main objectives of which 'was to maintain our political 
independence'. This he said 'would be frustrated  if we were prevented from producing 
our own nuclear weapons and the United States and Soviet Governments refused to 
destroy the stocks of nuclear weapons which they would have accumulated by 1960'.
437
 
 
   Sandys addressed criticisms that his plans for comprehensive disarmament were 'too 
idealistic and overlooked the practical difficulties involved' in a May 1958 Cabinet 
meeting. There he described the idea as 'militarily sound' and an 'attainable ideal'.
438
 
Further to this, he told the 1958 Conservative Party conference that only 'complete 
disarmament, supervised and controlled by a World Authority, backed by [a] World 
Police Force' would suffice.
439
 Five months later, he responded to charges that 'this is a 
bit airey fairy' in a television interview by saying that in the long-term, 'nothing less 
than this would be any good'. His reasoning was that because nuclear weapons kept the 
peace, their abolition 'will greatly increase the likelihood of conventional wars'. His fear 
was that in the end this would lead to a nuclear war since, as soon as the Third World 
War broke out along non-nuclear lines, 'both sides will start a mad race to produce 
nuclear weapons', which he thought would only take between six and twelve months.
440
 
For Sandys, the consequence of nuclear disarmament would ultimately be uncontrolled 
nuclear war; the very thing disarmament intended to prevent. This apparent fatalism 
creates something of a paradox when placed alongside his 'airey fairy' notions of world 
government, but it is one which emerges from two sincerely held positions. Firstly, he 
believed there was an inevitable shift towards government by supranational 
organisations taking place. Secondly, Sandys' belief in the utility of nuclear weapons 
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fed the assumption that they would inevitably be called upon as they had been in the 
closing moments of the Second World War. In this sense, Sandys' all-or-nothing 
approach to disarmament is perfectly consistent with his well-established belief system 
and his strategic outlook. 
    
   The threat of disarmament remained, but things improved for Britain in late-1957 
when the United States was forced to reconsider its unwillingness to allow other nations 
access to its nuclear knowledge in light of developments in the Soviet Union. In August 
the Soviets successfully tested the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile, the 
massive R-7. Sandys views appeared to have been vindicated with the appearance of the 
next stage of unmanned weaponry that he had previously spoken about. Over a hundred 
feet tall, and with four times the thrust that Sandys had predicted back in 1953, the 
descendents of the R-7 entered service in 1959 with the ability to carry megaton 
warheads to almost anywhere in the world.
441
 The fact that it had none of the 
'birthmarks' of German technology also meant that the Soviet Union possessed an 
independent, world-leading missile programme. The missile’s design strength was 
underlined two months later when a modified version of the R-7 launched Sputnik 1, the 
first artificial Earth satellite, beginning the Space Race.
442
    
 
   Lloyd informed the Cabinet that since the Soviet Union was 'seeking to focus world 
opinion on the military implications of the earth satellite which they had recently 
launched', it was 'undesirable that we should appear to be unduly concerned about these 
implications', and he therefore suggested congratulating them on such a 'notable 
scientific contribution to the International Geophysical Year'.
443
 Behind this official 
policy of faux disinterest, Macmillan quickly used Sputnik to his advantage, writing to 
Eisenhower asking 'what are we going to do about these Russians?' He said Sputnik had 
'brought it home to us what a formidable people they are, and what a menace they 
present to the free world', before predicting that it might be 'two or three generations' 
before communism collapsed and allowed the Soviet people to 'revert gradually to 
ordinary human behaviour'. The point of this letter was eventually reached when he 
asked: 
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Has not the time come when we could go further towards pooling our efforts 
and decide how best to use them for the common good. I believe that if your 
country and ours could join together to guide and direct the efforts of the 
Free World we can build up something that may not defeat the Russians but 
will wear them out and force them to defeat themselves.
444
 
 
   Macmillan wanted to see the McMahon Act repealed, and when Eisenhower agreed 
that the Cold War required Anglo-American leadership 'bound together by common 
convictions, purposes and principles', this would have seemed promising.
445
 Macmillan 
was invited over to Washington, and before he left he informed the Cabinet that Sputnik 
had forced the Americans to re-think 'the whole structure of Western collaboration'. It 
had, Macmillan felt, left them 'anxious, in particular, to review the pattern of their 
relations with the United Kingdom and to develop a closer relationship with this 
country'. In addition to working towards the repeal of the McMahon Act, Macmillan 
said he would push for 'joint Anglo-American machinery' regarding 'political, military 
and economic issues', and before he left London he was given a list of requests to put 
before Eisenhower.
446
 His list included access to fissile material (or help to make better 
use of British supplies), and information on designing ballistic missiles. This was 
followed by a recommendation that he should accept Thor missile sites in Britain, and 
the further suggestion that should he be able to secure Thor with 'the "strings" off', it 
could prove viable to re-cast Blue Streak as a joint programme with the United States 
aimed at developing an even better weapon.
447
  
 
   When he arrived in Washington on 23 October, Macmillan told Dulles that if the West 
held firm 'it was possible that extreme Marxist doctrines would eventually cease to 
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dominate the minds of the Russian people and that their threat to the free world would 
fade', albeit whilst making it clear that such a strategy of attrition depended upon Anglo-
American understanding. Dulles agreed, speculating that even this preliminary meeting 
'might well have a decisive influence on the course of history'. Dulles' well-developed 
sense of history led him to conclude that Britain and the United States were both nations 
whose pasts 'had been dominated by a sense of mission and of destiny', and that only 
they could 'shake the Western world out of its mood of apathy'. It was then that 
Macmillan said the following: 
 
[W]e should begin by establishing the principle that, since the purposes of 
the United Kingdom and the United States were the same, the independence 
of the two countries should become interdependence. We should work out 
how our separate resources - in political, economic, military and propaganda 
fields - could be pooled for the furtherance of our common purpose.
448
 
 
   Macmillan referred to this in his diary as 'quite a romantic picture of what [the] US 
and UK could do together', noting that the launching of Sputnik had seriously affected 
the American people, adding weight to his vision.
449
 That evening he used an informal 
reception at the White House to get at Eisenhower, before retiring to the British 
Embassy 'a little depressed'.
450
 His mood was lifted the following day when Eisenhower 
said he wanted greater co-operation between their two countries, making the exclusivity 
of this offer clear by adding that he wanted it to come with a degree of secrecy lest Paris 
or Berlin expect equal treatment. Macmillan hailed the 'exceptionally close personal 
links' between Eisenhower and himself as proving influential, stressing the seriousness 
of this new alignment by recalling how they were 'founded in their co-operation in a 
previous time of crisis'.
451
 British and American civil servants were then asked to 
prepare specific proposals for increased co-operation, and Eisenhower then referred to 
the provisions of the McMahon Act as a 'great mistake', promising to go 'as far as he 
could' in overturning this 'blanket of atomic secrecy'. This was what Macmillan had 
wanted to hear, but when Eisenhower suggested that the best solution might have been 
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'Some NATO concept of a stockpile or of special forces under SACEUR (Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe )', Macmillan made sure proposals relating to control of 
nuclear weapons and 'problems of pooling nuclear potential' were given special 
consideration.
452
 The civil servants concluded that although 'blocks' remained on further 
co-operation, if these could be rescinded then Britain could save significant amounts of 
money by using American fissile material. Furthermore, exchanging information and 
rationalising defence projects would save both countries money, possibly leading to 
effective defensive solutions to both unmanned weaponry and submarines (it was 
suggested that these projects could be supported through the use of shared testing 
facilities). Consideration was also given to the supply of  'complete weapons systems 
for the United Kingdom with custody retention in United States hands as necessary and 
with assurance of use only as jointly determined by the two countries'; but as the report 
noted, everything still had to be 'fully blueprinted'.
453
 Macmillan was nevertheless able 
to write in his diary that 'The job is done - and I must frankly say better done that I 
expected'.
454
 
 
   From here Britain enjoyed a run of success. The Declaration of Common Purpose was 
published on 25 October, laying down 'understandings' agreed by 'trusted friends of 
many years'. Interdependence was now said to be a basic fact, with 'the concept of 
national self-sufficiency' deemed 'out of date'. Moves towards the principle of collective 
security were recommended, as was the amendment of the McMahon Act to make 'close 
and fruitful collaboration of scientists and engineers' possible. Disarmament was raised, 
but in the event of its failure the two nations considered their nuclear arsenals to be held 
in 'trust for the defense of the free world' until a 'just and lasting' peace could be 
achieved through the collapse of 'Communist despotism'.
455
 Macmillan defended this on 
5 November, using the Debate on the Address to tell the House of Commons that: 
 
Since the war we in this country, as well as most of our friends and allies, 
have recognised that in modern conditions we are, to a large extent, 
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dependent on the United States and our other allies for our defence - that is, 
our defence in global war against Communism, our resistance to 
Communism. However - let us be frank about it - there has been some doubt 
about the position of the United States.
456
 
 
   These doubts related to whether the United States would 'relapse into isolationism or 
decide to go it alone' once the Soviet Union presented a credible direct threat to its 
mainland, and Macmillan claimed interdependence brought an end to these doubts.
457
 
He even began to talk about the agreement as a 'first beginning' for 'the effective union 
of the free world', into which nations would pour 'an even more significant contribution 
of their national sovereignty to the common cause than hitherto'.
458
 This heady rhetoric 
was toned down the following week when Macmillan said that 'Any agreement or treaty 
in a sense impinges on national sovereignty', and moved to stress that interdependence 
was a matter 'not of fundamental change, but of degree', modestly comparing it to the 
foundation of NATO.
459
 Macmillan may have simply got ahead of himself in the first 
debate, or the moderation of his enthusiasm in the interim may have owed something to 
the explosion of Britain's first true megaton weapon on 8 November. Either way, this 
apparent conflict between interdependence and independence became a major issue in 
defence policy-making during the remainder of Sandys' period of involvement. Whilst 
he was quick to embrace its practicalities, Sandys remained consistent with his well-
established policy preferences, demonstrating that possession of a credible delivery 
system took precedence over targeting arrangements in his definition of what it meant to 
possess an independent nuclear capability. 
 
Thor and the Independent Nuclear Capability 
 
   In early 1956 the United States began to develop an intermediate-range ballistic 
missile that was capable of hitting targets within the Soviet Union from European bases. 
This was Thor, and for all the testing problems it experienced throughout 1957, it was 
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expected to be a useable weapon by the time Sandys had implemented his new strategic 
concept. Indeed, it was the prospect of acquiring these weapons that had allowed 
Macmillan to remain ambiguous about the need 'to produce ourselves a medium-range 
ballistic rocket' in the February Defence Committee meeting where Sandys' strategic 
concept had been approved. This was a concern for Sandys, but, whatever the plans for 
Blue Streak in 1957, it was certainly not going to be operational in the near future, 
which meant that a temporary stop-gap had to be considered. Sandys was happy with 
such an arrangement. If unmanned weaponry was to replace manned bomber aircraft, it 
made sense to supplement the V-bomber force with American-made ballistic missiles 
until - and only until - the British-built weapon could be introduced to replace them all. 
 
   Macmillan had reached an agreement regarding Thor with Eisenhower at the Bermuda 
Conference (21-23 March 1957). He had invested a lot into these discussions, knowing 
that he had to repair Anglo-American relations after the Suez disaster, but also because 
he believed that if he could not make Eisenhower 'come round', then 'Europe is 
finished'.
460
 Macmillan put great faith in the value of summit diplomacy as a result of 
his experiences in the Second World War, and he knew Eisenhower well, having 
worked closely with him in the Mediterranean, considering him to be a personal 
friend.
461
 Bermuda was a genuine success for Macmillan. He was able to make it clear 
just how Britain had felt let down by the United States over Suez, whilst at the same 
time making his commitment to fighting the Cold War clear by describing communism 
as 'evil' during a well-received speech made to open the conference.
462
 Because of his 
success, he was able to tell Butler, left to run the government back in London, that he 
detected in Eisenhower a 'genuine desire to forget our differences and to restore our old 
relationship and cooperation in full measure'.
463
 The immediate practical result of this 
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was that a number of agreements were reached regarding defence collaboration 
including a tentative arrangement to co-ordinate strike plans between the respective 
bomber forces of the two nations; an agreement to increase intelligence co-operation; 
and an informal decision that Britain would take a more direct role in gathering 
intelligence by hosting U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. More importantly, the proposals 
mooted during Sandys' 1954 mission as the Minister of Supply were confirmed when 
Eisenhower agreed to store American nuclear warheads in RAF bases in case of 
emergency, and also to modify British Canberra bombers to enable their use. Macmillan 
wished to draw attention to this particular agreement as definitive proof that he had 
successfully restored Anglo-American relations, but Eisenhower urged secrecy so as not 
to encourage other allies to expect similar assistance.
464
 
 
   One important agreement that Macmillan was able to broadcast was the agreement in 
principle for Thor to be based in Britain, justifying it in the House of Commons by 
saying that Thor would be available 'some years before those [missiles] which we have 
been developing for ourselves'.
465
 Pre-empting concerns about the precise amount of 
control Britain had over Thor, Macmillan defended the agreement by comparing the 
missiles to the aircraft of Strategic Air Command based in Britain, which were 'under 
the sole control of the Government of the United States'.
466
 The fact that this agreement 
had been made under a Labour government meant that Macmillan was able to compare 
his new agreement favourably. Furthermore, it added weight to the project to develop 
British warheads. This was because, whilst the missiles themselves were to be fully 
owned, manned, and serviced by the British, they still carried warheads subject to 
United States control under the stipulations of the McMahon Act, placing the system 
under dual control. Macmillan was therefore able to state that an element of foreign 
control over Thor would last 'So long as we rely upon the American warheads, and only 
so long'.
467
 Despite the assurances of the Prime Minister, the details of this agreement 
sparked some controversy, with questions being asked about why 'we are entrusted by 
an ally with a weapon, but are not to be trusted with the ammunition'.
468
 Macmillan was 
content that his speech had seen 'the Tories (temporarily) united and the Socialists split 
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in two', and the White Paper was able to formalise the Government's intention to secure 
these American-made missiles.
469
 
 
   This short-term political victory may have pleased Macmillan, but similar concerns 
had already been raised by the Air Ministry. Taking their lead from Sandys' original 22 
February briefing that bomber aircraft would be replaced 'in due course' by ballistic 
missiles, it was pointed out that Blue Streak being abandoned or merely over-running its 
tight development schedule would leave Britain to either base its nuclear deterrent 
capability on 'obsolete' weapons, or become completely dependent on 'such weapons as 
the U.S.A. chooses to supply'.
470
 Consequently, since it was assumed that these weapons 
would come with similar political restrictions to Thor, whilst the Air Ministry was still 
supportive of the government's intentions, they made it clear that they could not support 
obtaining Thor 'at any price', advising the government to extract the most favourable 
terms on something that was 'useless' without European launching sites.
471
 Thor was put 
to one side for the remainder of 1957 as Sandys sought to implement his strategic 
concept, but in early 1958 formal agreements were drafted in the lead up to the 
publication of the latest White Paper. Now the Chiefs of Staff waded in, voicing their 
concerns that SACEUR might gain control over Thor and attempt to use it in support of 
any tactical operations.
472
 Boyle in particular had developed serious doubts about Thor, 
and warnings reached the government at the end of January that Thor was not only 
unsatisfactory in terms of what Britain required, but subject to a control arrangement 
'which in our view is designed to serve American ends more than British'.
473
 
 
   It was this control arrangement which has seen Thor become intertwined with Sandys' 
take on interdependence, and which has allowed historians to argue that he prioritised 
securing Anglo-American friendship over his long-stated belief that Britain should 
possess an independent nuclear capability, with Navias referring to the 'paradoxical 
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objectives of an emphasis on maintaining an "independent" nuclear force and the 
recognition that the major thrust of policy must be directed towards a deterrent posture 
in conjunction with the United States'.
474
 This has been given particular attention in 
relation to Sandys' brief period of enthusiasm for Thor over the summer of 1958, when 
he flirted with the idea of an independent version (without political conditions and 
topped with a British-built warhead) as an alternative to Blue Streak. Baylis describes 
this as characteristic of the 'dilemma over interdependence and independence' while 
Clark sees the period as being marked by Sandys' 'wavering' in relation to his otherwise 
consistent championing of Blue Streak.
475
 Navias goes further, using this moment as 
proof that 'total independence... was never his (Sandys') primary concern'.
476
 It is worth 
ascertaining precisely what is meant by independence here, and Navias offers two main 
alternatives and a 'third approach': 
 
(1) 'unilateral independence' whereby Britain would seek to deter the Soviet 
Union independently of the United States through the maintenance of a 
capability to deliver unacceptable damage to the USSR in the form of 
nuclear strikes against her cities; and (2) 'independence in concert', whereby 
Britain would maintain the capability pre-emptively (or possible even under 
attack) to destroy her own Soviet targets which were regarded as 
specifically threatening to the UK in the context of a joint allied attack.
477
 
 
   The 'third approach' was one where Britain maintained its nuclear capability 'to 
influence the United States and reinforce the United Kingdom's world power status' 
whilst planning on the basis of 'trust in the capabilities of SAC (Strategic Air 
Command) for dealing in the future with an ever-expanding Soviet target set'. This 
approach, he claims, was favoured by the various Ministers of Defence due to its 
'greater tolerance for economies and cuts'.
478
 This approach is not, however, satisfactory 
because even when discounting the fact that Blue Streak, by being heavily-dependent on 
American technology, would have fallen short of allowing Britain to pursue a policy of 
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'unilateral independence' under its strictest definition, attempts to reconcile Sandys with 
these rigid definitions in order to prove he was never committed to 'total independence' 
are problematic. Instead, we need to understand this period in the context of the 
arguments made in this thesis, that Sandys' actions make sense when they are seen in 
the light of his long-standing and complex world-view. 
 
Sandys and Nuclear Independence 
 
   In June 1953 Sandys had written that Britain's status as a leading nation depended 
'upon our ability to make a military contribution of sufficient importance to assure us a 
say, second only to America's... in the shaping of Allied strategy'. He knew that the 
United States would 'undertake a large proportion of the atomic offensive against 
Russia', but remained determined that Britain play 'some appreciable part' in their 
bombing strategy. He also argued that Britain had to remain capable of 'undertaking 
special missions, such as the precision bombing of vital installations', in particular 'the 
airfields from which the Soviet air attack on Britain is being launched'. His 
understanding of the future, derived from his interpretation of the past, led Sandys to 
conclude that such an air attack would be decisive. Consequently, it would be 
'unthinkable' to leave the task to any other nation, even the United States.
479
 Sandys 
was, therefore, arguing for interdependence as a means of ensuring overall British 
defence and the capacity for the British to focus on what he perceived to be critical 
missions. In his follow-up November memorandum this reliance on the United States 
was further emphasised: 
 
[A]n independent defence system is a luxury we can no longer afford. Our 
existence as a free nation is already entirely dependent upon the deterrent 
effect of America's strategic air force and her stockpile of atomic bombs, 
and it is only in alliance with America that we could hope to survive an 
attack by Russia.
480
 
 
   This early thrust towards a policy of interdependence was reinforced four years later 
by the White Paper's claim that the defence of Britain was only possible 'as part of the 
collective defence of the free world'. The White Paper said that Britain had to possess 
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'an appreciable element of nuclear deterrent power of her own', but admitted that 'The 
free world is to-day mainly dependent for its protection upon the nuclear capacity of the 
United States'.
481
 This would all represent an unequivocal endorsement on Sandys' part 
of Navias' definition of 'independence in concert'. On the other hand, Sandys had also 
asked rhetorically during the debate on the White Paper whether the United States 
would remain a reliable ally once the Soviet Union had acquired the ability to strike 
directly at their cities. In doing so he also appeared to define 'an appreciable element of 
nuclear power' as something capable of deterring the Soviet Union on its own.
482
 This 
was more in fitting with 'unilateral independence'. To further cloud the issue, Sandys' 
statements on 'the shaping of Allied strategy' and on American co-operation could be 
interpreted as Navias' 'third approach'; but at the same time his desire for Britain to 
possess a genuine nuclear threat, rather than to maintain a status symbol or a bargaining 
tool, would move him away from what reads like a primarily political definition. 
 
   Despite the Air Ministry's concerns, Sandys supported Thor, and in February he 
submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet detailing the precise logistical points. These 
were that the United States would provide the missiles and train British airmen to use 
them, and that Britain would pay for their facilities and maintenance. The weapons 
would remain under joint control, as the McMahon Act insisted that the warheads 
remained 'in American custody'. This might well have represented a 'valuable addition' 
to the Western deterrent, but Sandys added a note of caution, reminding the Cabinet that 
Thor 'cannot, of course, be considered as an element of independent British nuclear 
power'.
483
 In light of what Macmillan had said the previous July about how an 
'independent deterrent' was vital for a nation seeking to remain a nuclear power, this 
was an important point, and questions were raised in Cabinet about the precise nature of 
control. Drafts of the agreement were felt by some to imply that the Americans could 
launch them without deferring to Britain if a NATO member was attacked, as loose 
wording could be interpreted as having placed the missiles under the command of 
SACEUR.
484
 Sandys recognised these issues, and when he was questioned in the House 
of Commons as to whether constructing British warheads for Thor would make them 
completely independent, as Macmillan had intimated the previous April, he confirmed 
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the temporary nature of Thor when he replied with a definite reference to Blue Streak, 
claiming that the government had no plans to do this because 'We are concentrating our 
efforts on developing an all-British rocket of a more advanced type'.
485
 
    
   The United States had originally hoped to begin the deployment of Thor in July, but 
failures in testing slowed progress. Boyle used his information on these problems to 
predict that it was 'completely unrealistic' to expect Thor to be in any 'acceptable 
operational state' by December, despite what the government may have been 
promised.
486
 This brought British nuclear policy back into discussion, and in a series of 
Defence Committee meetings during the summer of 1958 there was general agreement 
that the purposes of the British nuclear capability was to retain influence on the United 
States and in world affairs, but also to 'make a definite, though limited, contribution to 
the total nuclear strength of the West'. The need for this 'definite' contribution was to 
ensure that if 'the development of inter-continental ballistic missiles' (it is worth noting 
the focus on missiles rather than bombers) forced the United States to withdraw from 
Europe, then Britain would still have had enough retaliatory power to deter the Soviet 
Union from overrunning Western Europe and to 'present the United States with a fait 
accompli before any effective retaliatory action could be taken'. In addition to this, an 
independent nuclear capability would have allowed for attacks on those targets 'of 
immediate importance to us'. It was by now accepted that only a 'stock of ballistic 
missiles' would provide Britain with an effective nuclear capability beyond the lifespan 
of the V-bombers, but it was suggested that if complete weapon systems could be 
purchased 'without any restriction on their use', then the development of a British-built 
weapon could be accorded lower priority.
487
 
 
   When Sandys had his say the following week, he seemed to be more convinced by 
Thor than he had been previously. Having entered a period of doubt regarding the Blue 
Streak programme in its existing form, he had come to see Thor as a possible stop-gap 
provided British warheads could guarantee its independence. If the missiles could be 
procured 'without restrictions on their use', Sandys believed that this would solve 'our 
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interim requirements' and allow Britain to reduce expenditure on Blue Streak.
488
 It is 
this moment which has been used to question Sandys' commitment to an independent 
nuclear capability. It is true that Sandys had always supported Blue Streak; but only 
because it promised to be the most suitable weapon in terms of its operational and 
technical independence, as well as in its ability to strike at the Soviet Union. This would 
be supported by his subsequent point in the aforementioned Defence Committee 
meeting that if Blue Streak was to be sidelined, Britain 'should seek to collaborate with 
the United States in a joint project for a more advanced type of ballistic missile' capable 
of succeeding both Thor and the V-bombers.
489
 This is why, when he suggested in a 
September memorandum that Blue Streak could be cancelled and that Britain should 
utilise an independent variation of Thor, he made it clear to the Defence Committee that 
this was in order for a 'better weapon' than Blue Streak to be developed, with the idea 
being that increased co-operation with Europe and new information from America 
would make this possible.
490
 It is also why, in a round of Washington discussions with 
the United States Secretary of Defense in late September, he explicitly referred to an 
independent version of Thor as an 'interim measure' between the V-bombers becoming 
ineffective and a 'more advanced' successor to Blue Streak being developed.
491
 In a later 
meeting he added to this by saying: 
 
Britain regarded them (Thor) as being an extension of the independent 
British medium bomber force, which, together with American Strategic Air 
Command, had the task of strategic bombing of targets deep inside Russia... 
Any missiles so acquired must be 'without strings,' so that they could be 
used independently by Britain, if she so wished, in the same way as the 
medium bomber force.
492
 
 
   For these reasons, Sandys made it clear that 'the British Government could not agree 
that any element of the independent British deterrent should be subordinated to 
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SACEUR'.
493
 When it became clear by November that technical advances 'could readily 
be incorporated' into the existing Blue Streak programme, and that European 
enthusiasm for a joint missile project was expected to be limited, Sandys reverted to his 
belief that 'if we wish to maintain an independent British contribution to the nuclear 
deterrent... we must proceed with the development of Blue Streak'.
494
 There was clearly 
wavering in relation to the effectiveness of Blue Streak, but Sandys' belief that only 
unmanned weaponry could provide a sustainable means of delivering nuclear warheads 
remained absolutely consistent, and central to his concept of nuclear independence. This 
is supported by the 5 November Defence Committee meeting in which he said that 'he 
could envisage circumstances in which the threat that we would use our nuclear 
deterrent independently of the United States would be the only method of preserving 
peace'. In the context of a discussion where the Chancellor had suggested abandoning 
Blue Streak 'even if this meant that at some time in the 1960's [sic] we should cease to 
have an independent deterrent', this is an unequivocal defence of maintaining the 
capability to pursue a policy of 'unilateral independence' albeit whilst expecting such an 
eventuality to remain unlikely.
495
 
 
   Sandys' return to Blue Streak was completed when another November memorandum 
thoroughly demolished his earlier advocacy of using an independent variant of Thor as 
even a temporary replacement. Thor, he said, would be 'unusable after about 1968', 
offering only 'marginal' benefits in light of plans to extend the lives of the V-bomber 
force by equipping them with air-to-surface missiles. Sandys also wrote that Thor had 
'no reserve of power or carrying capacity to embody technical improvements, such as 
devices to counter anti-missile defences', and would prove 'very vulnerable to rocket 
attack' owing to its deployment above ground, which meant it compared unfavourably 
with Blue Streak which was expected to be based in hardened underground silos. The 
most important consideration, however, was that using Thor to justify pausing Blue 
Streak whilst research was made into a superior weapon would end any hopes of 
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'completing the deployment of a British made rocket before the mid-1970’s, i.e. several 
years after the V-Bomber force had ceased to be effective'.
496
 
 
   In spite of its downsides, Thor represented a worthwhile investment for Britain in 
Sandys' eyes. He held no illusions about its drawbacks, but its positives outweighed its 
negatives from his perspective. The United States might have maintained unfortunate 
amounts of control over it, but this was balanced by the fact that it initially promised to 
be a more successful delivery system than the V-bomber force which, whilst under 
independent British control, was less likely to penetrate Soviet air defences. Sandys 
accepted this lack of genuine independence in Thor, but it cannot be used as evidence of 
him having had no real commitment to independence. He saw Thor as a temporary 
solution only, heavily-dependent on the condition that its adoption did not allow the 
government to abandon the British-built ballistic missile that could guarantee genuine 
long-term independence. In this sense any ambiguity over definitions of independence 
on Sandys' part were in relation to having to accept this short-term political compromise 
that conflicted with certain aspects of his established policy preferences. 
 
   Where Navias uses the uncertainty that momentarily came to surround Blue Streak as 
evidence of Sandys having had no interest in an independent nuclear capability, his 
analysis is restricted by overly-rigid definitions of independence presenting a false 
dichotomy. He also appears to view Blue Streak with the benefits of hindsight. We now 
know that Blue Streak represented Britain's last shot at developing for itself an 
independent nuclear capability, but Sandys was clearly looking beyond Blue Streak at 
this point, explicitly connecting his willingness to sideline the project with the promise 
that Britain's long-term nuclear independence be secured by a superior weapon. Baylis 
has written that whilst interdependence with the United States was the Government's 
preferred strategy, 'considerable uncertainty existed amongst political and military 
leaders over the reliability of the United States in the rapidly changing strategic 
environment of the late 1950s', giving rise to 'contradictory trends in British nuclear 
strategy'.
497
 This would go some way towards explaining Sandys' various statements, 
and Baylis' contention that historians have tended to underestimate 'the genuine interests 
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in some quarters in more independence', which he believes are best illustrated in the 
debates that took place over Thor, would certainly be applicable to Sandys. 
 
   However, this also has to be considered alongside the notion that Sandys consistently 
attempted to adhere to an established set of policy preferences. Despite having to meet 
Macmillan half-way on Thor, everything had been considered with Blue Streak (or its 
successor) and the truly independent qualities it promised providing the intellectual 
framework to these discussions. In the same way that his strategic concept flowed from 
his belief that unmanned weaponry would dominate future warfare, Sandys' concept of 
nuclear independence was based solely on whether Britain would have full control of an 
effective nuclear strike weapon - that is to say a stock of ballistic missiles. For Sandys, 
provided Britain controlled its ballistic missiles, it possessed a truly independent nuclear 
capability. This is the fixed point of reference from which his personal definition of 
independence is best understood. That the United States was open to a joint targeting 
arrangement was helpful, and an allied construction project would have had its 
advantages; but as long as these partnerships did not place a theoretical block on the 
operational independence of whatever weapons that Britain might have gained (in the 
way that joint control arrangements had), then Sandys would have considered the 
British nuclear capability to have been independent. What it was aimed at, and who it 
was aimed with, were secondary concerns. Unmanned weapons were such a threat in 
Sandys' mind that even if the United States pulled out of any joint targeting strategy, 
what was left would have still represented a significant threat to the Soviet Union (even 
at the point of cancellation the plan was to have [at least] sixty Blue Streak missiles 
based in secure underground facilities). This is supported by his March 1959 statement 
that Britain would have enough Blue Streaks 'to make anyone who is planning to attack 
us think again'.
498
 
 
   Thor was deployed in Britain from July 1959 onwards, and although successful test 
launches had been conducted, it was still not fully operational by the time Sandys had 
left the Ministry of Defence.
499
 Overall it might be said that whilst assessing Sandys' 
contribution to the policy-making process relating to Thor can go some way towards 
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proving his commitment to 'total independence', at the same time its adoption did not 
prove particularly testing to Sandys' established policy preferences. Once Macmillan 
had moved towards the need for an independent weapon system, Thor came with 
relatively little risk, both financially and in relation to its effects on Blue Streak entering 
service. It was available, and it soon became apparent that it could not be considered a 
serious long-term alternative to a British-built ballistic missile, particularly as its 
eventual deployment would prove difficult. This can be held in contrast to Polaris, 
which proved a much more troublesome prospect for Sandys. 
 
The Move to Polaris 
 
   The previous chapter mentioned that White Paper had contained little in the way of 
Sandys' true thoughts about the future of the Navy; but this was not an indefinite 
reprieve. When Sandys arrived at the Ministry of Defence, McGrigor wrote to 
Mountbatten to warn him that his new minister had little regard for the Navy 'as 
everything will be finally decided by the H-bomb', and Mountbatten expected him to 
'make my fight for the Navy difficult'.
500
 It was later said that Mountbatten had to 
persuade Sandys 'once a month' about the value of aircraft carriers, which he did so by 
entertaining him at Broadlands, his lavish country residence.
501
 In mid-February 1957, 
Sandys lived up to his billing when he invited the Chiefs of Staff to pick up where the 
Radical Review had left off and consider the future of naval aviation. Their response 
was to refer to the Fleet Air Arm as 'the most flexible and valuable' part of the Navy, 
and say that aircraft carriers 'should be the last [ships] to be reduced'. The report 
touched on familiar defences, listing the need to maintain cohesion within NATO 
alongside 'prestige value' as worthwhile reasons to maintain aircraft carriers.
502
 Sandys 
accepted this, and his 22 February plan for a 'considerably reduced fleet' explained that 
this 'would be composed basically of 3 Carrier Task Groups'.
503
 This idea was 
developed in the first draft of the White Paper, which said that aircraft carriers would 
become increasingly important as Britain reduced its number of permanent bases 
overseas, and was carried over to the finished product which referred to them as 'in 
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effect a mobile air station'.
504
 This softening of Sandys' previous views appears to have 
instilled a certain amount of confidence in the Navy, and the Admiralty once again tried 
to argue that the V-bomber force received too many resources, claiming that they could 
no longer support them 'having the first call on Defence Votes'.
505
 
    
   The Navy may have saved its aircraft carriers, but Sandys still doubted those heavy 
ships that had escaped the Radical Review. The White Paper had said that 'the number 
of large ships will be restricted to a minimum', and it was unfortunate for Sandys that, 
having attacked cruisers in his Radical Review recommendations, construction had then 
began on three of them in one of Macmillan's first acts as Minister of Defence.
506
 These 
were the Tiger class cruisers, which were now so close to being completed that Sandys 
had little option but to accept them. This was in spite of the fact that they were not 
particularly modern, as their construction had actually started during the Second World 
War, only for their completion to be delayed by post-war austerity measures and 
previous defence reviews. In November Sandys wrote a memorandum for the Defence 
Committee on the 'Role and Composition of the Navy' that said that one of these 
cruisers could be banished East of Suez, where 'limited war is most likely to occur' and 
where a 'balanced all-purpose naval force' was actually needed. This was held in 
contrast to the Mediterranean and Atlantic, where the Navy was expected to operate 
within NATO, reducing the need for balanced forces. Here Sandys returned to the idea 
of naval power being concentrated on anti-submarine operations, which provided a use 
for the aircraft carriers and the N.A. 39s he had tried to abolish with his Radical Review 
proposals.
507
 
 
   Sandys' compromise was not enough for the Navy. Mountbatten accepted most of 
what Sandys had in mind, but warned against 'arbitrary ruling[s] that naval forces were 
artificially restricted either to one role or one geographical area'. Mountbatten could not 
increase manpower, but he stressed the need for 'well-found ships and modern 
equipment' as well as flexibility of action. This was based on the idea dual deterrence, 
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dependent not only on the nuclear deterrent, but also on the political and military 
cohesion of NATO. Since the Royal Navy was the second biggest navy in NATO, and, 
therefore, a 'keystone of NATO as [a] deterrent', Mountbatten followed his own logic 
and described the Navy as a vital component of the deterrent, claiming that undermining 
it could also undermine NATO. This in turn would lead to NATO's collapse and allow 
the Russians to dominate Europe 'piecemeal' before turning towards Britain.
508
 With 
such drastically different ideas of what the Navy was for, the Chiefs of Staff were asked 
to examine the two reports. They sat on the fence, concluding that 'both the First Lord's 
and the Minister of Defence's proposals accord sufficiently closely with the United 
Kingdom's strategic requirements to be acceptable', adding that 'the ideal fleet would 
probably lie about half-way between these proposals'.
509
 
 
   There remained a degree of consistency in Sandys' attempts to accommodate his 
policy preferences with political realities. In his June 1953 memorandum he had argued 
against aircraft carriers on the basis that shipping could be better protected by land-
based aircraft. It was still held to be the case that aircraft were better at sinking 
submarines and surface ships, but some use now had to be found for the existing aircraft 
carriers. The logical conclusion was to integrate them into the strategy Sandys had 
brought over from the Ministry of Supply and risk '£40 million of capital in a fleet 
carrier that can be sunk with one bomb', as the Air Ministry had previously put it. 
Finding a role for aircraft carriers showed that when required, Sandys was capable of 
moderating his policy preferences in light of his new responsibilities. Where he was 
previously able to conceive an entirely new defence outlook as the Minister of Supply, 
at the Ministry of Defence he was constrained by the kind of political realities that made 
scrapping significant parts of the fleet extremely difficult. However, as with Thor, this 
sort of compromise position was only possible so long as Sandys' core strategic concept, 
which was by this point wholly bound up with Blue Streak (or its successor), was not 
threatened. When the Navy began to propose their own alternatives to Blue Streak, this 
ability to compromise was challenged. 
 
The Admiralty and Setting the Agenda 
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   The Chiefs of Staff were no longer willing to defend the Navy as they had during the 
Radical Review, and, with Mountbatten fighting a running battle to secure the Navy's 
future, one solution was to increase its importance to Britain's nuclear deterrent. The 
Polaris programme was still in its infancy in 1957, and Grove has written that the 
Admiralty initially showed 'distinctly limited enthusiasm' towards it; but having been 
briefed on its development by friends in the United States Navy, Mountbatten proposed 
it as an alternative to Thor in May.
510
 Sandys' Blue Streak-friendly allies at the Ministry 
of Supply immediately moved to criticise Polaris, describing hopes that it would be 
operational by 1965 as 'optimistic even by American standards', questioning the size of 
its warhead, and saying that any British project would be 'similar in magnitude to Blue 
Streak'.
511
 This foray put the issue to one side for a while, but when Macmillan asked 
the Admiralty about the 'atomic submarine' in August, by which he simply meant the 
potential uses of a nuclear-powered vessel within existing naval strategy, Selkirk used 
this opportunity to impress upon him their potential to take on an even greater 
responsibility.
512
 His reply to Macmillan described the move to nuclear-powered naval 
vessels as being as revolutionary as 'the transition from sail to steam', and urged him to 
find enough money for Britain to keep pace with Soviet developments. Further, he told 
Macmillan that the United States was looking to equip its nuclear submarines with 
ballistic missiles, and that they regarded this as 'an essential development in the nuclear 
deterrent'. The key move that Selkirk made was to emphasise that using submarines as 
nuclear missile platforms  meant 'giving high mobility to a weapon which is practically 
undetectable and almost invulnerable'. The argument was that submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles could represented a genuine alternative to their land-based 
counterparts.
513
 
 
   The Admiralty was able to confirm these opinions in October when they were given a 
glimpse into what USS Nautilus, the world's first nuclear-powered submarine, was 
capable of. Nautilus had been launched in early-1954 and put to sea the following year, 
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and it had soon became apparent in testing that much of what was understood about 
anti-submarine warfare would have to be re-written. In two naval exercises, one 
organised by NATO and another by the Royal Navy during which Nautilus was placed 
under British command, this became clear. It was reported within the Navy that 'she can 
command the freedom of the seas whenever she chooses to take the initiative', and that 
in previous American exercises she had proven herself a hundred times less likely to be 
'killed' than non-nuclear submarines. Within the Navy it was immediately realised that 
the threat of Soviet nuclear submarines placed renewed focus on exactly what was 
required to keep the Atlantic lifeline open, thereby serving to throw Sandys' naval plans 
into question. It was also noted that: 
 
As an instrument of surprise attack against targets (sea or land) the nuclear 
submarine had potentialities which are unsurpassed whilst the problems 
which it poses to the defence are formidable indeed. The American Navy, 
originally sceptical of its capabilities, now regard the nuclear submarine as 
an entirely new weapon of war.
514
   
 
   Sandys had witnessed the Nautilus exercise as Mountbatten's guest, and he was 
impressed by its performance. Too impressed for Mountbatten's liking, and he wrote to 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet to warn him that because Sandys was 'given 
to reaching sudden conclusions', there was a 'very real danger' that he would 'decide that 
the nuclear-propelled submarine has made our present Navy completely obsolete'.
515
 
This was probably more a case of Mountbatten projecting his own 'sudden conclusions' 
onto Sandys' modernising zeal, as there is little to suggest that Sandys gave any real 
consideration to basing the future of the Navy on these vessels. 
 
   If Sandys could not be impressed directly, other means had to be utilised for the 
Admiralty to put their preferences over. This was particularly true in light of the January 
directive that had increased Sandys' influence over equipment, as well as removing the 
Service Ministries' ability to lobby Macmillan or the Chancellor directly. Early 
examples of this can be found in Selkirk's considered approach to putting Polaris on the 
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agenda, beginning with his response to an article in The Times that described the idea of 
a naval deterrent as 'a luxury that only the Americans can afford'.
516
 Selkirk wrote to the 
editor of The Times to complain that 'all the far-reaching implications' of missile-firing 
submarines had not been given adequate coverage, and, having educated him as to the 
benefits of a submarine-launched missile system, Selkirk offered to send a 'full article 
for publication' prepared by the Admiralty.
517
  
 
   This subterfuge can be seen at a more official level in a personal letter of January 
1958 that Selkirk sent to Quintin Hogg, making the Admiralty's motivations for 
following this course clear. Selkirk was 'very anxious to percolate slowly but gradually 
into the minds of our colleagues' the possibilities of missile-firing submarines, which he 
believed would be operational by 1961. He said that 'nobody is as yet ready' to properly 
consider putting the main body of the British deterrent out to sea, and he was worried 
that the Air Ministry would consider Polaris 'an offensive red herring'. Selkirk was sure 
that 'by 1967 or so missile sites will be out of this island and at sea'. He wanted to put 
Polaris in the frame before the government became irreversibly committed to Blue 
Streak, and sought to enlist Hogg as a 'neutral' supporter.
518
 As well as being Selkirk's 
predecessor as First Lord of the Admiralty, Hogg was the Lord President of the Council, 
providing him with access to the Cabinet and to Macmillan whilst being outside of the 
departmental rivalries that existed within the defence policy-making process. Thus 
when Selkirk suggested that 'at a convenient time you might ask in Cabinet that some of 
the facts of this development be at least laid before it', he knew that coming from Hogg 
this initiative would be less likely to 'frighten the Chancellor' than had it come directly 
from an Admiralty looking for more money.
519
 
 
   This indirect approach was coupled with the inflow of information from official 
sources that the Admiralty could utilise. Edwin Plowden at the United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority (which oversaw all aspects of British nuclear capabilities, including 
those relating to the deterrent) was one, and he was able to report to G. A. M. Wilson, 
the admiral with special responsibilities for nuclear propulsion at the Admiralty (the 
excellently-named 'Rear Admiral Nuclear Propulsion'), that although Macmillan was 
unconvinced by the nuclear-powered submarine in relation to existing naval plans, 'not 
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enough has been made of the deterrent value of the polaris [sic] carrying submarine'.
520
 
This inter-departmental support was boosted in January 1958 when a delegation from 
the Royal Aircraft Establishment visited American ballistic missile development 
installations. With no service affiliation, the delegation was able to present a 
comprehensive report on American progress across a number of different systems. With 
particular relevance to British policy, the report claimed that American thinking was 
moving towards the belief that missiles based underground, as Blue Streak was to be, 
would still prove vulnerable if the enemy could bring enough explosive power to bear 
on their launching sites, and that the cost of building silos strong enough to withstand 
any eventuality would prove 'prohibitive'. 
521
 The report claimed that 'the only solution 
to the ultimate maintenance of a useful weapon system lies in a great diversity of launch 
points', and in a smaller weapon of increased accuracy. Polaris was then explicitly cited 
as a 'very real technical advance', held in direct contrast to Thor, and given its own 
detailed section which claimed that Polaris would enter full service in the United States 
Navy by June 1963.
522
 
 
   In the wake of this report the Admiralty began to campaign more openly, setting up a 
working party under the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff to 'examine various aspects of the 
employment of POLARIS missiles in submarines'. The working party concluded that 
Britain would gain 'considerable strategic advantages' with Polaris, whilst also 
recognising the 'many hurdles' the Admiralty would have to surmount in realising its 
intentions. Chief amongst these was the 'virtually inevitable' conflict between Polaris 
and Blue Streak. This conflict was held to be inevitable as the British Polaris system 
would have to be constructed in Britain 'to avoid the political disadvantage of not 
having the deterrent completely under U.K. control'. Therefore the working party 
warned the Admiralty that to pursue Polaris they would have to argue for a 'major 
revision' of existing deterrence policy.
523
 The conflict with Blue Streak was made clear, 
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and the report claimed that constructing eight Polaris submarines - even if the missiles 
had to be bought from the United States - would prove cheaper than Blue Streak, and 
that a crash British Polaris programme could have its first submarine at sea only a year 
after Blue Streak was expected to be ready.
524
  
 
   The Board of the Admiralty questioned these optimistic projections, but it was 
nevertheless decided that such 'factors governing the practicality' of the project should 
not be allowed to obscure the 'overwhelming' strategic advantages of exchanging Blue 
Streak for Polaris. It was therefore decided that Polaris was to become a 'major naval 
objective'.
525
 Yet, having decided upon this course, the Board urged caution. Expecting 
'bitter opposition' from the Air Ministry was one issue, but they also worried that the 
Admiralty would be given the go-ahead to pursue Polaris without seeing their spending 
allocation increased. On the other hand 'if time were allowed for the great advantages of 
POLARIS over BLUE STREAK to sink in', the most 'natural' outcome would be for the 
Navy to receive Blue Streak's allocation. Thus it was decided that the Admiralty would 
wait for Macmillan to make further enquiries about Polaris, and when he did they would 
emphasise the 'greater certainty of control' Polaris offered in order to undermine what 
had become a contentious issue with Blue Streak - that it was ineffective as a retaliatory 
weapon system as its preparation time left only a small window in which to properly 
consider using it.
526
  
 
The Conflict with Blue Streak 
 
   In April Sandys asked Selkirk for a paper on the 'future potentialities of rocket 
weapons launched from submarines' in order to discuss it with the Admiralty, the Air 
Ministry, the Ministry of Supply, and 'technical experts of the three departments'.
527
 
Both the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Supply were hostile to Polaris, but there is no 
suggestion that Sandys had deliberately stacked the odds against the Admiralty in this 
instance. However, Selkirk's paper, which was basically a summary of what the working 
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party had previously concluded, was attacked by the Air Ministry.
528
 They said 
Admiralty assumptions were based upon 'unproven American data', and reminded 
Sandys that the deterrent was not only based on the land-based ballistic missiles used in 
the Admiralty's comparisons, but also 'aircraft with free falling and guided bombs', 
which offered just as much flexibility as the Admiralty claimed for Polaris. The cost of 
Polaris was also doubted, as were its claims of invulnerability. Here the Air Ministry 
had detected a major hole in Admiralty thinking. If putting the deterrent out to sea 
would act to draw any Soviet nuclear attack away from the British mainland, would that 
not suggest they were able to detect and destroy the Polaris submarines (which they also 
argued would be far easier than destroying a Blue Streak in its hardened silo)? This was 
itself only a minor drawback, arguing as it did that Britain would then lose the war 
whilst not being [quite] as devastated as it might otherwise have been; but coupled with 
the contention that having more time 'to decide whether to retaliate or not' might act to 
reduce the will to do so, this would have hit upon Sandys' critical belief that the nuclear 
deterrent had to present a credible threat. As the Air Ministry put it: 'Retaliation must be 
a prompt reflex action - if it is not the certainty of it is reduced'.
529
  
 
   Polaris' momentum had rattled the Air Ministry, and the Admiralty began to argue that 
were it adopted the shape of both the Navy and the Air Force 'could hardly be 
preserved'. Their response to the Air Ministry answered each of their criticisms; the 
most important from their perspective being in relation to the 'unproven American data' 
and the credibility of Polaris as a nuclear threat. To rebut the former it was pointed out 
that Polaris was 'two or three' years ahead of Blue Streak, so this also applied to British 
weapons. The latter issue was answered with accusations that the Air Ministry had 
missed the point - 'presumably intentionally'. The Admiralty had not meant to argue that 
Polaris would draw any Soviet nuclear bombardment away from the mainland. They 
had merely meant to say that Polaris would not in itself attract an attack on Britain. The 
trivial strategic nature of this point was revealed when the Admiralty said that in the 
event of global war an attack on Britain would still be expected; but they argued that 
'such an attack would no longer affect the deterrent' and claimed once again that Polaris 
would prove 'practically immune to any form of counter attack'.
530
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   It is easy to see from this early exchange how Polaris presented Sandys with 
difficulty. Whilst he expected a devastating Soviet bombardment to open (and decide) 
any global war, the claims of immunity advanced by the Admiralty tapped into Sandys' 
concept of Britain's nuclear capability. His support for ballistic missiles was based upon 
the 'lack of effective counter-measures' first noted in November 1944. If what the 
Admiralty described as the 'silent, stationary submarine in plenty of sea room' was also 
immune to counter-measures, then it was the equal of any land-based ballistic 
missile.
531
 It is therefore revealing that, as he wavered over the summer of 1958, Sandys 
made no attempt to advance Polaris as the most suitable alternative to Blue Streak, and 
his September memorandum in which he recommended its cancellation in favour of 
Thor and a more advanced weapon made no mention of Polaris. He concentrated instead 
on measures aimed at 'remain[ing] in the rocket business'.
532
 Having been presented 
with both sides of the argument, failing to include even a passing reference to Polaris 
could be seen as conspicuous; particularly as he was in no way anti-submarine, having 
based his concept of naval warfare on the idea that Soviet submarines were the biggest 
threat to NATO naval forces. On the other hand, this could be explained if Sandys still 
felt himself unable to make any sort of decision on Polaris at this point. However, 
Sandys' approach to Polaris over the winter of 1958 makes it harder to give him the 
benefit of the doubt, pointing instead towards an inherent hostility to moving the 
nuclear delivery system away from land-based ballistic missiles.  
 
   When, following his September memorandum, Sandys visited Washington, he 
discussed Polaris only in terms of its potential as a land-based system, dismissing 
attempts to inform him of submarine developments by claiming that he 'fully 
understood these problems', and asking whether it might provide the basis for Blue 
Streak's successor.
533
 This was disappointing for the Admiralty, as prior to his visit 
Mountbatten had enlisted the United States Navy to help him convince Sandys of 
Polaris' benefits. Writing to Arleigh Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations in the United 
States Navy, Mountbatten asked whether he could arrange to meet Sandys' Chief 
Scientific Advisor, Frederick Brundrett, who Mountbatten knew from their time at the 
Royal Navy Signal School. Mountbatten described Brundrett as 'one of my oldest 
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friends' and a 'true friend of the Navy', hailing his 'sound and excellent advice to the 
Minister' as the main reason for the Navy emerging relatively unscathed from the White 
Paper. Now Mountbatten was keen for Polaris 'not to be excluded' from the debates now 
surrounding Blue Streak and asked Burke to 'spare a few minutes' in support of the 
Admiralty and bring Brundrett up to speed with the latest developments.
534
 
 
   It is not clear whether this meeting took place, but by mid-October the Admiralty 
noted that Sandys had not been convinced in Washington. In an internal note it was said 
that Sandys 'dismisses solid fuel weapons' as being both 'inherently short on range' and 
prohibitively expensive for Britain.
535
 Even though the promise of American help could 
have brought Britain up to speed within three years, commencing research into solid 
fuel weapons might well have been expensive; but it seems odd that Sandys would rule 
any particular fuel out as being 'inherently' weak. Even in his own version of events it 
was the issue of fuel that had led to doubts over whether the Germans were capable of 
developing a long-range rocket. Now Sandys was guilty of disregarding information 
that conflicted with his preconceived notions. Then it had been the so-called 'rocket 
experts' who had ruled it out because they themselves could not conceive of a suitable 
propellant, and here Sandys was following their lead despite having been told in 
Washington that by 1963 the United States would possess a solid fuel missile with a 
range of 5,500 miles.
536
 This was the Minuteman, modified versions of which still form 
a substantial element of the American nuclear deterrent; but in October 1958 the 
Admiralty was forced to concede that these were valid points backed by Brundrett and 
the Ministry of Supply, making it an unprofitable line of attack.
537
 Fearing that the 
continuation of Blue Streak might see Polaris 'shut out for ever', Mountbatten suggested 
that the Admiralty come to the defence of Thor. If the Admiralty could refute Sandys' 
objections to its lifespan and range, they could then make better use of the constant 
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stream of updated Polaris information in order to make a better case for it being 
preferable to Blue Streak.
538
 
 
   This notion of Sandys being inherently hostile to Polaris can be strengthened by 
taking his follow-up memorandum of 3 November (in which he had rediscovered his 
enthusiasm for Blue Streak) into consideration. This mentioned Polaris, but ruled it out 
across a number of questionable points:  
 
As an addition to our armament it would be very desirable; but the 
development of this kind of weapon is not sufficiently advanced for us to 
stake everything upon it. Moreover, the yield of the POLARIS warhead is 
only about one tenth of the yield of the warhead that could be carried by 
BLUE STREAK. It is unlikely that a submarine-launched weapon could 
have the same degree of accuracy as one launched from a fixed base on 
land. Because of its small size, the warhead is very wasteful of fissile 
material and correspondingly expensive. In addition to the cost of the 
weapons, it would, of course, be necessary to construct six or eight large 
rocket-launching submarines, which would be extremely expensive.
539
 
   
   His comments about the accuracy of Polaris were pure speculation; Blue Streak could 
hardly have been described as 'sufficiently advanced' (although 'extremely expensive' 
certainly applied); and Sandys of all people ought to have appreciated that warhead 
development would have eventually allowed for smaller megaton devices. The 
dismissive nature of this assessment prompted Selkirk to write directly to Macmillan, 
circumventing the January directive, objecting to Sandys having made no reference to 
strategic considerations before discounting Polaris, adding that the 'vast sums' being 
devoted to the project in America meant that Polaris was 'already years further advanced 
than BLUE STREAK'.
540
 Sandys remained equally vague in the 5 November Defence 
Committee meeting during which he recovered his support for Blue Streak, mentioning 
that he had become convinced Blue Streak could work having become aware of new 
technologies (he did not say what) 'after discussions in the United States'.
541
 The 
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Admiralty might not have been aware that these discussions ought to have invalidated 
his concerns about solid fuels as nobody challenged him on this point, but Polaris was 
placed on the agenda and Sandys later wrote to Selkirk requesting a note on the 
effectiveness of Polaris when 'both fitted in submarines and in merchant ships'.
542
  
 
   Including surface vessels could suggest that Sandys was slightly behind on Polaris-
related thinking, or it could have been a deliberate attempt to cloud the issue; but 
Selkirk dismissed this idea, concluding that submarine-launched missiles were the 
'solution' to Britain's need for an effective nuclear capability 'while so restricting the 
effort involved'.
543
 In his 16 November memorandum that reiterated his support for Blue 
Streak, Sandys included much of what Selkirk had sent him, generously admitting that 
Polaris offered 'certain very important theoretical advantages over any land-based 
system'. Having done so, he restated his previous concerns. Costs were cited, as was the 
'feasibility' of something that was 'by no means fully proved' (references to what 'the 
Americans hope' add a sceptical tone to this memorandum) and the explosive yield 'of 
less than half of that of THOR'. Sandys said that Britain would need eight fully-
equipped submarines, and whilst this would have been a real alternative to Blue Streak, 
'it is not yet certain that the POLARIS project, with its immense technical 
complications, will necessarily be successful'.
544
  
 
   Clark has said that Sandys made a 'convincing case' for Polaris and was now 
'sufficiently interested' to monitor its progress.
545
 Sandys did say he would 'watch the 
progress' of Polaris, but remained convinced that Britain must go ahead with Blue 
Streak 'as now planned'.
546
 Indeed, this seems like a sop to the Admiralty when 
considered alongside his previous memorandum talking about how he would welcome 
Polaris as an 'addition to our armament', knowing that this would be impossible if Blue 
Streak was continued 'as now planned'. He had used a similarly false concession during 
the Radical Review to conceal the true extent of his opposition to aircraft carriers, so we 
should avoid reading too much into his willingness to monitor Polaris. That he was 
taking it more seriously simply meant that his own campaign against it had to expand. 
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   It did not take Sandys long to point out the Soviet Union would eventually get the 
better of Polaris. He suggested that they might track submarines from their point of 
departure, and even destroy them in peacetime by sinking them under the polar ice cap 
where any accident could not be properly investigated.
547
 If this was the best Sandys 
could come up with, the Admiralty stood to benefit from Polaris being debated more 
openly, even if Sandys had just told the House of Commons that the question of 
acquiring Polaris 'had not yet arisen'.
548
 They also received information from the British 
Joint Services Mission in Washington suggesting that Polaris' range could still be 
increased dramatically, with a range of 2000 miles deemed possible by early-1964, and 
2500 miles not long afterwards.
549
 Whilst this was going on, the Air Ministry intensified 
their nascent campaign for an updated bomber. They still believed that counter-
measures to Sandys' preferred land-based ballistic missiles 'will certainly be developed 
eventually', and Ward told Sandys that the Air Staff wanted an aircraft that could take 
off vertically; possessed 'Good endurance using flight refuelling if necessary'; and 
carried both 'long range powered bomb[s]' and non-nuclear weapons. If these conditions 
could be met Ward believed that speed was not important, listing the benefits of such an 
aircraft as: 
 
(a) Would be independent of fixed and vulnerable bases for long periods. 
(b) Could take off at short notice. 
(c) Could remain airborne and poised for attack under positage [sic] 
(positive) control, without becoming irrevocably committed. 
(d) Could mount a flexible attack from any point on the Soviet or Chinese 
perimeter very quickly. 
(e) As an instrument of national policy could continue the important role 
played by the 'V' bombers not only as a deterrent but also in cold and 
limited wars.
550
 
 
   It might not have been immediately obvious to Ward, but these points were exactly - 
save for the direction of vertical travel - what the Admiralty were using to sell Polaris. 
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The Air Ministry were forced to attack Polaris on similar lines to Sandys, citing its cost, 
as well as supporting the fanciful idea about the Soviet Union staging accidents at sea, 
and calling the flexibility of Polaris into question by pointing out that submarines were 
slower than aircraft.
551
 
 
   Selkirk wrote to Sandys to complain about what he perceived as another failure to 
consider Polaris 'objectively and correctly', but made little fuss about this latest round of 
Air Force attempts to strengthen their hold on Britain's nuclear capabilities.
552
 This was 
because whilst the Admiralty had pushed Polaris with caution due to its unproven 
qualities, they were also constrained by their lack of enthusiasm for an independent 
deterrent capability. We have seen how during the Radical Review the Navy reversed 
Sandys' arguments by asking why Britain could depend on America at sea but not hide 
behind Strategic Air Command, and they had stayed true to this point. The reason for 
this was that throughout the 1950s the Navy had concerned itself with the issue of 
nuclear sufficiency - the point where the Soviet Union acquired the capabilities to 
devastate the United States - which grew in importance following Sputnik and the R-
7.
553
  
 
   This had been touched upon in May 1957, but began to attract serious discussion in 
January 1958 when the Joint Planning Staff reported to the Chiefs of Staff on the likely 
nature of global war in 1970. Boyle felt that the 'rapid and unpredictable' course of 
technological development made a nonsense of planning for a war twelve years away; 
and besides 'our policy was the avoidance of war'.
554
 The report had started out as a 
naval study, and it is obvious why Boyle was opposed to further studies and did not 
want American policy-makers to think that Britain was altering its policies. 
Nevertheless, another version was produced that spurred the debate on. The report did 
not actually undermine the RAF, stating that it would become 'even more important' to 
maintain both a worthwhile deterrent capability and the will to use it, recommending 
that British defence policy should continue down its current path.
555
 Boyle now happily 
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accepted the report 'as it stood', but Mountbatten and Templer demurred. Templer 
wanted 'major amendments' if the deterrent was no longer effective 'except in certain 
areas vital to one side or the other', whilst Mountbatten had 'never agreed that the 
current Government policy... would necessarily remain valid after nuclear sufficiency'. 
He said that the value of nuclear deterrence 'depended upon the extent to which it was 
believed in', which for Britain meant that a truly independent capability was irrelevant 
as it was 'unlikely' that the Soviet Union would believe that Britain would use its 
nuclear weapons against them without full American backing.
556
 This opened the door 
for a re-examination of the nuclear/non-nuclear balance of forces that the White Paper 
had altered, but more importantly for Polaris meant that the British deterrent did not 
have to be based upon an independent weapon system. Polaris bought in from the 
United States, even with certain conditions on its use, would have been suitable in this 
new age of nuclear sufficiency. This led Sandys to accuse Mountbatten in late-1958 of 
not really believing in nuclear deterrence after Mountbatten said the insistence that 
Britain could resort to nuclear warfare without United States support 'would surely be to 
commit national suicide immediately'.
557
 
 
   This conflict in naval thinking came to a head in 1959 as the campaign in support of 
Polaris became more overt. In January it was agreed that the basis for the British nuclear 
capability would be subject to a rigorous examination, which the Ministry of Defence 
expected would take six months.
558
 Sandys accepted this timeframe because Blue Streak 
was going ahead as planned and because he assumed that each system would be 
assessed in relation to the government's existing policies. This put the pressure on the 
Admiralty to prove their case, and Mountbatten wanted to know whether or not the 
government would continue to pursue its existing definition of 'independence'.
559
 
Sandys immediately began sowing doubts about Polaris, claiming that it would soon be 
just as easy to pinpoint the location of a submarine as a land-based missile.
560
 When the 
Admiralty heard about this they shrugged it off, but said if Sandys was right they would 
like to know how to go about doing it.
561
 The claims of invulnerability associated with 
Polaris were its strongest suit, and when the Admiralty received word that the United 
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States Deputy Secretary of Defence was visiting London to discuss early warning 
systems and anti-ballistic missile missiles, which were expected to be fantastically 
complicated and therefore expensive, they reacted by saying that this 'really does put 
BLUE STREAK out of court'. They also claimed that the Ministry of Defence had been 
aware that such systems would be required 'for some time', and that since any new 
defences would then need their own defences, there was no end to this logic 'as long as 
the principle of BLUE STREAK persists'.
562
 
 
   February saw an increase in the flow of information from Burke. In order to refute 
Sandys' doubts about the invulnerability of Polaris, Mountbatten wrote to Burke asking 
for all the information he had.
563
 It was also reported within the Admiralty that although 
the Ministry of Defence was willing to envisage the use of solid fuel missiles, whether 
land-based or submarine-launched, 'they are highly skeptical [sic] of any such 
development, if not actually opposed to it'.
564
 This was another way for Sandys to 
defend Blue Streak, even though he had received the information about extending 
Polaris' range in December, but the Admiralty were boosted by Burke telling 
Mountbatten that he expected to have five submarines out on patrol by mid-1961, and 
promising to keep him supplied with all the information 'which our laws permit'.
565
 
Mountbatten wrote asking for 'all the ammunition we can possibly get' as 'speed is of 
the utmost importance'.
566
 In his reply Burke said it was a 'never ending source of 
wonder' that people still questioned submarine-launched missiles. Even the most 
devastating land-based systems would have their locations known by the enemy, which, 
he said, was their 'great defect': 
 
If, possessing this knowledge, the Soviet believes that he is capable of 
destroying these sites before they can react to his attack, then deterrence has 
failed, regardless of whether or not the Soviets are correct in the belief... If 
the deterrence fails to deter, the arguments of the proponents of land-based 
systems, that they can achieve some degree of invulnerability by hardening, 
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dispersal, holes-in-the-ground, etc., become academic because the general 
war will have commenced.
567
 
 
   This argument would have represented a declaration of open warfare against Sandys' 
policy preferences. Yet, rather curiously, the momentum built up since the beginning of 
1958 began to slip away from the Admiralty at this point. Charles Lambe, who was 
responsible for the introductory quote about Sandys doing 'all in his power' to protect 
Blue Streak, used the same internal note to urge caution. Lambe was the de facto First 
Sea Lord by May 1959, his appointment delayed only until Mountbatten could succeed 
Dickson as Chief of the Defence Staff, and he warned that it would be 'very unwise for 
the Admiralty to stick its neck out too far'. Lambe was fully aware of what Sandys 
wanted to happen, claiming that he had suspended the investigation into the future 
deterrent as - quoting what he had heard were Sandys' words - 'he did not wish the 
validity of BLUE STREAK to be questioned'. In spite of this he put his faith in 
Mountbatten, arguing that the Navy would be stronger 'if we were (at any rate, 
apparently) pushed into the POLARIS project'. He therefore wished to see the 
'propaganda' operation halted and for the Admiralty to build a convincing case for 
Polaris in the background 'to answer any queries when they come - as, in my view, they 
undoubtedly will'.
568
 Selkirk tried to convince Lambe that Blue Streak was becoming 
more secure by the day and that if Polaris was to be taken on 'we must be prepared to 
make the running ourselves', but he was unsuccessful.
569
 
 
Conclusion 
 
   Historians have noted this loss of momentum in the Admiralty campaign. Richard 
Moore wrote that Mountbatten maintained a 'studious silence' when he ought to have 
been pushing Polaris as Blue Streak's successor from mid-1959 onwards.
570
 Moore puts 
this down to the aforementioned Admiralty belief that there was no need for an 
independent capability, and that once Blue Streak had been cancelled the United States 
was unlikely to provide weapons for such a capability.
571
 Clark has also highlighted the 
'two contradictory goals' of playing down the need for an independent nuclear capability 
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whilst also backing Polaris in a 'self-conscious programme for wresting the deterrent 
from the RAF'.
572
  
 
   The imprecise thinking prevalent within the Admiralty can be held in stark contrast to 
the logically consistent policy preferences with which Sandys approached the provision 
of an independent British nuclear capability. Although the Admiralty argued that Polaris 
possessed all the qualities that made land-based ballistic missiles Sandys' preferred 
method of obliterating the Soviet Union, it can be seen throughout this period that 
Sandys maintained an aversion to the submarine-launched alternative. Resorting to 
criticisms that might have been applied to Blue Streak by similarly unsympathetic 
parties, Sandys was never able to make a truly convincing case against Polaris. Indeed, 
his cognitive dissonance over the question of solid fuels would suggest that he did not 
even intend to. Provided he could bring the weight of the Ministry of Defence and its 
esteemed scientific advisors to bear, he only had to convert the uncertain to the kind of 
official Ministry of Defence orthodoxy that he had previously campaigned against. This 
was also the case with Thor. Where Macmillan and others saw the benefits of buying 
the British nuclear capability 'off the shelf', Sandys worked to prevent Thor being seen 
as anything more than an interim measure. He did this relatively easily. The main lesson 
to be taken from the debates surrounding Thor was that Sandys was fully committed to 
Britain being able to unilaterally inflict significant damage on the Soviet Union, and 
how this leads directly into his approach to Blue Streak. The following section will use 
this sincere belief in the need for a truly independent nuclear capability as the base 
explanatory means for understanding Sandys thinking and actions in respect of Blue 
Streak. It was this idea, coupled with his long-standing belief in the qualities of ballistic 
missiles, that informed his support for Blue Streak, and which eventually left him 
isolated and forced to defend his advocacy of a failed weapon project. 
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Blue Streak 
 
In the closing stages of the Second World War, Britain was subjected to over 1000 V-2 
attacks, and it was natural that the British government should have taken an immediate 
post-war interest in these new weapons. However, the United States and Soviet Union 
had captured most of the German scientists involved, allowing them to effectively 
continue Germany's work on unmanned weaponry. This left Britain to make do with 
access to the Peenemünde team and the test firing of some captured V-2s. This 
comparative lack of knowledge, and the government decision to assign overwhelming 
priority to the development of atomic weapons, left few resources to spare for updated 
delivery systems (whether manned or unmanned) and research was mainly concentrated 
on defensive surface-to-air weapons.
573
 There is, therefore, nothing to suggest that 
Sandys' report of November 1944 provided any significant influence on government 
policy.  
 
   We have seen how this report provided the basis for Sandys' policy recommendations 
at the Ministry of Supply, and how it consequently placed him well ahead of other 
influential policy-makers in relation to these new weapons. That is not to say that 
nobody else had recognised the potential of unmanned weaponry, but Sandys does 
appear to have been an exception at the highest levels of the defence policy-making 
process in calling for an increased reliance upon these nascent weapon systems.
574
 
Further down the policy-making hierarchy it was a different story, and although Sandys' 
1953 memoranda were received with caution by the Ministry of Defence and Service 
Ministries, voices within the Air Ministry were operating on similar wavelengths. In 
January 1953, G. W. Tuttle, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operational 
Requirements), circulated a note on the 'long-range surface-to-surface weapon'. This 
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said the V-bombers, which had barely entered serious testing at this point, would not 
prove effective for long: 
 
I believe the only way to ensure delivery [of nuclear weapons] in ten years 
time will be by means of a supersonic unmanned missile, and I believe that 
this solution will take ten years to achieve. We must start now. In ten years, 
any manned aircraft is unlikely to survive in the face of a guided weapon 
defence... In ten years I would suggest that if there has not already been a 
war, our stock of atomic warheads will allow a force equipped with this 
weapon to be a real deterrent without the assistance of Allies.
575
 
 
   The Air Staff examined the problem throughout 1953, but they could only proceed on 
particular requirements after Sandys' technological exchanges with the United States.
576
 
In April 1955 an American delegation arrived to advise the Ministry of Supply, and 
potential problems were apparent at this early stage.
577
 Thomas Pike, the Deputy Chief 
of the Air Staff, kept an account of the meetings and reported that whilst Britain had 
hoped to develop its own ballistic missile within ten years, the Americans expected the 
Soviet Union to be capable of 'threatening us' with their own weapons by 1960 (as 
Sandys had predicted in 1953), and told the Ministry of Supply that they should be 
looking to deploy a suitable weapon by this point. Pike thought that even with 
substantial American help Britain would have been 'jolly lucky' to meet its original 
target, but the Air Staff soon placed an order for an advanced weapon 'to fill a strategic 
bombardment role'.
578
 They wanted a nuclear warhead-carrying missile with a 2000 
mile range (with development potential for 2500 miles) that could be operated 'in any 
part of the world' that was accurate to within 8000 feet (with a 50% circular error) of its 
target. Further specifications calling for a 90% reliability rate and an ability to be 
launched within two hours made this an ambitious target.
579
 The weapon was 
codenamed Blue Streak. 
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   The official files show that, whilst Britain trailed the United States, co-operation 
allowed for relatively rapid progression, and Brundrett and his Defence Research Policy 
Committee became Blue Streak's strongest supporter during these years.
580
 In a July 
1956 report, the Committee had concluded that only Blue Streak and its 'convincing 
capability for global war' would prove an effective deterrent, and that what seemed like 
daunting development costs would be recouped through its successors (or through 
related projects) once the 'know-how' had been acquired.
581
 In spite of this, Navias has 
shown that the Air Ministry 'tended to be most ambivalent' about acquiring the missiles 
they had commissioned, citing a September 1956 discussion in which they said they 
would have preferred the supersonic bomber that was then being discussed. Even the 
Ministry of Supply began to worry about an 'unjustifiable duplication of effort' should 
the Americans look to base their own missiles in Britain.
582
 It was left to Monckton, the 
Minister of Defence, to overcome this initial bout of scepticism, writing a lengthy 
memorandum justifying the possession of a British-built ballistic missile. Taking his 
cue from Brundrett, Monckton's views could have been Sandys' own, emphasising the 
'revolutionary development in warfare' that unmanned weaponry promised, and 
claiming that there was 'no serious doubt that they will supersede the manned aeroplane 
for most military purposes'. Therefore failing to replace manned bomber aircraft with 
unmanned weapons was to effectively place an expiration date on Britain's nuclear 
strike capability by 'undermining the moral and political effect of our bomber force 
immediately'. Monckton concluded that this would not only 'turn us into an American 
satellite from about 1965 onwards', but, in an early warning against the dangers of 
nuclear sufficiency, risk Britain being left alone should the United States abandon 
Europe once the Soviet Union could attack them directly.
583
 
 
   This section does not attempt to provide a comprehensive history of Blue Streak, but 
the debates that raged surrounded the programme until its cancellation as a weapon 
system had been established early in its life. The nature of its supposed invulnerability - 
both in the air and in the ground - had been raised at this early stage, as had the potential 
effects of its development on the Air Force; but the Committee report struck a chord 
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with Sandys' previous advocacy of these weapons. The idea of any delivery system 
needing a 'convincing capability for global war' worked with Sandys' concept of 
deterrence consisting of what his June 1953 memorandum described as 'actual 
preparations for war, such as will convince a potential aggressor that he will surely be 
defeated'. It was only when Sandys carried these ideas over from the Ministry of Supply 
that Blue Streak gained the type of consistent support that it had previously lacked. 
Prior to 1957, the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Supply, the two departments 
responsible for missile development, had been uncertain about Blue Streak; and whilst 
Monckton appears to have been firmly on board, he had resigned by mid-October 1956. 
When Sandys made a viable nuclear capability the central tenet of the 1957 White 
Paper, it followed that whatever other areas were to be decided by compromise, Blue 
Streak would have to become his priority, and in its closing moments the main pillars of 
Sandys' strategic concept - the superiority of unmanned weapons and the inability of 
Britain to withstand them, as well as the conventionalisation of nuclear weapons - came 
together, demonstrating that his isolation in favouring Blue Streak was as much a case 
of him championing one particular weapon as it was his relatively unconventional 
approach to fighting the Cold War. 
 
Policy Implementation in the Aftermath of the 1957 White Paper 
 
   The 1957 White Paper had made no firm commitment to a British-built ballistic 
missile, but its successor of February 1958 did. This is not particularly remarkable in 
itself; but historians have regularly noted the constant financial pressure Blue Streak 
was under, and yet between April 1957 and February 1958 the programme seemed to 
escape the Treasury scrutiny it was otherwise used to.
584
 This is noticeable, since the 
Chancellor often provided the decisive voice on most areas of defence policy, including 
the size of the V-bomber force. During this period there appears to have been no serious 
attempt to cancel the programme, and its continuation was confirmed with little 
objection even after the Ministry of Defence lobbied Treasury civil servants for official 
support in August 1957, which would have been an opportune time to question the 
programme.
585
 This is where circumstances may have favoured Sandys. His attempts to 
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explicitly link the 1957 White Paper to the development of a British-built ballistic 
missile were restrained by two cautious Service Ministries and Macmillan's ambiguity, 
but he was well-placed to make his case post-publication because of the Blue Streak-
friendly team at the Ministry of Defence. In addition to Brundrett's scientific weight, his 
two most senior civil servants, Powell and R. C. Chilver, were strong believers in the 
need for British-built ballistic missiles, and Sandys also retained K. G. Post, who had 
been his Military Assistant during the Second World War, as his personal advisor.
586
 
With this group at the heart of the policy-making process, Sandys could better promote 
Blue Streak, establishing momentum in its favour and allowing him to defend it against 
whatever opposition the Service Ministries and Treasury could provide. 
 
   With an impending round of Defence Committee meetings in the summer of 1957, it 
was expected that Sandys would have to defend Blue Streak. In order to do so, Chilver 
provided him with a draft memorandum that sought to make the case for it. This made it 
quite clear that Britain had to go ahead with the programme, but Sandys still made 
significant alterations to make his policy preferences more apparent. Where Chilver had 
suggested that Sandys should justify Blue Streak with 'the same reason for having the 
V-Bomber force', Sandys changed this to 'developing the V-bomber force', casting Blue 
Streak as the successor weapon in order to prevent the two delivery systems being seen 
as complementary. The draft also said that in absence of any plans to replace the V-
bombers, 'if we do not have Blue Streak we shall have no deterrent under our own 
control after these aircraft are gone'. Sandys replaced this entire line with his own that 
said the planned supersonic bomber had been cancelled 'in view of the likely progress of 
ballistic rockets, and if we do not have Blue Streak we shall have no deterrent under our 
own control after the bombers are gone'. By referring to 'the bombers' in general and the 
progress of ballistic missiles as a whole, Sandys had introduced a definite move towards 
his overriding belief that unmanned weaponry would inevitably supersede manned 
aircraft, and his removal from the draft of sections relating to manpower, 'know-how', 
and limited war suggest that he did not wish these peripheral matters to cloud the central 
issue - that abandoning Blue Streak 'would be to abandon development of offensive 
weapons generally'.
587
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   Chilver returned a defensive second draft that incorporated some of Sandys' 
amendments whilst framing the issue as deciding 'whether to continue'. Sandys objected 
to this line of argument, which he thought would 'cast doubts on this project' where they 
did not already exist.
588
 Chilver informed Sandys that he was merely attempting to build 
the strongest possible case for Blue Streak, as the Treasury had started to question the 
programme. This was standard advice from his Deputy Secretary; but in his letters to 
Sandys, Chilver revealed how the policy-making elite at the Ministry of Defence 
identified their interests with the success of Blue Streak. He suggested that the Ministry 
of Defence could time the circulation of any memorandum to their advantage by waiting 
until long-term research and development had been completed. By holding out it was 
also conceivable 'that a favourable decision will fall into our laps before that stage'.
589
 In 
the event Blue Streak was not raised in the summer Defence Committee meetings.
590
 
However, it is important to bear in mind the approach that Sandys and his team had 
taken to Blue Streak at this early stage, and how this mindset would come to affect both 
its development, and also the extent to which alternative weapon systems were given 
fair consideration.     
 
   Having failed to attract scrutiny over the summer of 1957, Blue Streak enjoyed a run 
of good fortune. We have seen how disarmament proposals saw Macmillan shed his 
doubts about the need for nuclear independence, and also how the Navy had proven 
unsuccessful in its [limited] attempts at reversing Sandys' strategic priorities. More 
importantly, the Air Ministry had demonstrated its backing for Blue Streak during the 
White Paper discussions, taking Sandys' line that the success of the White Paper 
depended upon Blue Streak entering service.
591
 Blue Streak also strengthened its 
position in the debates over air defence and the V-bomber force that took place in late-
1957 following the successful testing of Britain's first megaton weapon. During these 
discussions, Sandys' policy preferences were more apparent, as he sought to undo the 
official statements contained in the White Paper by seeking the abolition of Fighter 
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Command and a reduction in the proposed number of V-bombers. Navias has framed 
Sandys' contribution to these debates as being another attempt to pursue economies at 
the expense of both sound strategic policy, and also what he had said in the published 
White Paper. However, this interpretation again neglects Sandys' over-arching strategic 
concept as having provided the dominant influence on his thinking.  
 
   Whilst his true feelings had been diluted in the published White Paper, we have seen 
how Sandys was convinced that there were no effective counter-measures to ballistic 
missiles on the horizon to the point that his entire strategic concept emanated from this 
belief, and at the end of 1957 he was allowed to re-state his case. In a November note to 
Macmillan (he did not wish to involve the Air Ministry until Macmillan, the Chancellor, 
and the Foreign Secretary had approved the notion) he extended the logic of the White 
Paper which restricted fighters to protecting the deterrent. Sandys ruled out the 
possibility of a Soviet surprise attack because such 'large-scale preparations' would not 
go unnoticed, meaning there would be ample warning to keep the V-bombers on high 
alert: 
 
In these circumstances, the absence of any defence would clearly have no 
effect on the ability of our bombers to take off on their initial sortie. It is 
true that a fighter defence might succeed in preserving some of our airfields 
from destruction, thereby enabling those of the bombers which returned 
safely to make further sorties. But, having regard to the heavy casualties 
which are expected, this cannot be more than a marginal factor. Moreover, it 
is questionable whether the Russians would, in fact, attack empty airfields in 
preference to centres of population.
592
 
 
   Sandys concluded that 'from the military standpoint, our fighter defences in Britain do 
not fulfil a really essential function'.
593
 The timing of this proposal may have been 
fortunate with Macmillan just back from Washington, but by December the Prime 
Minister was also considering abolishing Fighter Command, which he had originally 
wished to do as Minister of Defence in 1954. The Defence Committee considered the 
fact that fighters would prove 'useless' against ballistic missiles, and Macmillan agreed 
with Sandys in relation to 'the military point of view' making it difficult to justify fighter 
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expenditure, but both Macmillan and Sandys gave Fighter Command a reprieve due to 
its role in protecting Strategic Air Command facilities and because Macmillan had 
concerns about the 'psychological impact' of appearing to leave the British people 
without any fighter defence.
594
  
 
   Navias has written that Sandys here had the choice between 'taking his own 
declaratory statements [in the White Paper] about defending the V-bombers seriously' 
and the pursuit of further spending reductions, concluding that he pressed forward with 
his search for economies and was not overly attentive to the problems of 
vulnerability'.
595
 Sandys did write to the Air Ministry asking how much money could be 
saved on fighter defences, but he had also told Ward that there could be no war until the 
Soviet Union acquired enough ballistic missiles for a surprise attack.
596
 It is irrelevant to 
this thesis whether Sandys was correct in thinking fighter defence had become 
redundant, but it is incorrect to claim that he had not considered the problems of 
vulnerability. He had been doing so since the Second World War, and just happened to 
have reached a different conclusion to the Air Ministry. 
 
   Fighter Command survived, but the acceptance of what Sandys had originally sought 
to include in the White Paper - that defence was impossible, and that Britain would be 
decisively ruined in any nuclear exchange - had ramifications for Blue Streak. If the V-
bombers could get away before their airfields were destroyed, then concerns about the 
time it took to prepare Blue Streak were weakened. If they would be destroyed on their 
runways in a surprise attack, then planning beyond that moment was an irrelevance, as 
Britain would have lost the war. These concerns were also reflected in the debates that 
took place concerning the future of the V-bombers. Sandys said that any Soviet attack 
would be 'preceded by a period of international tension or localised war', which would 
also have provided enough time for Blue Streak to be made ready.
597
 More importantly, 
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if the principle of there being no defence against nuclear attack was clearly not yet fully 
accepted - hence the continuing debate over fighter defences - the Prime Minister 
coming to formally recognise this offered tacit support to Blue Streak as the most 
convincing basis for any policy of deterrence. This ties into the debates surrounding the 
strength of the V-bomber force, where economic concerns have again been cited as 
having dictated Sandys' actions.  
 
   The first draft of the 1957 White Paper had said the V-bombers 'will in due course be 
supplemented and later replaced by ballistic rockets'.
598
 The published White Paper 
differed and declared an 'intention' that the V-bombers would merely be 'supplemented 
by ballistic rockets'.
599
 When Sandys became Minister of Defence the existing plans 
expected Britain to have a force of 184 V-bombers, 120 of which would be Mark II 
versions able to carry the Blue Steel propelled bomb. However, existing orders provided 
for an eventual force of 176, only 40 of which would be Mark IIs.
600
 Sandys felt that 
propelled bomb capabilities were crucial to 'any serious deterrent influence upon the 
Kremlin', and in May he put forward policies for 184 aircraft including 120 Mark IIs.
601
 
The Chancellor refused to commit himself when Sandys' put in a request for 95 Mark 
IIs, but Sandys told the Defence Committee in July that he still felt 'that a force of this 
size is desirable'.
602
 
 
   In August Sandys retreated from these numbers, which Navias has said was due to 
Treasury pressure, Sandys' apparent willingness to deter in concert with the United 
States, and his belief that 'if worst came to worst' Britain would still possess enough 
aircraft to deter the Soviet Union independently. In order to remain consistent with his 
argument that Sandys largely ignored strategic considerations, Navias quotes Sandys as 
going back on his previous advocacy of Air Ministry figures by saying 'there could be 
no arithmetical proof that this was the right figure'.
603
 This would give the impression 
that Sandys was wriggling out of his previous recommendations with vague 
explanations; but his words need to be placed in their full context: 
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The Air Staff now proposed a front-line strength of 184 aircraft of which 
120 would be Mark II Victors and Vulcans as the minimum needed to 
provide an effective military force in global war. There could be no 
arithmetical proof that this was the right figure; but the operational 
arguments in its favour were sound.
604
 
 
   It is true that Sandys recommended that the V-bomber force be reduced to 144 with 
104 Mark IIs; but to say, as Navias does, that reductions were being made 'on the basis 
of economic considerations' misinterprets Sandys' motives. Of course Sandys 
considered the economic effects of any proposal, pointing to 'our investment 
programmes as a whole... imposing a severe strain on the economy'; and he did say that 
'we should never, in practice, expect to challenge the Soviet Union alone'.
605
 But this 
does not mean he focussed on costs and only then sought to strengthen his arguments 
'with an explicit rejection of a preference for unilateral strategic actions', as Navias 
claims.
606
 Given that we have seen in the previous section how he valued the retention 
of an independent nuclear capability in relation to Thor, and how he had alluded to it 
just months before this apparent August climb-down, it is hard to accept that he had 
gone back on this point in order to save relatively small amounts of money.
607
 More 
likely, he still regarded 104 Mark II V-bombers as constituting a worthwhile threat until 
they too could be upgraded - that is to say replaced - by Blue Streak. Powell confirmed 
this in later life when he recalled that the prospect of Blue Streak 'coming in to take 
over' was known to 'lay behind' decisions made about the V-bombers, and that, whilst 
economies had to be made, it was believed that 144 aircraft 'would be quite sufficient to 
determine the weight of attack that would serve as the deterrent'.
608
 
 
The 1958 White Paper and the First Period of Doubt 
 
   These shifts were reflected in the 1958 White Paper, Britain's Contribution to Peace 
and Security, which merely reported the progress of Sandys' previous offering. 
Devoting lengthy passages on disarmament and interdependence, this latest White Paper 
                                                          
604
 CAB 131/18, D. (57) 7th Meeting: 2 August, 1957. 
605
 CAB 131/18, D. (57) 7th Meeting: 2 August, 1957. 
606
 Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, pp. 171-72. 
607
 54 million pounds over five years - less than one per cent of projected defence spending over that 
period. Based on the figures included in 'Strategic Bomber Force: Memorandum by the Minister of 
Defence, 26 July, 1957'; CAB 131/18, D. (57) 15. 
608
 'Defence Turning Point', p. 31 and NHP/SR2. 
177 
 
also went further than its predecessor in its backing of Blue Streak, claiming that despite 
acquiring Thor, a ballistic missile 'of a much more advanced type is being developed on 
the highest priority'.
609
 That this could have been published as official government 
policy in February 1958 suggests that Blue Streak had benefitted from the debates over 
bombers and fighters, as the policy-making process for the 1958 White Paper began in 
December 1957.
610
 However, as was previously the case, the finished product differed 
from its earlier versions. The basic premise of 1957 remained; but whilst the first few 
drafts of January all mentioned ballistic missiles, there was nothing to suggest that 
Britain would produce its own. It was clearly stated that manned bombers would be 
'supplemented' by ballistic missiles, but this was directly related to the Thor agreements. 
Even when drafts paid tribute to the Soviet Union's 'remarkable progress in rocket 
development' there was no firm commitment to a British-built weapon, choosing instead 
to cite American weapons as countering Soviet developments and maintaining the 
stalemate.
611
 Further proofs of  late January and early February made similar omissions, 
and there is nothing to suggest that the Ministry of Defence was questioned about 
this.
612
 
 
   It was not until 5 February that the 'British ballistic rocket of more advanced design' 
was mentioned in the version submitted to the Cabinet and the Defence Committee, 
who raised no objection to its inclusion.
613
 The Air Ministry was beginning to question 
the Thor agreement at this point, so they would have defended Blue Streak; but the 
issue of nuclear sufficiency may have seen Mountbatten and Templer question the 
programme. It can only be speculated upon as to why this commitment suddenly 
appeared as the White Paper went before the politicians. Perhaps Sandys thought there 
would be less detailed scrutiny at Cabinet level. It is noticeable, however, that in the 
House of Commons debate on the White Paper, Sandys never said that Britain was 
building its own ballistic missile. Even when Ward and the Minister of Supply, Aubrey 
Jones, defended the White Paper, there was no mention of Blue Streak.
614
 Blue Streak 
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does not appear to have been publicly mentioned at all until late-June, when Sandys said 
production was on-going and that its independence would be guaranteed by British-built 
warheads.
615
 
 
   This becomes even more strange when you consider that, although it had sailed 
through the autumn and winter, problems with Blue Streak had become apparent during 
the period. In August the Defence Research Policy Committee claimed reductions in 
research and development spending had added six months to its timetable, and Jones 
worried in October that Blue Streak would probably go over budget by 'at least 100%', 
as every American missile programme had.
616
 Even the Ministry of Defence thought 
that progress could not be increased without resources 'from elsewhere'.
617
 The result of 
this was that Blue Streak entered 1958 in crisis.
618
 Sandys had asked around for ways of 
accelerating the programme, but no solutions were forthcoming, and securing 'some 
form of exceptional priority' for Blue Streak was not considered politically or 
economically viable.
619
 When Brundrett told Sandys that Blue Streak would probably 
end up costing twice its original estimates, Sandys responded by asking him to re-
consider the V-bomber requirements.
620
 He also asked Jones to consider whether 
Britain's requirements could be met by manufacturing American weapons, such as a 
land-based Polaris.
621
 
 
   Had all of this been made clear during the White Paper drafting process, it is likely 
that Blue Streak would have been questioned. Is it possible that Sandys had minimised 
(or even concealed) any concerns over this period when they might have been pounced 
upon, knowing that he could then work around them? He had conceded important parts 
of his strategic concept in the 1957 White Paper only to then attempt to re-direct them 
towards his original intentions, so this would represent a consistent approach to the 
policy-making process. If this was the case, then Sandys' initial attempts to deal with 
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this uncertainty would confirm points previously made in this thesis. His willingness to 
consider American delivery systems at this point - months before his brief enthusiasm 
for Thor - strengthens the idea that his concept of nuclear independence was based upon 
the possession of worthwhile strike capabilities, and it was only Jones' claim that the 
United States would refuse to sell Britain the lightweight warheads it would need 
'without strings' that ruined that particular solution, as this would have prevented Britain 
from exercising full control over its weapons.
622
 That he sought to re-open the V-
bomber programme in order to release resources for Blue Streak also strengthens the 
contention that he had Blue Streak in mind when he accepted reduced numbers.
623
 This 
is also the case for his attempts at re-opening the fighter issue that had seemingly been 
settled only days before. Much like how he had assigned aircraft carriers to anti-
submarine duties, this was further evidence of Sandys attempting to re-write policy with 
the aim of furthering his original policy preferences - in this case maintaining an 
effective ballistic missile system under full British control. That he spent January 
frantically addressing issues with Blue Streak whilst failing to mention it during the 
White Paper drafting process, only to then include it in February having resolved none 
of these problems, also suggests that he had sheltered it from scrutiny, and possibly 
even attempted to withhold crucial information from other leading policy-makers. 
 
   This is further supported by the fact that he did not make any formal attempt to solve 
the issue until well after the White Paper had been published. Tuttle, now Deputy Chief 
of the Air Staff, warned that Air Ministry in February that development had reached a 
'dangerously slow pace'.
624
 This would have been another opportune moment to consult 
the Cabinet and the Defence Committee, but Sandys did not arrange crisis talks until 
April when he chaired a meeting of officials from the Ministry of Defence and the 
Ministry of Supply, with Tuttle representing the Air Staff. These Blue Streak-friendly 
policy-makers arranged for a working party to be set up under Powell with 
representatives from those ministries already present; for Sandys to be kept informed of 
any threatened delays stemming from decisions 'outside the Ministry of Supply'; and for 
Jones to prepare a paper 'with a view to an approach by the Minister of Defence to the 
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Chancellor'.
625
 Tuttle was frank in his report to the Air Ministry that the 'only object in 
having the meeting was to endeavour to accelerate the time by which the R.A.F. might 
have BLUE STREAK in operational use', and that the working party would 'make 
recommendations with a view to accelerating the date'.
626
 We have seen with McGrigor 
and Dickson finding common ground at the expense of the Army during the Radical 
Review that making mutually beneficial arrangements was not entirely new to the 
defence policy-making process; but now three significant ministries were colluding to 
ensure Blue Streak entered service, thereby undermining the point of separate Service 
Ministries existing to defend their sectional interests by binding them to the Ministry of 
Defence position.
627
 
 
   The Ministry of Supply and Air Ministry listed measures to hasten development, such 
as using American testing facilities as well as just buying components (from guidance 
systems to full engines), but were stuck for solutions, particularly when the Air Ministry 
raised the cost of the proposed underground launching sites.
628
 The final report of the 
Working Party, compiled by Chilver, was equally short of ideas beyond deploying 
hand-made 'unproved production rounds' ahead of schedule.
629
 The report created an 
appropriate atmosphere of crisis, and Sandys called Jones and Ward (as well as their 
civil servants and advisors) in to remind them that Britain had a policy of 'maintaining 
continuously in being an independent element of British nuclear retaliatory power', 
making it 'essential for Britain to develop a major rocket project of her own'.
630
 This 
appears to have been the meeting where Sandys' turned to Thor, as it was suggested that 
the loosening of the McMahon Act might allow Britain to buy them 'without strings'. 
However, as the previous section argued, this was explicitly connected to the idea that it 
remained 'necessary to expand British development capacity', and that any alternative to 
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Blue Streak would have to retain its main qualities: 'its range, its invulnerability against 
attack and its independence'.
631
 
 
   Sandys agreed to ask the Chancellor for 'the provision of more test facilities' and to 
suggest ways of hastening deployment.
632
 This approach to the Treasury had been two 
months in the making, and Sandys again made sure to emphasise the central tenets of 
his belief system in making the case for Blue Streak. The first draft put to Sandys said 
that by the mid-1960s 'the deterrent value of the V Bomber Force, even with the 
propelled bomb, will be declining owing to the introduction in the interval of a Russian 
ground-to-air missile defence system'. Sandys struck a line through the mention of 
propelled bombs and referred to 'the growth in the interval of the Russian missile 
defence system'.
633
 By removing the temptation to depend on air-to-surface missiles, 
Sandys removed the notion of continuing to depend on manned bombers, which was 
strengthened by the suggestion that the Soviets already had effective counter-measures. 
The need for Blue Streak was also stressed in one of the concluding sections that 
originally described it as being of 'cardinal importance', calling its introduction by 1965 
a 'vital factor'. Sandys changed this so that Blue Streak became 'one of the central 
features in our whole defence concept', with timing being upgraded to a 'critical 
factor'.
634
 
 
   The second, expanded draft received similar alterations. Where it was suggested that 
Britain 'ought to get an effective ballistic missile into service as soon as possible', 
Sandys said Britain 'must' do so. This draft ran for five pages, and Sandys simply 
removed three of them. The paragraph including the words 'expensive as it is' was 
erased, as were suggestions that the amended McMahon Act might allow for reduced 
expenditure. He also removed the section debunking 'the idea that we can discontinue 
our own rocket programme'; all mention of adopting American-made weapons; and the 
case against not accelerating the Blue Streak programme, and against using a lighter 
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warhead, was also taken out.
635
 As had been the case the previous summer, Sandys may 
have wished not to cast doubts on the programme where they did not already exist. But 
in removing passages that actually defended Blue Streak, albeit whilst conceding that 
there were reasons to doubt it, the implication is that should scrutiny have been applied 
to Blue Streak at this stage then it would have been difficult for the government to come 
down on its side. If this was the case it would represent a striking example of both 
Sandys' underhand methods and, as was made clear in this version of the letter, his 
unwavering belief that 'our right course, if we want to preserve an independent 
deterrent, is to continue BLUE STREAK and to accelerate the programme as now 
proposed'.
636
 
 
   When Sandys circulated his September memorandum on scaling back Blue Streak and 
concentrating on its successor whilst using an independent version of Thor, he cited the 
'favourable developments' brought about by the relaxation of the McMahon Act that 
assured Britain 'full information' about the manufacture of lightweight warheads as well 
as making it possible 'that we may now be allowed to acquire American rocket tails 
without political restrictions'.
637
 It has been shown how Sandys saw this as leading to 
the possibility of a 'more advanced weapon' developed in partnership with allies, 
thereby not really representing a relaxation of his policy preferences; but the Ministry of 
Defence seems to have entered into a period of doubt at this point, and Sandys had to 
steady the ship. This had been partly prompted by the nuclear sufficiency debates, with 
the War Office questioning the independent British nuclear capability in July, and 
calling for the total reverse of Sandys' policy preferences by assigning lowest priority to 
'any weapon which would only be used in global war'. Jones also thought Britain was 
devoting too many resources to 'long-range nuclear weapons', and echoed calls for a 
strategic re-appraisal.
638
 The Air Ministry was still in full agreement with Sandys, who 
told the Defence Board that: 
 
Britain must continue to make an independent contribution to the nuclear 
retaliatory power of the West... Moreover, unless the independent British 
deterrent were to be allowed to lapse, we must in due course provide 
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ourselves with a ballistic rocket, under our own control, to succeed the 
bomber aircraft. It was not, in his opinion, necessary that the rocket should 
be made in Britain, provided its use was not restricted by 'political 
strings'.
639
 
 
   He added that discussions with the Americans had led him to believe that Thor might 
be available free of conditions along with information to design a suitable British 
warhead. If this could be arranged, it might be possible to 'drop' Blue Streak and join the 
United States in developing a 'more advanced solid propellant missile of the POLARIS 
type'.
640
 Sandys considered Thor so long as it did not prevent Britain building its own 
ballistic missile, but that that weapon should have been identified as a solid fuel weapon 
at this early stage connects to Sandys' conduct during the debates over Polaris. Like 
Sandys, Powell also bound the use of Thor to the development of Blue Streak's 
successor, advising that Blue Streak continue until 'favourable answers' from the United 
States made this successor weapon a possibility. Interestingly, Powell also refers to any 
successor in terms of it being a solid fuel weapon. Blue Streak was ruled out for 
conversion to solid fuel because Britain could not make a light enough warhead, but he 
specified a 'more advanced missile of the POLARIS type using solid propellant'.
641
 If in 
August the Ministry of Defence identified solid fuel as the future basis of any ballistic 
missile, Sandys and the department suddenly becoming hostile to it at the same time as 
they rediscovered their enthusiasm for Blue Streak (enabled by the implementation of 
non-specific technological developments) is highly questionable. 
 
   The solid fuel issue appears to have been solved when its effect on Blue Streak was 
given proper consideration. Chilver wrote to Powell on Sandys' behalf asking 'are we 
clear why we are so anxious to have a solid-fuel rocket?' He cited range and 
development issues, but the letter revealed Sandys' policy preferences as being decisive 
when it asked: 
 
I have seen no proper examinations of whether it would be cheaper or less 
vulnerable (apart from the possibility of launching it from a submarine)... 
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To settle a policy will include deciding what we want in the long term, i.e. 
what we mean by "wanting to stay in the rocket business".
642
 
 
   Was this a concession that submarine-launched missiles were cheaper and less 
vulnerable than Blue Streak? Equally, was it an admission that 'official' Ministry of 
Defence policy was to back land-based ballistic missiles regardless, even if it meant 
pressing on with weapons utilising an inferior fuel source? It certainly indicates a 
discernible amount of bias towards Blue Streak within the department. Further evidence 
of this can be seen in a response to an early draft of Sandys' September memorandum 
prepared by Chilver. This said that 'If we can get suitable American rockets for our 
independent deterrent, we should give up the development of BLUE STREAK', but 
failed to link this move to the development of a successor weapon. This draft 
recommended the solid fuel Minuteman as the ideal weapon system for Britain, and 
even conceded that submarine-launched missiles had great advantages, albeit whilst 
claiming it would be wrong to 'rely wholly' on them when detection methods might 
improve.
643
 E. C. Williams, the Scientific Advisor (Intelligence) at the Ministry of 
Defence, told Chilver 'I do not like this paper at all': 
 
The deterrent can only be considered independent if it is absolutely manifest 
that it is independent not only now but can remain so in the future... That 
means to say that it must be known that we retain in this country the 
capacity to carry on building deterrent vehicles and warheads even if a 
future American administration changes its mind.
644
 
 
   This may have been an influential intervention in terms of directing Chilver's draft 
towards its final form, as would warning against giving Ministers the impression that 
'there is any cheap way of maintaining an independent British deterrent which must in 
the long run be a rocket'.
645
 This might explain Sandys caveats for acquiring Thor 
'without strings', but what about the move back towards Blue Streak in November?  
 
   Despite the low mood around the Ministry of Defence following the Washington talks 
and the doubts over Blue Streak, this was not reflected in Sandys' November 
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memoranda, nor in his conduct during this period. In mid-October Brundrett had said 
that Thor could fulfil Britain's requirements until 1968, but that the United States' 
decision to discontinue intermediate-range missiles meant that Britain would be unable 
to buy a successor. Working on the assumption that it would have to be land-based, he 
insisted that Polaris had too short a range, and that solid fuels were inherently inferior. 
He was therefore 'forced, with considerable disappointment, to conclude that... we 
should continue with Blue Streak'.
646
 In response to this Sandys met his officials and 
made it clear that 'we could not guarantee the maintenance of an independent deterrent 
unless we went with BLUE STREAK'. Polaris' warheads were too small, and solid fuel 
weapons would remain inferior 'for some time at least'. It was therefore decided that 
policy should revert back to where it had stood in July when Sandys had asked the 
Chancellor to accelerate the Blue Streak programme.
647
 
 
   This uncertainty became truly problematic when Jones sent Sandys his 'personal 
thoughts' on Blue Streak, admitting he too only supported it reluctantly. Jones was of 
the opinion that the United States deterrent was all-powerful, and that Britain only 
needed its own nuclear capabilities for 'reasons of prestige and as an insurance policy'. 
Like Brundrett, Jones also discounted solid fuel missiles as an immediate solution; 
particularly Polaris, which he said was 'specifically designed for submarine use', and 
therefore of no use to Britain. However, he did recommend further investigation into 
solid fuels, suggesting that a programme of research and development should be 
undertaken with money from Blue Streak's budget.
648
 This was a definite attempt to 
distance the Ministry of Supply from both Sandys' strategic concept and his 
unwillingness to consider solid fuel weapons. The real problem for Sandys, however, 
was that Jones sent copies of this letter to the service ministries. Having compromised 
their supposedly neutral role in the policy-making process by following Sandys' Blue 
Streak policies and colluding with him and the Air Ministry to ensure their success, by 
revealing this uncertainty to the Admiralty and the War Office, Jones was now aiding 
those departments that agreed with him that 'the main military objective of this country 
should be preparedness for limited war'.
649
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   Mountbatten used this information in a meeting of the Defence Board, where he tried 
to argue that whilst Blue Streak ought to continue, it should be reviewed within twelve 
months lest Britain commit itself 'irrevocably' to depending on it. He was clearly 
angling for Polaris, but Sandys closed the meeting by citing 'general agreement that a 
land-based rocket would be required to maintain an independent British deterrent'.
650
 
This failed to satisfy either party, and the following week Mountbatten, with Army 
support, questioned Sandys' policies on nuclear independence. Sandys claimed it was 
'inconceivable that Britain would hesitate to use her own nuclear retaliatory power' if 
the United States abandoned Western Europe, making the retention of an independent 
nuclear capability 'no less important for the future than it was now'. Mountbatten made 
his 'national suicide' remark in response, and Sandys exploded: 
 
These so-called priorities had never been, and never could be, mutually 
exclusive... He did not believe that the anxiety shown by the First Sea Lord 
and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was really concerned about our 
deterrent policy. In his view they were concerned lest the high cost of the 
deterrent should necessitate cuts in the conventional forces.
651
 
 
   He said that even if Blue Streak was cancelled in favour of an independent version of 
Thor, the British missile programme could not disappear as Thor would eventually need 
replacing. Even if its replacement was another American weapon, Britain would have to 
make that independent, so 'it was wrong to assume that, if we abandoned altogether our 
contribution to the nuclear deterrent, the resultant financial savings could be used to 
increase expenditure on conventional forces'.
652
 This signalled that Sandys had re-
discovered his enthusiasm for Blue Streak, and that he was not willing to allow his 
strategic concept to fail alongside it. He had explored alternative ways of providing 
Britain with a truly independent nuclear capability, but none of them had been suitable. 
Now he had to make sure Blue Streak could proceed as planned. 
 
Sandys' Final White Paper 
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   Sandys' determination that Blue Streak should succeed can be seen in his November 
memoranda. These ought to have reflected the climate of doubt and confusion that had 
surrounded the programme, but Sandys was once again able to override any uncertainty 
and present an image of calm, resolute support by altering the more balanced proposals 
put to him by Chilver. The first document Chilver produced did reflect the uncertain 
climate. The Washington talks were framed as a disappointment, and the plan was for 
Sandys to say 'I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the revised policy I outlined 
[in September] is not feasible'. Blue Streak was backed in this draft, and although 
Polaris was noted to have an inadequate range, it was suggested that in light of 
emerging alternatives Blue Streak be kept 'under review, in common with the rest of our 
programme'.
653
 The official files do not contain any subsequent drafts, but what Sandys 
circulated was drastically different in both content and tone. There was no reluctance in 
his memorandum, and whilst Chilver had said Blue Streak could utilise 'anti-defensive 
measures or other improvements', Sandys implied that he had been made aware of these 
in Washington (and suggested as much in the Defence Committee meeting). The section 
on Polaris made up of weak arguments, as discussed in the previous section, was his 
own inclusion. Finally, Sandys' memorandum simply stated that he had 'come to the 
conclusion that, if we wish to maintain an independent British contribution to the 
nuclear deterrent, after the mid-sixties, we must proceed with the development of BLUE 
STREAK'.
654
 
 
   The main difference between what Chilver and Sandys produced is the certainty of 
Sandys' version. There was no point keeping Blue Streak 'under review' because to 
Sandys it was indisputable that a land-based ballistic missile was the ideal nuclear 
delivery system, and to keep the question open 'in common with the rest of our 
programme' was absurd. From Sandys' perspective, Blue Streak was the rest of the 
programme, aspects of which were only left open in order to ensure that the central idea 
of the 1957 White Paper - that Britain maintain a viable nuclear strike capability in 
order to deter Soviet aggression - could become a reality. Sandys' entire strategic 
concept was based upon the idea of ballistic missiles having mastery of all other 
weapon systems, which could be (and should be) sacrificed in order to make Blue 
Streak a reality. Britain failing to press ahead with Blue Streak as recommended would 
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have meant it ceased to possess a viable nuclear strike capability beyond the lives of the 
V-bombers, thereby making his entire defence review redundant. 
 
   We have seen in relation to Polaris how Sandys managed Blue Streak through the end 
of 1958, with his second November memorandum reiterating his support for the 
programme, albeit whilst appearing to support watching Polaris' progress. Clark has said 
that by this point 'it was apparent that Blue Streak would proceed but on a provisional 
basis only', citing Macmillan's 8 December wish to 'pause for a year or so, until we are 
in a better position to make a firm choice'.
655
 But this does not seem to have been 
embraced by the Ministry of Defence. As far as they were concerned, the immediate 
crisis of confidence had passed. This can be seen in early drafts of the 1959 White Paper 
which were prepared in late-1958. The 'first shot' at a draft, produced in late-November, 
mentioned that Britain had a 'need for ballistic rockets' after the V-bombers expired, but 
could only note in the margin 'Will it be BLUE STREAK?'
656
 By Christmas (despite 
Macmillan's intervention) this had become a detailed passage about the limited life-
spans of the V-bombers and Thor, adding that 'Work is therefore continuing on the 
development of the British ballistic rocket BLUE STREAK', and only mentioning 
Polaris with more hollow support on condition that 'available resources were 
unlimited'.
657
 
 
   However, as noted in the previous section, Sandys had agreed to review the future of 
Britain's nuclear deterrent, and Powell worried that such a definite statement in favour 
of Blue Streak 'prejudges the outcome'. This was standard procedural advice from 
Powell, but he revealed the Ministry of Defence's interest when he added 'This enquiry 
will, in my view, take something like six months, but so long as BLUE STREAK 
continues in the meantime, there is no need to hurry it and, indeed, every reason against 
hurry'.
658
 This was because whilst Blue Streak continued its development it swallowed 
up further resources. This made it more difficult to cancel as wasted time and 
expenditure would (and did) prove embarrassing for the government, and Sandys' 
second November memorandum going further into the costs - both financial and 
political - of Blue Streak than his previous papers is no coincidence, even though he had 
previously been reluctant to raise the expenditure issue lest it attract negative attention. 
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This memorandum now admitted that Blue Streak involved 'heavy expenditure', about 
£480 million (£200 million on development, the rest on production and deployment), 
but adding that this could only be understood in relation to the costs of the V-bombers, 
in which case it was 'really not more than might reasonably be expected'. What had 
already been 'spent or committed' was stressed, knowing that the government would 
find it difficult to justify writing-off large amounts of capital.
659
 
 
   This echoed Jones' qualified support in October, which included the fact that 'we have 
gone some way with Blue Streak' as a reason against cancellation; but Sandys presented 
his renewed support as owing more to the inferiority of alternative systems, with his 
concluding remarks claiming 'We have already spent or committed £50m. on BLUE 
STREAK. It would obviously not make sense to stop the project now and then quite 
likely have to start it up again in a few years' time'.
660
 This conceded the practical case 
against writing-off previous expenditure, which could imply reluctance; but his policy 
preferences became clear when he stated his belief that Britain would end up having to 
rely on Blue Streak anyway in the same paragraph that admitted Polaris might be viable 
'If we were starting from scratch' and could wait three years for its 'prospects' to be 
realised.
661
 When read as one statement this displays a marked cynicism towards 
Polaris, as well as demonstrating his well-established belief in land-based ballistic 
missiles as the inevitable weapon of choice for anybody actually wishing to retain a 
viable nuclear delivery system.  
 
   This explains Sandys' relaxed attitude towards the review, which was to work on the 
basis of existing British policies. These were currently in the process of being re-stated 
by Sandys in the upcoming White Paper, the next draft of which not only committed 
Britain to Blue Streak, but explained why submarine-launched and solid fuel systems 
were inferior to it 'from the operational or financial standpoint'.
662
 The 1959 White 
Paper, Progress of the Five-Year Defence Plan, was a brief one, and the official files 
suggest that it did not undergo the same amount of deliberation as Sandys' previous 
White Papers. Both the Cabinet and the Defence Committee devoted little time to it, 
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seeing only two printed proofs, and not insisting on any substantial alterations. The one 
change that the published version did make was the removal of any mention of 
alternatives to Blue Streak, which was described 'on present knowledge' as being 'the 
type of missile best suited to British needs'.
663
 
 
   Sandys justified this brevity in the defence debate by claiming that 'the policy 
approved by the House two years ago has proved itself to be sound and workable and 
has, therefore, not had to be changed'.
664
 He ran through most of his policies in short 
order, but unlike the previous year, he sought to defend Blue Streak at length: 
 
Rockets - particularly long-range guided rockets with nuclear warheads - 
are, of course, expensive things. But the rocket is not a superfluous addition 
to our armoury. We must remember that the role of the ballistic rocket is to 
take the place of the V-bomber when it comes to the end of its operational 
life. If we did not make the rocket, we should have to develop and 
manufacture another generation of strategic bombers and provide the trained 
crews, airfields and control systems to operate them.
665
 
 
   He compared the cost of Blue Streak to another manned bomber, saying 'It follows 
that if we can afford a bomber deterrent now, we should be able to afford a rocket 
deterrent in the future', before responding to calls of 'How much?' by defending Blue 
Streak as 'the type of weapon which will best suit our needs'. To convince the House of 
this he then claimed 'The Americans are at present putting their main effort into liquid-
fuel intercontinental land-based missiles. We believe that they are quite right, however, 
if they can afford it, also to develop alternative methods'.
666
 The United States was 
certainly developing liquid fuel weapons, but their 'main effort', as Sandys had been told 
in Washington, was directed towards the solid fuel Minuteman and Polaris.  
 
   He had suggested in his opening remarks that critics of his cuts to non-nuclear forces 
failed to recognise that 'the circumstances in which we might have to carry out military 
operations entirely on our own, without allies, are today very limited', adding 'I find it 
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hard to visualise any wars which we might have to fight alone without allies'.
667
 Frank 
Beswick then asked from the Labour benches 'If that is the case with regard to 
conventional forces, in what circumstances does he think we are going to use the 
deterrent nuclear weapon independently of the U.S.A., and if not, what is the good of 
it?'
668
 Beswick had been a pilot during the Second World War, and one of the British 
observers of Operation Crossroads, the post-war atomic bomb tests over the summer of 
1946.
669
 Yet Sandys could only mock him about 'joining the Liberal Party' (who 
rejected the need for an independent British deterrent) and refusing to be drawn 'on a 
major issue of that kind' in reply to an intervention - that is to say, without having 
prepared for it.
670
 He was asked again 'under what circumstances he conceives the use 
of these weapons by Britain independently of their use by other Powers?', to which he 
replied 'Does he say now that he does not agree with his party that we must have an 
independent nuclear deterrent?' The Speaker was asked then to intervene as 'he 
apparently refuses to answer a question of crucial significance', before Sandys said such 
questions were 'tedious' and refused any further interventions.
671
 
 
   Clark has suggested that Sandys' admission that he would 'continue to watch progress 
of other developments in America and elsewhere' demonstrates the 'qualified nature of 
the Government's commitment to Blue Streak'.
672
 But read as a whole Sandys' speech 
can only be taken as a defence of Blue Streak, even if it appears from reading Hansard 
that he was keen to delve into the details of Blue Streak to avoid having to justify its 
strategic value. This is because. despite the fact that he refused to elaborate on the 
precise uses he had in mind for Blue Streak, he nevertheless stressed its independence, 
claiming that 'any other course would involve a wholly unjustifiable gamble' and that 
'Thor is not an element of independent British nuclear power... it is certainly not a 
successor to the V-bomber'.
673
 He may have been reluctant to make a definitive 
statement regarding Britain's wish to retain the capability to deter the Soviet Union 
unilaterally - in the era of interdependence it is understandable that the Minister of 
Defence was unwilling to suggest that this might be a necessity, even though it made it 
difficult to defend reductions in other areas - but we have seen that this was definitely 
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Sandys' intention, which shows that his support of Blue Streak, and by extension 
Britain's independent nuclear capability, was by this point decidedly unqualified.   
 
   Labour tried to exploit this (public) incoherence by questioning both Blue Streak and 
Sandys' approach to it, with George Brown, Labour's defence spokesman, focussing on 
the idea of 'present knowledge' determining its future: 
 
I am bound to say that I am surprised at the extent to which the right hon. 
Gentleman ties himself to land-based static launchers of the nuclear 
deterrent in the future, and why he rules out seaborne solid fuel rockets. The 
continuance of the V-bombers with their standoff bomb will carry us a long 
way ahead, probably quite long enough to reach out to when the seaborne 
solid fuel invulnerable mobile rocket arrives. Why does the right hon. 
Gentleman rule them out as firmly as he does?
674
 
 
   The next day Sandys defended an independent nuclear capability on the grounds that 
the United States appreciated its contribution and because it might 'in certain 
circumstances, be a decisive factor in preventing war by miscalculation'. He had 
touched upon the idea of nuclear sufficiency forcing the United States out of Western 
Europe, but failed to clarify his position by saying such a retreat was 'inconceivable', 
and still refusing to address the prospect of unilateral action.
675
 
 
   He then turned to Blue Streak as a delivery system, admitting that Polaris' mobility 
was one of its 'very great attractions', but adding 'it should not be assumed that the 
removal of the deterrent from this island would in practice protect our population from 
attack'. He said Polaris' warhead was too small, but then introduced a new concern by 
suggesting the missile itself was too small to accommodate 'means of evading or foxing 
the anti-missile missile which is coming up to destroy it', which were important if 'we 
wish our rocket to remain an effective deterrent for a reasonable time'.
676
 Sandys had 
suggested the incorporation of these in his November memoranda, and he does appear 
to have been genuine in believing that they would increase in importance; but as with 
the question of lightweight warheads and solid propellants, his inability (or 
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unwillingness) to apply his usual long-term outlook to specific technological 
developments that ran counter to Blue Streak's best interests raises questions.
677
 
 
   This is where Clark's argument proves problematic. The government (Macmillan and 
other leading policy-makers), might well have remained uncertain about Blue Streak; 
but this does not apply to Sandys, and the question of counter-measures reveals how he 
was capable of holding contradictory beliefs where it suited Blue Streak. When Britain 
acquired Polaris it eventually developed systems aimed at confounding any Soviet 
counter-measures. It could be argued that the cost of these counter-measures, and the 
fact that they reduced its range, validated Sandys' concerns.
678
 However, given the 
information available to him at the time, he had little reason to believe that this would 
prove to be the case, and in claiming only something the size of Blue Streak could carry 
electronic counter-measures, Sandys was effectively discounting further development of 
the Polaris system, as he had over the question of solid fuels.
679
 There was no reason for 
Sandys to believe that only Blue Streak could accommodate counter-measures, and 
although Polaris was adapted with some difficulty, it still managed to incorporate them 
and remain viable. That is not to say that the case could not have been made, or that 
Sandys would not have felt confident making predictions about the future of unmanned 
weaponry; but by this point he had been thinking about the next phase of missile 
development for fifteen years, so he was either satisfied that missile development had 
peaked, or he was being disingenuous to protect Blue Streak. Nevertheless, it had 
survived another immediate crisis, and the review of deterrent policy could begin. 
 
The Nuclear Deterrent Study Group and Emerging Alternatives 
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   In late-March Powell wrote to Sandys proposing that Blue Streak's future be debated 
by representatives from the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the Ministry of Supply, the 
Atomic Energy Authority, and the Army. He wanted to leave the Air Force and the 
Navy out because they were 'expected to have a bias', although he would consider 
including them both instead of the Army, lest their support be pursued. There is some 
indication that Powell was distancing himself from previous Ministry of Defence 
thinking at this point, particularly in his reluctance to include Brundrett. Brundrett was 
the leading scientist in the defence policy-making process, but Powell said 'he is 
generally known to hold certain strong views on the subject', and proposed merely to 
keep him informed.
680
 It may have been the case that the government maintained 
'qualified' support for Blue Streak, but Sandys position was made clear in May when the 
Chiefs of Staff and the Cabinet Secretary began wondering why nothing had been done. 
Powell asked Sandys for his authority to proceed because, despite initially agreeing to 
the study, he had, in Powell's words, 'subsequently asked me to do nothing, in order to 
avoid casting doubt on the future of BLUE STREAK'.
681
 The official files do not appear 
to contain any written order to this effect, even though word of this had reached Lambe, 
so it could have been done informally; but this was Sandys' most overt act in defence of 
Blue Streak to date. It was one thing trying to manipulate White Papers, to depend on 
dubious arguments, and even to collude with other departments; but actively trying to 
prevent the study group from being able to potentially expose Blue Streak was next-
level duplicity, and once again suggests that he was worried that it could not survive 
government scrutiny. 
 
   Powell convened the study group in June, but with Brundrett and all three services 
present alongside the other institutions, and by July detailed terms of reference were 
set.
682
 The wish for Britain to remain capable of acting in isolation was kept in place, 
and the following technical considerations were listed: 
 
1) The ability to deter the Soviet Union (although an ability to strike at China was an 
advantage if not too costly) was the primary intention. 
2) It would most likely be used against cities. 
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3) There was a need to keep vulnerability so low that even a much larger Soviet nuclear 
capability could not expect to eliminate Britain's retaliatory capability in any 
preventative attack. 
4) The government had to maintain absolute certainty over final launching control, 
which had to be available in the shortest time possible.
683
 
 
   The summer recess intervened, but when the policy-making process resumed in 
September, Sandys received news from Jones that the main contractor for Blue Streak, 
de Havilland Propellers, expected work to cost 'substantially more' than had been 
agreed.
684
 Proving that collusion between the ministries was a thing of the past, Jones 
also sent this news to the Treasury, and the Chancellor let both of them know that there 
was no more money 'even if corresponding savings are found elsewhere in your 
programmes'.
685
 Jones claimed to have done everything possible to keep costs down, 
and suggested backing Blue Streak until its future had been decided.
686
 This was 
accompanied by a more direct letter from Sandys regretting the 'inevitable 
overspending', but backing the programme at least until after the coming election.
687
 
Sandys had started to be honest about the costs of an independent nuclear capability, but 
he still claimed the Ministry of Defence could account for it, and although he had 
previously said an independent nuclear capability was not cheap, overspending being 
described as 'inevitable' represented a major shift, the logic of which insulated Blue 
Streak from any financial arguments. This may have been what the Chancellor had in 
mind when recommending freezing expenditure, as mounting costs could well have 
forced Sandys to shred the rest of Britain's military capabilities; something which, if his 
actions during the Radical Review were anything to go by, he would have been willing 
to consider. 
 
   In mid-September the study group reported on possible alternatives to Blue Streak, 
and the submarine-launched missile appears to have been the most highly thought of 
owing to its diversity of approach paths, its ability to fire with little warning from the 
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Soviet coastline, and its ability to go undetected.
688
 Unfortunately for Sandys, his 
influence over the policy-making process was severely depleted following the October 
1959 general election, after which Macmillan moved him back to the Ministry of 
Supply with specific orders to break it up and form a Ministry of Aviation to rationalise 
the failing aircraft industry.
689
 He would still have a voice in the defence debates in this 
role, which was a task he was suited for; but there is also some suggestion that Sandys’ 
approach to policy-making had worn thin at the Ministry of Defence. His successor, 
Harold Watkinson, recalled that his first acts as Minister of Defence were to inform the 
Chiefs of Staff that he saw them 'not only as my advisers but my trusted colleagues 
whose advice I am not likely to disregard', and to replace the rectangular table Sandys 
had used to confront his advisors and express 'the dominance of the political arm of the 
Ministry' with an oval table to foster a more cordial atmosphere.
690
 
 
   Days after the election, Brundrett circulated studies completed by the Joint Global 
War Study Group that carried troubling conclusions for Blue Streak. The first report on 
submarine-launched systems concluded that it would continue to be a 'matter of the 
greatest difficulty to detect missile firing submarines at sea', and that 'on a missile for 
missile basis', Polaris' ability to cause the desired amount of damage to Soviet cities was 
'comparable with that of Blue Streak'.
691
 The second report stressed the importance of 
invulnerability, upon which the 'credibility of the deterrent' was said to depend. Here 
'bombers in the air or submarines at sea' were said to possess an advantage over land-
based ballistic missiles as control over the latter could not be delegated. In addition to 
this, concerns were raised that even the use of hardened underground silos might not 
reduce Blue Streak's vulnerability, as there could still be a period where the lids were 
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open but the missiles had not 'reached sufficient height to be immune from the blast'.
692
 
The third report did not recommend any particular system, but in concentrating on the 
likely nature of a Soviet attack on any land-based deterrent in Britain, its conclusions 
could not have failed to have an effect on policy-makers. It predicted that in neutralising 
100 hardened Blue Streak silos, the Soviet Union would probably have to use three 
missiles per site, each carrying an eight megaton warhead. Blue Streak's supporters had 
considered such a possibility during the debates of late-1958 and had satisfied 
themselves that the Soviet Union launching an attack of this scale was unrealistic, but it 
was difficult to avoid the startling result of this calculation, which was that 'Fallout from 
the scale of attack required to knock out 100 hardened missile sites widely dispersed 
over the UK would kill nearly everybody'.
693
 
 
   In a meeting of the study group convened specifically to discuss Blue Streak's 
vulnerability doubts were also raised that 'even if the political authority were given to 
fire on radar warning, there would be sufficient time to fuel and launch BLUE 
STREAK'. Despite Sandys' late-1957 claims that global war would only erupt after a 
prolonged period of international tension, concerns about Blue Streak's relative inability 
to remain on alert meant that it would in fact 'be more vulnerable to pre-emptive attack 
than the V-bombers'.
694
 Meanwhile, the Admiralty returned to the fray, and 
Mountbatten told Powell that the United States was 'most anxious' to help Britain put its 
nuclear capabilities out to sea, to the point where he thought they would be willing to 
provide 'complete drawings' of their new Polaris submarines as well as the missiles 'if 
we wanted them'.
695
 
 
   The pressure was beginning to tell on Blue Streak, and Sandys wrote to the 
Chancellor to state its case once more. He said that any project of 'exceptional size and 
complexity' was bound to prove difficult, particularly for a country with no prior 
experience of producing unmanned weaponry, and his reasoning is worth quoting at 
length: 
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I think we must face the fact that whatever we do the maintenance of an 
independent British nuclear deterrent is bound to be a costly business, in 
terms of money. But the military power, security and influence which it 
gives us is out of all proportion greater than anything we could hope to 
obtain by devoting a similar sum to forces of any conventional kind. It may, 
of course, be argued that we should scrap Blue Streak and change over to 
some other form of nuclear deterrent. If there are convincing military 
reasons for doing this, which I doubt, we must, of course, be prepared to 
change horses, but I am sure that no change of this kind would be justified 
on financial grounds.
696
 
 
   This letter has been used by Clark to argue that Sandys was by this point 
accommodating himself to the prevailing mood around Blue Streak, writing 'What is 
telling about this [letter] is that Sandys, although a supporter of Blue Streak, accepted 
the basic premise that the decision must be taken on military, and not financial, 
grounds'.
697
 This would seem to imply that Sandys was open to being convinced that 
alternative delivery systems were superior to Blue Streak; but this interpretation of 
Sandys' conduct fails to take into account the fact that he had always supported Blue 
Streak (or any advanced successor) on solely military grounds, working as it does from 
the premise that Sandys was motivated primarily by the pursuit of spending reductions. 
It is true that Sandys had, as we have seen, protected Blue Streak from difficult 
questions; but he did so as a result of his sincerely-held belief that only something like 
Blue Streak could guarantee Britain's future as an independent nuclear power. By 
starting from the interpretation of Sandys and the 1957 White Paper that casts his 
policies as being dictated by financial considerations, and accepting that his willingness 
to depend on the nuclear deterrent was merely a way of making his cuts an acceptable 
reality, his belief system and policy preferences become lost amongst the more 
quantifiable aspects of the policy-making process. It should be clear that Sandys was 
completely committed to the idea of land-based ballistic missiles providing the most 
suitable basis for that deterrent, and accepting that Blue Streak could only be discussed 
in military terms was not really a concession if, as the letter says, he doubted there were 
any convincing reasons to cancel the programme.  
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   Whilst he was still going to defend Blue Streak as a weapon system, Sandys did make 
the financial case for its retention, using the familiar refrain of sunk costs and 
prospective expenditure; but at the same time maintaining that Blue Streak was the best 
option: 
 
Whether we go in for rockets launched from the ground, from the sea, or 
from the air, the next generation of nuclear deterrent is likely to cost 
something of the order of £500M. We have already spent £50M on Blue 
Streak and it would be a large sum of money to wind it up. First firings are 
due next year... In all the circumstances, I hope that an early decision may 
be taken to go ahead with Blue Streak at the full planned speed; for, you 
will I am sure agree, that a policy of going slow on an urgent project is 
really a very poor form of economy.
698
 
 
   By now Sandys was becoming rapidly isolated. Even the Air Ministry, for long 
second only to Sandys in their devotion to Blue Streak, had moderated its position. In 
mid-1958, probably motivated by the minor crisis over Blue Streak, Boyle had 
approached Solly Zuckerman to chair the Strategic Scientific Policy Committee to 
advise on long-term trends in aerial warfare. The nature of the investigation was slow-
paced, and meetings were spaced far apart, but their conclusions slowly pointed towards 
Blue Streak becoming expendable. In early meetings the basic belief in nuclear 
independence was upheld when the optimum strength was given as 'large enough to be 
clearly effective on its own'. However, this was mainly in order to secure further 
American co-operation, and to out-do the 'pure prestige demonstration planned by 
France'. In one meeting of December 1958 Polaris was actually said to have been 
preferable on a number of counts. It would not attract a massive attack on Britain; it did 
not require foreign bases; it would not be under dual control; and it was actually said to 
have been 'less vulnerable' than Blue Streak. On the other hand, 'severe operational and 
technical difficulties' were still believed to plague the project, and further studies were 
ordered.
699
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   Five months later, the principle of independence was confirmed, but Blue Streak was 
now afforded only qualified support. Soviet ballistic missiles were not believed to have 
been accurate enough to neutralise Blue Streak in any surprise attack, and anti-missile 
defences were similarly unsophisticated; but this situation was only temporary. Two 
May 1959 meetings then discussed 'insurance weapons' that could at first complement 
Blue Streak, but then succeed it when the land-based ballistic missiles became 
unsuitable for Britain's purposes. By narrowing down the successor weapon to 
something more flexible than Blue Streak and unlikely to attract additional attacks on 
the mainland, they admitted that it would have to be either an air-to-surface missile 
launched from advanced manned bombers or a submarine-launched system. They 
naturally backed the former as it could be shielded from surprise attack in Australian 
bases, and because Polaris still said to be ten years away from being fully controllable, 
by which point the Soviet Union would have worked out how to counter them. Polaris, 
it was said, would prove a useful supplementary weapon for 'varying the bowling', but 
because it 'had no foreseeable use except as a deterrent weapon', it lost out to an 
advanced manned bomber in the Air Ministry's self-serving conclusions despite being 
said to have possessed clear advantages in 'mobility, and possibly also in 
invulnerability'.
700
 
 
The End of Blue Streak 
 
   The study group published its interim report on 31 December recommending that Blue 
Streak should continue. The V-bombers could continue until 1965 with Blue Steel, but 
Blue Streak would prove effective until the Soviet Union developed anti-missile 
defences. It was suggested, however, that provided 'it would be acceptable for this 
country to be seen to be wholly dependent between 1965 and 1970 upon the United 
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States for the weapons used by the British contribution to the nuclear deterrent' then the 
government should look to either prolong the V-bombers' existence with Skybolt 
(although a new aircraft would be required to make this viable beyond 1970), or to 
acquire Polaris (either buying completed submarines or building them in Britain).
701
 
The study group planned to investigate Skybolt and Polaris, but Powell offered his 
'personal view' to Watkinson: 
 
[D]espite the cost involved, we should continue with the development and 
some deployment of BLUE STREAK, unless we are prepared to accept an 
entirely new concept of a 'British controlled' contribution to the nuclear 
deterrent, substituting 'British operation' of part of an American deterrent 
force for the independent British contribution to a joint Anglo-American 
effort... I think that we should have to be very sure that it would be to our 
long term advantage to do so before we abandoned the effort we have made 
during the past 12 years to build up our independent nuclear weapon 
capability.
702
 
 
   Sandys took his lead from Powell, who had moved to the Board of Trade in the New 
Year, and wrote to the Chancellor supporting the study group's conclusions. Claiming 
that he had hoped to see the matter decided by the end of 1959, Sandys argued that until 
Blue Streak was officially cancelled 'we must not fail to do all that is necessary to 
ensure that the programme proceeds efficiently', asking for further spending on test 
facilities in Australia.
703
 Two weeks later he sent another letter that said failing to do 
this would see it come into service late, and 'Therefore, unless the Defence White Paper 
contains an announcement that BLUE STREAK is to be abandoned, which I regard as 
inconceivable, and which I would, of course strongly resist, I must ask you to give the 
"all-clear"'.
704
 Hill has suggested that these pleas to the Chancellor show that Sandys 
was kept in the dark about what the study group had concluded, but the timing of this 
intervention makes this unlikely.
705
 Either way, the Chancellor demolished Sandys' case 
in his reply. He said it would be unreasonable to increase spending when the 
programme was still under review, and that new delays were hardly going to make-or-
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break the programme. Furthermore, he dealt with Sandys' concerns that it would enter 
service later than planned by reminding him that 'it is, of course, this very possibility 
that, among other things, has necessitated the current review'.
706
 
 
   The Sandys-era thinking had not yet left the Ministry of Defence, and whilst Brundrett 
was succeeded as Chief Scientific Advisor by Zuckerman, Chilver remained, and he 
could still offer Watkinson pro-Blue Streak advice. Zuckerman did not support Blue 
Streak, but Chilver submitted their 'joint views' in late-January and offered it a degree or 
support. He accepted that the Chiefs of Staff were likely to turn against Blue Streak if 
Skybolt continued to progress, and that as long as Britain did not mind being dependent 
on the United States then Blue Streak could be sacrificed. However, should Britain wish 
to maintain an independent nuclear capability, as well 'keep[ing] in the business of 
developing large rockets (not merely manufacturing copies of American rockets)', then 
Blue Streak had to continue. The missile's vulnerability was said to be irrelevant 
because there were 'no foreseeable circumstances' under which the Soviet Union would 
launch a pre-emptive attack; combining it with another weapon was too expensive; and 
making other rockets would cost the same as Blue Streak.
707
 
 
   Sandys' influence was felt elsewhere too. Hogg, now the Lord Privy Seal, another 
neutral position, but with added responsibilities for science, reported to Watkinson that 
Sandys had told him that 'he greatly hoped that our White Paper would not encourage 
speculation [about Blue Streak]'.
708
 Hogg pointed this out to Watkinson to avoid any 
cross-examination that could prove 'embarrassing', but it supports the argument that 
Sandys' approach to White Papers was highly-politicised. From springing Blue Streak 
commitments on the government in 1958, but refusing to elaborate on them, and then 
making a point of emphasising its continuation in 1959, Sandys clearly knew that the 
White Paper, in being a formal statement of government policy, was influential in 
holding it to account, and therefore liable to cause a degree of embarrassment when its 
pledges were not met. Watkinson took a similar approach, and informed the Cabinet in 
February that he had considered the possibility of not publishing a White Paper every 
year, lest it bind the government. He would do so in 1960, but in the form of a progress 
report and in 'non-controversial terms' stressing continuity. This was of 'particular 
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importance' in avoiding any firm commitment to Blue Streak, which he proposed to 
gloss over by saying things were developing, but that the government was investigating 
alternative systems alongside it.
709
 
 
   Watkinson knew that Blue Streak's future was not certain. He had asked the Chiefs of 
Staff for their views in mid-January, and he began February by asking them how many 
Polaris/Skybolt Britain would need to meet its existing nuclear commitments, crucially 
asking them to assume that Blue Streak would not enter service.
710
 The Chiefs of Staff 
said they had read the study group report and recommended Blue Streak's cancellation. 
They did not wish to see Britain abandon the development of ballistic missiles 'for 
which we may well have a requirement in the future', but the perceived vulnerability of 
Blue Streak and its comparatively lengthy preparation time meant that it could only be 
used as a 'fire-first' weapon, making it an unsuitable basis for a declared retaliatory 
policy. The Chiefs of Staff thought Skybolt was the ideal replacement, as it had the 
added benefit of extending the lives of the V-bombers 'in which a great deal of money 
has already been invested', but suggested that Polaris might prove more suitable beyond 
1970, and asked for further studies into their relative merits. The 'militarily 
unacceptable' Blue Streak was definitely out, even if an American replacement could 
not be found, and in such an eventuality Britain would just have to 'accept a gap in our 
nuclear deterrent capability'.
711
 The Ministry of Aviation had also been asked about the 
effects of cancelling Blue Streak on the aircraft industry, and they said it would be 'little 
short of disastrous'.
712
 The Ministry of Defence read between the lines of this argument 
and told Watkinson that if he could not be certain about acquiring an American 
replacement for Blue Streak 'The Minister of Aviation could say that you are taking 
great risks', and advised him not to include any what-if sections in his case against Blue 
Streak.
713
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   Blue Streak's fate was due to be sealed by the Defence Committee, and Sandys 
mounted a last-ditch attempt to save it. He said that three questions had to be answered 
before any decision was made, and his reasoning for each is worth considering at length 
as, in this moment of desperation and uncertainty, Sandys returned to the core tenets of 
his personal nuclear belief system in making his case. The first question was 'Must it be 
invulnerable?' Watkinson had taken the Chief of Staff's position that Blue Streak was 
both vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack, and that it was also 'politically unacceptable' for 
a peace-loving democracy to depend on something that could only be used to begin 
nuclear hostilities.
714
 'I entirely disagree' was Sandys' verdict, and he accused the 
Ministry of Defence and Chiefs of Staff of failing to provide any reasons for their 
position. Sandys' argument was that the 'effectiveness of the British deterrent cannot be 
considered in isolation'. He said that to 'knock out' Blue Streak the Soviet Union would 
have to hit Britain with 1000 megatons of thermonuclear explosives, which would kill a 
third of the population on the first day before condemning 'many of the remainder' to 
fallout death. Not only did this make its vulnerability an irrelevance, since nobody 
would live to benefit from its retaliatory capabilities, but he thought there was no way 
the United States would let such an act go unpunished, so the Soviet Union would 
therefore have to simultaneously launch a similar attack on them, which they were not 
capable of doing. If they were, and if they were also 'prepared to provoke punishment of 
this magnitude', Sandys witheringly suggested that a 'handful of British POLARIS 
submarines could hardly be expected to affect their decision'.
715
 
 
   If this may read like a full reversion to interdependence, he did consider independent 
action from the Soviet perspective. If they convinced themselves that the United States 
would not avenge Britain, they would still have to assure themselves that Britain would 
abandon Western Europe. This would simply not happen, as an attack on Britain 'would 
inevitably follow'. This all meant that 'Russia would not dare to make a preventative 
attack upon Britain'.
716
 As well as confirming that Sandys' valued the retention of 
unilateral capabilities for valid - if unlikely - strategic reasons, his belief in the 
inevitability of the Soviet Union turning on Britain is revealing. Previous sections 
explored his staunch anti-communism, believing confrontation to be inevitable and 
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comparing the emerging Cold War to the late-1930s. This informed his take on the 'fire-
first' controversy, which also drew upon the concept of deterrent he first used during the 
Radical Review: 
 
[If Britain] were to give the impression that we would in no circumstances 
be the first to fire a strategic nuclear weapon to repel a conventional attack, 
we would completely undermine the value of our deterrent. We would, in 
effect, be assuring the Russians that they could use their immense 
conventional superiority, without risk of nuclear retaliation. That would be 
little short of an invitation to aggression.
717
 
 
   Here Sandys furthered his previous logic. He did not consider nuclear weapons to 
belong to a different category of weapon, and he believed that in any war of vital 
national interests they would inevitably be utilised. Therefore, if Britain refused to use 
its own devastating nuclear capability first, according to Sandys' concept of deterrence - 
that it was simply a case of proving you could destroy your opponent - this ceded the 
initiative to the totalitarians, who, unburdened by feelings of embarrassment over naked 
aggression, forced Western policy to become inherently reactive.
718
 Credibility in this 
sense was as much bound up in the political will of politicians as it was the capabilities 
of any particular weapon system. Even if Polaris and Skybolt could do everything their 
supporters promised, their credibility was undermined by gifting the Soviet Union a free 
shot at destroying Britain. 
 
   His second question was 'Are other methods better?' He described Skybolt as 
'immensely complex and entirely novel', predicting that its existence on the 'utmost 
limit' of technology would make it 'very much less reliable' than Blue Streak and 
Polaris. To some extent he would go on to be proven correct about this, but it does once 
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again raise questions as to why he was placing an arbitrary limit on development. He 
also argued that Skybolt could not carry 'decoys' like Blue Streak, so it was also easier 
to defend against, and its immunity was based on an ability to keep the V-bombers 
constantly 'at three to four minutes notice' (alternative schemes, such as the Air 
Ministry's idea of keeping manned aircraft constantly airborne, were discounted as 
'extremely costly'). Polaris received similar criticism, as it shared most of Skybolt's 
apparent weaknesses. It did not have Blue Streak's range, and both its warhead and its 
counter-measure capacity were insubstantial.
719
 He conceded that although the two 
alternative systems could be said to have the greater measure of invulnerability on 
account of their mobility, he argued that this was 'more of a theoretical than an actual 
asset': 
 
In theory, it might be useful to be able to deploy strategic nuclear weapons 
in the Middle East and the Far East... But it is inconceivable that we would 
ever wage war against China, except in alliance with the United States, 
whose nuclear power in the Pacific would not be significantly increased by 
any contribution we could make. Moreover, in such a situation, it would 
hardly be safe for us to deploy our limited deterrent force so far away from 
home.
720
 
 
   This again reads like a shift towards interdependence, but the implication is that 
Britain did 'significantly increase' American nuclear power in Europe, and also that 
temporarily leaving Britain without a home-based deterrent - or the greater part of its 
offensive capabilities, as Sandys would have seen it - could attract the Soviet pre-
emptive attack, which again implies that the independent British nuclear capability was 
a functioning deterrent in itself.  
  
   The third question was 'Will it save money?' His answer was no. Sandys claimed that 
over the next ten years Blue Streak would cost £515 million, which compared 
favourably with five years of Skybolt and nine Polaris submarines to replace it costing 
£50 million. This was increased over the next fifteen years, when the Polaris costs 
would exceed £700 million, more than £150 million above the expected cost of 
maintaining Blue Streak. Sandys had showed that Blue Streak was the 'cheapest method 
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of maintaining the deterrent after 1965', but claimed it was so important that these costs 
did not necessarily have to come from the defence budget, as his hopes for Blue Streak 
as an instrument for space research meant that it could benefit from the allocation of 
normal civil expenditure.
721
 Because he had not been asked to consider Blue Streak in 
depth, Sandys had tried to save Blue Streak by reverting to his well-established beliefs 
regarding the nature of deterrence and the utility of nuclear weapons; but the decision 
was to be made in a Defence Committee meeting on 24 February, and his isolation was 
about to become complete.  
 
   The Air Ministry finally turned against Blue Streak as a military weapon in order to 
pursue their short-term desire for replacement manned bombers, but it was Macmillan's 
intervention that fundamentally undermined Blue Streak going into the crucial 
meetings.
722
 In this he framed Britain's nuclear capability as guaranteeing 'standing' and 
'influencing American policy', rather than as a genuine nuclear strike capability, 
explicitly rejecting 'aiming to provide a force capable by itself of deterring Russia'. He 
said Britain 'must maintain a viable force in being, under our ultimate control, which is 
sufficiently large to accomplish our political purposes'; but these political purposes now 
solely referred to influencing alliance strategy, rather than destroying particular targets 
of importance to Britain. Macmillan said he supported abandoning Blue Streak and 
relying on Blue Steel until 1966, when Skybolt would take the deterrent into 1970, 
before either continuing or making way for another mobile system.
723
 Macmillan's 
account of the crucial meeting reads 'General agreement reached (Duncan Sandys alone 
dissenting)', and the minutes bear this out.
724
 Watkinson had recommended cancelling 
Blue Streak, and noted an 'important consideration in favour of mobility' as being the 
'difficulty facing a democratic Government in any prospective use of static "fire-first" 
weapons'. Sandys responded by re-iterating the main points of his memorandum. 
Cancellation would fail to save money 'in the long term', and mobility brought no 
practical advantage to Britain's nuclear capability owing to the fact that the Soviet 
Union would be incapable of launching simultaneous attacks on Britain and the United 
States. On the other hand, a 'fire-first' system could still prevent the overrunning of 
                                                          
721
 Ibid. 
722
 In a remarkably blinkered proposal, the Air Ministry wanted Blue Streak cancelled but sought 'to keep 
alive the technique of building long range rockets' so Britain could maintain an independent nuclear 
capability beyond the life-span of its immediate replacement, which they hoped would be the V-bomber 
successor they craved; Ward to Watkinson: 23 February, 1960; AIR 19/813. 
723
 'Deterrent Policy: Memorandum by the Prime Minister: 24 February, 1960'; CAB 131/23, D. (60) 2. 
724
 24 February, 1960; Catterall, The Macmillan Diaries: 1957-66, p. 274. 
208 
 
Western Europe if American support failed to materialise. He said any decision had to 
'depend primarily upon financial considerations', but also on a 'technical judgment of 
the performance of the various weapons systems', which he thought ruled out Skybolt 
and maintaining the manned bombers it required. In spite of this, Sandys said he would 
not oppose abandoning Blue Streak as a weapon provided development work continued 
as part of a British space programme, and the Committee provisionally agreed to its 
cancellation.
725
 
 
   Sandys had accepted defeat, but the minutes of the meeting do little to suggest that he 
had lost faith in Blue Streak, as the arguments made against it were applicable to his 
strategic concept. The Chancellor focussed on its cost, but in general discussion it was 
suggested that a mobile deterrent would reduce 'the commitment for air defence of the 
deterrent', and have positive implications for civil defence planning.
726
 Had Sandys' 
proposals been followed over the years, there would be no air defence burden. Nor 
would civil defence have remained an issue in terms of post-thermonuclear war 
planning, as he had long believed that Britain would not survive the decisive opening 
phase. If Blue Streak were ever to be attacked, government calculations suggested that 
this opening phase would now be utterly fatal to the entire country, making any 
considerations beyond what could most effectively strike the Soviet Union a complete 
irrelevance.  
 
   Macmillan then closed by saying there was 'no more military value in a static missile', 
and that mobility 'made our deterrent more credible'.
727
 The V-bombers were mobile, 
but if they could not guarantee an ability to strike at the Soviet Union, then their 
credibility was non-existent, which was why Blue Streak had been commissioned in the 
first place, and why Sandys remained unconvinced by Skybolt's comparative 'military 
value'. The following day he asked Macmillan whether the Defence Committee had 
truly considered this, pointing out that Skybolt was only as effective as the V-bombers. 
Apart from the risk of them simply being shot out of the sky, if they could not disperse 
within a short period of warning, they were just as vulnerable as Blue Streak, and 
'incomparably' more so if pre-emptively attacked because they would not benefit from 
being stored in reinforced concrete silos. Therefore, Skybolt was 'just as much a "fire-
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first weapon" as BLUE STREAK'.
728
 This was a valid point, and one which the Air 
Ministry sought to dispel by using the same argument Sandys had used in favour of 
Blue Streak, saying 'it does not matter whether the V-bombers could or could not escape 
a Russian attack... I do not believe that the Russians could or would decide to attack us 
on the basis of such a fine but potentially suicidal calculation'.
729
 
 
   The Defence Committee officially cancelled Blue Streak on 6 April, and Sandys 
resigned himself to placing on record his belief that 'from the military point of view', 
Skybolt had 'no marked advantage' over Blue Streak.
730
 Macmillan then informed the 
Cabinet of this decision, claiming to have been left satisfied during his recent trip to 
Washington that an adequate American replacement could be acquired, and it was left to 
Watkinson to break it to the House of Commons.
731
 He did this with a short statement 
saying Blue Streak was outdated. It was vulnerable, and 'launching missiles of 
considerable range from mobile platforms' was now a possibility.
732
 Brown immediately 
began to gloat, calling it the 'most incredible chapter of obstinacy and of determination 
to go on with something long after all kinds of people everywhere were clear in their 
minds that it was wrong'. Labour had been against Blue Streak for some years, and they 
sought (with some justification) to make it into an issue of 'Ministerial and official 
incompetence and of a determination to hide it at the end of it all'.
733
 Brown wanted an 
official inquiry into the programme, but when Watkinson tried to explain things by 
referring to what Sandys had said the previous February, he was interrupted by shouts 
of 'Where is he?' and calls for his resignation.
734
 
 
   Two weeks later Brown forced a debate about holding an inquiry. His focus was 
Sandys, and whilst he said he did not wish to criticise 'the Minister of Aviation and his 
colleagues' for being proven wrong, he was concerned that they had 'persisted in an 
error of judgment, which... they persisted in long after it became apparent to almost 
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everybody that it would turn out to be a costly and abortive failure'.
735
 In response, 
Sandys attacked Brown, asking him whether he thought it had been a mistake to 
commission Blue Streak.
736
 Hansard gives the impression that Brown took exception to 
Sandys' line of questioning, and he began attacking Sandys' record as Minister of 
Defence, accusing him of bearing 'personal responsibility' for the continuation of the 
programme, and being 'guilty of persisting with a rocket which has failed to work and 
which has cost us large sums of money'. He put this down to the 'fallacy' at the heart of 
Sandys' strategic concept, his dependence on an independent nuclear capability, and 
brought up previous Labour complaints about Blue Streak as a 'fire-first' weapon: 
 
Not only did he not understand what we were arguing about here, but he did 
not understand what his own Service advisers were saying to him. He did 
not ever get to the bottom of what was worrying the Air Force. He was blind 
to all the arguments. This was why the advice reaching us did not make the 
impact on him which it made on us. He never saw the basic point of the 
advice.
737
 
 
   Sandys had obviously understood the issue. He just simply disagreed with the idea of 
it being a problem. But apart from that, Brown was right to accuse Sandys of having 
ignored other concerns which were now said to undermine Blue Streak. It was not just a 
case of it being an undesirable 'fire-first' weapon, but of paying no attention to 'the 
whole of the evidence at that time [which] was in favour of mobility and of solid fuel': 
 
The conclusion can only be, therefore, that all the information was 
available, that it was all opposed to going on with Blue Streak and that the 
Minister nevertheless persisted with Blue Streak for eighteen months... It is, 
therefore, the Minister's determination to persist with the project, against the 
weight of the evidence, which is the basic accusation which we make 
against him.
738
 
 
   Watkinson defended the government, and Jones, now on the back-benches, defended 
both Sandys and Blue Streak. Harold Wilson, the Shadow Chancellor then joined in, 
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quoting the Financial Times as saying 'Blue Streak survived as long as it did simply 
because Mr. Duncan Sandys is an extremely obstinate man'. The crux of their argument 
chimed with what Labour alleged: 'He based his defence policy on the deterrent, and he 
based the future delivery of the deterrent on Blue Streak. So long as he was Defence 
Minister he was a jealous patron of the project against all comers and, indeed, against 
all arguments'.
739
 This captures the argument of this thesis nicely, and when Sandys 
finally spoke he did not attempt to evade personal responsibility, but nevertheless 
contextualised his position:  
 
I suppose that I have had more to do with rockets - at both ends - than any 
other hon. Member. In the war-time Coalition Government I was the 
Minister responsible for defence against the German V1 and V2 weapons, 
and since 1951 I have been concerned with missiles at the Ministry of 
Supply, the Ministry of Defence and now at the Ministry of Aviation. I 
therefore readily recognise that I am accountable in a special degree for the 
decisions that have been taken.
740
 
 
   He added 'I am convinced that the decisions that we have taken were right, in the 
circumstances obtaining when they were taken, all the way through', and claimed that 
'Blue Streak has not been stopped because of any technical failure'. Had it been 
completed, he was 'confident that it would have had as fine a performance as any 
medium-range rocket made in Russia or America'.
741
 Sandys defended Blue Streak 
against the background of his original White Paper, 'an essential part' of which was 'that 
Britain should possess nuclear weapons of her own, and the means of delivering them'. 
With manned bombers becoming increasingly vulnerable to air defences, the 'only kind 
of weapon' that could overcome them, he said, was a ballistic missile.
742
 He then 
recalled his 1954 and 1958 visits to the United States, claiming 'I have, in fact, from the 
very start been consistently trying to substitute an American weapon for Blue Streak so 
as to save money'.
743
 Clark has noted this claim, suggesting that Sandys might have 
been guilty of 'retrospective rationalization to portray an image of consistency in 
Government policy in the light of the decision to scrap Blue Streak and purchase 
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Skybolt in its stead', but also writing that there was no viable substitute for Blue Streak 
on offer during this period.
744
 In viewing Blue Streak in terms of government policy, 
rather than Sandys' personal approach, Clark concludes that 'if the advice of the Chiefs 
was compelling in 1960, it should have been equally compelling much sooner', making 
the government 'guilty of political cowardice in the short term'.
745
 The Chiefs of Staff's 
reasoning was not compelling to Sandys, for reasons made clear over the course of this 
thesis. Nor would it ever have been, so he cannot be accused of trying to reconcile his 
actions to their arguments. He would happily have substituted an American weapon for 
Blue Streak; it was just that none of them were considered to be worthwhile 
substitutions owing to both political and technical shortcomings, which is why he 
insisted that he 'had no alternative but to continue with the development of Blue 
Streak'.
746
 
 
Conclusion 
 
   In his memoirs Macmillan said 'I am not now convinced that it was wise' to cancel 
Blue Streak.
747
 He believed that it would have worked perfectly had it received adequate 
backing, but his perspective was no doubt coloured by the crisis Britain was thrown into 
by the cancellation of Skybolt. This has briefly been covered in the previous section, 
and a lengthy history of the acquisition of Polaris is not merited, particularly as Sandys' 
influence on the defence policy-making process was all-but ended in July 1960 with his 
move to the Commonwealth Relations brief. However, it is worth mentioning that when 
Macmillan convinced the United States to let Britain in on the project, he went to great 
lengths to stress its operational independence. He insisted that any declaration of joint 
policy allowed for an exception 'where Her Majesty's Government may decide that the 
supreme national interests are at stake', and when he returned to Britain having secured 
this he appeared convinced of the need for an independent nuclear capability.
748
 Having 
detected a degree of scepticism in Kennedy's advisors, which he attributed to the fact 
that his government 'included hardly any of the men who had been associated with this 
country in the Second World War', he defiantly reminded the Cabinet that Britain's 
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atomic weapons programme pre-dated the United States', and provided four reasons 
why Britain had to maintain its nuclear independence:  
 
1) The Western Alliance would 'cease to be a free association' if nobody else had 
nuclear weapons. 
2) The United States could theoretically abandon Britain in the face of Soviet 
aggression. 
3) The Soviet nuclear threat, with no British counter threat, rendered conventional 
forces worthless. 
4) Giving up nuclear weapons entirely would remove Britain from disarmament talks. 
 
   He had therefore requested Polaris on account of its 'high degree of indestructibility', 
its second-strike capabilities, and its mobility. And he had got it, in spite of American 
policy-makers' worries that it 'would extent [sic] (extend) the effectiveness and 
credibility of the United Kingdom deterrent for an almost indefinite period in the 
future', which he said they opposed as it could potentially undermine their nascent plans 
for pooling Western nuclear resources under their supervision.
749
 
 
   If this had become Macmillan's position on nuclear capabilities in later life, it 
represents a remarkable reversal of his proposals that had killed Blue Streak, as well as 
a move towards what Sandys had consistently advocated. In February 1960 he had 
rejected maintaining an ability to devastate the Soviet Union in favour of having just 
enough nuclear power to command American attention. Perhaps the reluctance he had 
encountered in the Kennedy administration had convinced him that the Anglo-American 
partnership was not as strong as it had been under Eisenhower, who had a firm 
association with Britain and the Second World War (and Macmillan personally), but his 
move back towards an insurance policy of unilateral capabilities was important.
750
 He 
had told the Cabinet that Polaris' second-strike capability made it suitable, but in 
coming to regret the cancellation of Blue Streak, despite its sole use as a 'fire-first' 
weapon, it would imply that he had retrospectively come to see Sandys' interpretation of 
deterrence as having been correct. It was mentioned in the third section how during his 
own period as Minister of Defence Macmillan had accepted that 'if the Russians 
                                                          
749
 CAB 128/37, CC. (63) 2: 3 January, 1963. 
750
 'He would trust this President [to defend Britain], but what about his successors?'; Horne, Macmillan: 
Volume II, p. 440. 
214 
 
attacked (which is very unlikely) with conventional weapons only, in the first instance, 
we should be forced into the position of starting the nuclear war', so why did he fail to 
support Sandys' position at the time?  
 
   Clark has summed up Sandys' involvement with Blue Streak by describing him as a 
'vocal champion, apart from some wavering in late 1958 but a champion who, having to 
contend with a wider empire, could not afford the parochial dedication to the missile 
which was demonstrated by the Air Staff'.
751
 His 'wavering' over Thor aside, which has 
been shown to have not been a direct threat to Blue Streak, Sandys' approach to Blue 
Streak was utterly parochial. Unlike the Air Ministry, he never turned against it in 
favour of new aircraft, and the lengths he went to in supporting it have been made clear. 
Perhaps Clark's characterisation would better suit Macmillan. His strategic concept was 
originally strikingly similar to what Sandys advocated, but his 'wider empire', whether 
having to balance departmental budgets, stave off Labour Party attacks, or increase 
British influence in United States policy-making, prevented him from letting his 
Minister of Defence have it all his own way. We have seen how Sandys was forced to 
make similar compromises in major aspects of his defence review, but we have also 
seen how he refused to do so with Blue Streak. Blue Streak was, as his critics alleged, 
what his entire strategic concept depended upon. Where he could allow debates over air 
defence and aircraft carriers to go against him, he could not sacrifice Blue Streak, and if 
this meant convincing himself that solid fuels were inherently weak, that over-spending 
was 'inevitable', or that the Soviet Union would sink submarines under the polar ice 
caps, then he did so because of his parochial dedication to this particular weapon 
system.  
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Conclusions 
 
This thesis has argued that there is clear evidence that Sandys' policy preferences as a 
minister, and his actions in office, were the practical realisation of his personal nuclear 
belief system, which was itself formed out of his interpretation of his role in the fight 
against unmanned German weaponry during the Second World War. This belief system 
proved highly-influential in helping Sandys to navigate the uncertain and ambiguous 
strategic landscape in which the defence policy-making process of the 1950s and early-
1960s took place. By beginning with Sandys' belief system and taking it seriously as a 
core element determining Sandys' actions, this thesis has challenged previous scholarly 
interpretations of his actions that place an emphasis on external pressures - departmental 
thinking, political expediency, but most of all the prioritising of reductions in 
expenditure over any coherent strategic concept. In doing so, it suggests they miss a 
critical element needed to form a clear understanding of British defence policy 
throughout Sandys' period of involvement, and the central tenets of the 1957 White 
Paper in particular. 
 
   In assessing Sandys' individual belief system, and how its foundations can be found in 
his experiences of the Second World War, this thesis has posited that two beliefs stand 
out as particularly influential in determining his strategic concept. The first is an 
appreciation of the role weapons that were perceived in 1945 as 'unconventional' had to 
play in future warfare. This appreciation informed his concept of deterrence, and 
therefore his strategic concept overall. The second was a particular belief that ballistic 
missiles descended from the V-2s would inevitably form the basis of any worthwhile 
strategic strike capability. This led to him choosing to make such weapons central to the 
success of the 1957 White Paper, and therefore offers a convincing explanation as to 
why he fought so hard to ensure the success of the Blue Streak programme in the face of 
strong opposition from the Armed Forces, Cabinet colleagues, and opposing politicians.  
 
   Sandys' personal perception of the nature of the threat of unmanned weapons, was 
conceived even before the V-weapons were unleashed against Britain. His ideas led him 
to take these novel contraptions seriously even before their threat had materialised. 
Having been charged with finding practical solutions to unknown quantities, he began 
to consider the secret German projects as merely another problem to be solved, rather 
than as some new weapon of a different order. That he had to combat these new 
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developments with tried-and-tested means (anti-aircraft guns, fighter aircraft, and 
precision bombing raids) meant he was simply unable to treat the V-weapons as 
anything out of the ordinary, as might have been expected of somebody who first 
witnessed them literally falling out of the sky. This business-like approach to new 
technology became the foundation of his attitude towards nuclear weapons prior to his 
return to government. Where Sandys simply sought to balance the use of nuclear 
weapons against their potential to save lives (and time) in halting the spread of 
communism in Korea, others were horrified at his apparent willingness to move beyond 
acceptable parameters of 'normal' force utilisation. Sandys' view was based upon his 
approach to new technology as merely another step in a logical progression of 
technological development. Throughout his period of office he failed to see what 
practical differences there were between ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons when 
discussing the supposed rules of warfare.   
 
   Nuclear weapons were held to lie outside of normal strategic planning because they 
were only useful for devastating everything within any given area.
752
 But the V-2 had 
been designed specifically to attack enemy populations, and the need for a 'strategic 
bombardment' weapon had also been cited as the reason for commissioning Blue Streak. 
This was the fundamental difference between those weapons descended from the V-2 
and the manned bomber, which, whilst being more vulnerable to defensive counter-
measures, could still boast a greater level of versatility, as the Air Ministry sought to 
emphasise when Blue Streak was about to be cancelled. Sandys had rapidly 
accommodated himself to the idea of the ballistic missile coming to dominate strategic 
planning on the basis that they could not be defended against. In his view from the 
attacking perspective they promised an ability to devastate the enemy population 
without having to resort to the kind of extensive economic mobilisation needed to 
sustain the manned bomber forces used throughout the Second World War. This was 
why he reported in November 1944 that 'In future the possession of superiority in long 
distance rocket artillery may well count for nearly as much as superiority in naval or air 
power'.
753
 The logic of this position, which was later reflected in his repeated references 
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to any war of vital national interests inevitably becoming one in which nuclear weapons 
were called upon, was that nuclear weapons were sensible alternatives owing to their 
ability to force decisions at a reduced cost to the attacker.  
 
   This position was carried over into the Ministry of Supply, when he challenged the 
strategic priorities laid down by the Chiefs of Staff as part of his Radical Review policy 
documents. Rather than seeing deterrence as an individual layer of defence policy, 
which was different to, and only lead in to, the actual war, Sandys believed that the 
Soviet Union could only be deterred by Britain actually preparing to fight the Third 
World War with nuclear weaponry. In other words Sandys' beliefs led him to argue that 
the British government needed to make serious plans to obliterate Soviet national life 
before the communists could do the same to Britain. This naturally fed into his belief 
that the possession of newly-developed thermonuclear weapons, the most effective 
weapons for such a task, was a pre-requisite for any nation with serious global 
ambitions. The result of this was that he found himself advising the government to 
depend on these weapons a full year before Churchill and other leading policy-makers 
began to take the idea of developing them seriously. Furthermore, this was a decision he 
seems to have reached without agonising over the moral implications of this 'super 
bomb', as American policy-makers had, and which even Churchill made reference to 
when he announced, with an air of reluctance, to the House of Commons in March 1955 
that Britain was to manufacture its own so as not to be left behind.
754
  
 
   The British thermonuclear weapons programme was well underway by the time 
Sandys entered the Ministry of Defence in January 1957, but it was his dependence on 
his established policy preferences that saw the idea of preparing to fight the Third 
World War become the intellectual basis for the entirety of Britain's new defence 
posture. This provides the connection to the second major aspect of his belief system. 
The idea that ballistic missiles could not be defended against, first presented to the War 
Cabinet in November 1944. This became the other dominant aspect of Sandys' strategic 
concept. When he informed the government of there being no 'effective counter-
measures' to the V-2, which could out-perform all existing fighter aircraft and fixed air 
defence weapons, Sandys immediately recognised the potential value of unmanned 
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weaponry in future warfare. By pressing the British government not to allow itself to 
fall behind in the development of weapons which he believed would go on to 'count for 
nearly as much as superiority in naval or air power', Sandys was putting the descendants 
of the V-2 at the heart of his defence thinking a full decade before Britain got around to 
commissioning its own unmanned strategic bombardment weapons.
755
 
 
   Sandys returned to his November 1944 reports as Minister of Supply when charged 
with finding a solution to the strategic dilemmas of the Cold War whilst operating on a 
seemingly ever-decreasing budget. In what proved to be alarming proposals to some, 
that were described as 'revolutionary' when being politely declined by the Ministry of 
Defence, Sandys followed the logic of his wartime reports. His June and November 
memoranda advocated a long-term shift in British defence policy, that would lead to it 
becoming dependent upon the only delivery system capable of striking at the Soviet 
Union - ballistic missiles descended from the V-2s that had previously confounded his 
own defensive efforts. This had the reciprocal effect of convincing Sandys that if the 
Soviet Union were to begin the Third World War, Britain could not hope to survive the 
'decisive opening phase'. Thus the Soviets had to be discouraged from doing so by 
Britain building up of a supply of 'long-range guided rockets for use in offensive 
bombing roles'. It was the 'devastating possibilities' of these, when capped with 
thermonuclear warheads, that Sandys believed were the only convincing threat to 
expansionist Soviet policy-makers.
756
 In his second 1953 memorandum, Sandys went 
further than his previous arguments, stating that 'we have no means of defence 
whatsoever against long-range rocket attack'. In other words, he accepted that Britain 
could no longer protect its people if global war broke out. The only solution was for 
Britain to manufacture 'long-range weapons of our own, either ballistic rockets of the 
V.2. type or flying guided missiles', as manned bomber aircraft could not maintain the 
necessary amount of striking power to make the Soviet Union think twice about 
attacking Britain.
757
 
 
   Britain's own attempt at constructing a 'ballistic rockets of the V.2. type', Blue Streak, 
was commissioned in mid-1955, and when Sandys became Minister of Defence, he 
immediately attempted to realise his previous policy ideas by building British defence 
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policy around what he perceived to be Blue Streak's irresistible offensive qualities. 
Defence: Outline of Future Policy was not the revolutionary document it held itself to 
be in terms of doctrine; but, as well as taking the credit for pulling existing trends 
together for the first time, we have seen the extent to which Sandys' policy preferences 
played a decisive role in its eventual form. Powell, the co-author of the White Paper, 
gave him sole credit for placing an emphasis on the role of ballistic missiles rather than 
manned bomber aircraft, and his attempts to maintain the thrust of his favoured 
prescriptions in the face of opposition from the Air Ministry, the Admiralty, and those 
involved at Cabinet-level, can simply not be disregarded in any interpretation of the 
thought processes behind Sandys' involvement in this fundamental re-organisation of 
Britain's strategic concept.
758
  Nor can Sandys' personal involvement be underestimated 
in relation to Blue Streak. It was this personal commitment that meant the missile 
remained at the heart of British defence policy, as Groom put it, 'at least twelve to 
eighteen months after the missile had been found wanting'.
759
 
 
   In the first major declaration of his policy preferences as Minister of Defence, Sandys 
told the House of Commons in February 1957 that it was 'inconceivable' that Britain 
could be completely protected from an attack from the air. In consequence, he argued, 
this basic fact had to inform all attempts to devise sensible defence policies for Britain. 
It was also ‘'quite clear' to Sandys that this aerial bombardment, should it ever 
materialise, would come from unmanned weapons rather than manned aircraft, and that 
devising any solution to this threat in the short-to-medium term was 'absurd'. He alluded 
to his Second World War service in this debate, and informed the House of his belief 
that the future effectiveness of Britain's nuclear capabilities, and therefore the credibility 
of its deterrent, would 'depend upon the possession by us of these weapons'.
760
 
 
   From here he set about making Blue Streak indispensable. In his February 
submissions to the Cabinet and the Defence Committee he laid out his plans to replace 
manned bomber aircraft with ballistic missiles, and when preparing his drafts he did not 
appear to have paid much attention to Macmillan's suggestion that an indigenous missile 
programme was not all that essential.
761
 The first draft Sandys and Powell produced 
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claimed that ballistic missiles made it 'necessary for all previous defence planning to be 
revised', and flatly declared that 'defence has become impossible', much to the 
annoyance of the Air Ministry and the Home Office.
762
 It may have been the case that 
subsequent offerings revised the wording of these passages, but as has been 
demonstrated, Sandys did his utmost to maintain the spirit of his original policy 
statements. There was no promise of a British-built ballistic missile in the published 
White Paper, but it was still the case that the government 'frankly recognised that there 
is at present no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country 
against the consequences of an attack with nuclear weapons'.
763
 He made up for these 
concessions in the House of Commons, however, when he undermined his previously 
compromising language about unmanned weapons merely supplementing manned 
bombers by claiming 'We are unquestionably moving towards a time when fighter 
aircraft will be increasingly replaced by guided missiles and V-bombers by ballistic 
rockets'.
764
 
 
   Having re-orientated British defence policy around his strategic concept and 
preference for ballistic missiles, Sandys had to carry the policies through to completion. 
In order to deter the Soviet Union by making actual preparations for the Third World 
War, he had to ensure that Britain maintained a viable nuclear strike capability. He also 
wanted to ensure that this would be under the complete control of the British 
government. Although he explored Thor as a temporary stand-in, it has been shown that 
he was consistently unwilling to allow Thor to be used as a reason to discontinue the 
drive towards acquiring truly independent nuclear capabilities. The importance of 
Britain having full control of its nuclear delivery system was also bound up with 
Sandys' ideas of what a worthwhile nuclear delivery system looked like. It was no use 
depending on the V-bombers, even if the United States had no say in their deployment, 
as he believed they were incapable of doing any significant damage to the Soviet Union. 
Once the two mainstays of his belief system - the need to be able to devastate the Soviet 
Union, and the idea that only ballistic missiles were capable of fulfilling this task - came 
together, Sandys' time as Minister of Defence (and at the Ministry of Aviation) can only 
be properly understood by giving full consideration to the influence of his belief system, 
and thus the effect of his Second World War experiences, in determining his actions.   
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   The 'negative' aspects of allowing these policy preferences to influence decision-
making, the 'cage' referred to in the introductory section, can be seen in Sandys' 
machinations that sought to de-rail the Admiralty’s campaign in favour of Polaris whilst 
simultaneously making sure that Blue Streak was shielded from potentially hostile 
criticism and scrutiny. In making the most out of what ambiguity existed over questions 
relating to propellants, range, cost, and vulnerability, Sandys was successful enough in 
presenting Blue Streak as the only conceivable means of Britain maintaining its 
independent nuclear capabilities that it managed to survive various periods of crisis. 
That Sandys had a slightly different concept of the value of these independent 
capabilities, choosing instead to stress the utility of Blue Streak as a strategic 
bombardment weapon, rather than as a bargaining chip in influencing United States and 
NATO policy, also informed his decision-making. The fact is that had Sandys followed 
most of the arguments he made in favour of ballistic missiles, he ought to have been 
convinced by Polaris; if not straight away, then certainly by the time Blue Streak was 
becoming untenable.  
 
   The Admiralty had a strong case for Polaris being practically invulnerable, and the 
fact Sandys could only respond with the improbable notion of the Soviet Union sinking 
the submarines under the polar ice caps suggests he did have a degree of sympathy with 
their arguments. But, however unlikely it was that the Soviet Union could neutralise 
Polaris at sea, it could never be ruled out completely. This was because Polaris had a 
fundamental weakness in Sandys' mind - the submarine. That is, the manned 
component. Land-based ballistic missiles such as Blue Streak were manned at their 
base, but these bases were to be sited deep underground, secured beneath 750 tons of 
reinforced concrete. If the Soviet Union wished to counter the manned aspect of Blue 
Streak, they would have to have destroyed Britain in doing so. This made any concerns 
about vulnerability in relation to Blue Streak irrelevant to Sandys. In the event of the 
British bluff being called he believed that most people would be dead and Britain would 
no longer exist as a functioning nation state capable of waging war. This quite literally 
made Blue Streak an all-or-nothing weapon system, and therefore quite in fitting with 
Sandys' belief that there was no chance of Britain surviving any exchange of nuclear 
weapons. It is therefore, easy to see why he was unmoved by the government's concerns 
about its supposed limitations as a 'fire-first' weapon. Even if it could only be fired first, 
it would do what it was built to do, whereas provided there was even the remote chance 
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of Polaris being countered in the open water (or of Thor being destroyed on its 
airfields), these alternatives were no better than the manned bombers Blue Streak was 
meant to replace. His belief system forced him to conclude that this risk, no matter how 
small, meant such systems could not guarantee the effective delivery of British nuclear 
weapons. In consequence, they were unsuitable as the focal point of Sandys' strategic 
concept. 
 
   In perceiving Blue Streak as invulnerable (for all intents and purposes), it logically 
became the only worthwhile delivery capability for Britain in accordance with the 
policy preferences that had emerged from Sandys' belief system, which had itself been 
established during his days in the South East of England struggling to defend Britain 
from Blue Streak's predecessors, the V-1s and V-2s that Hitler had unleashed in a 
desperate attempt to force Britain out of the war. In taking all of this into account, 
Sandys' involvement in the defence policy-making process across three government 
departments represents a workable case study in demonstrating that the role of 
individual policy-makers merits greater consideration in any discussion of policy-
making that uses the idea of strategic cultures and the nuclear belief system as its 
intellectual basis. By focusing on Duncan Sandys and his personal beliefs, albeit whilst 
taking external pressures into account, we are able to expand our understanding of 
British nuclear policy through increased consideration of individual agency. 
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